Commentary

Volume Fifty-seven, Number Four, April 1974

The End of the Postwar Era

Fritz Stern

Journalism and Truth

Edward Jay Epstein

Nuclear Strategy: The New Debate

Edward N. Luttwak

Books in Review:
Elliott Abrams
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Is Isolationism Possible?

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Stalin Under Western Eyes

Lev Navrozov

Reviewing Plays

Jack Richardson

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Letters from Readers

Watergate and the Law

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Though I often find Alexander M. Bickel's essays thought-provoking, as well as precise and well-documented in their analyses, his "Watergate and the Legal Order" [January] is distressingly facile and often self-contradictory. To wit:

. . . Mr. Bickel tells us that "The checks and balances of the government, the contrivance, in the words of the 51st *Federalist*, of 'the interior structure of the government,' so that 'its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places' —this contrivance is working reasonably well." One wonders what Mr. Bickel means by "reasonably well," considering the President's massive "bugging" (which Mr. Bickel himself admits "transgressed the limits"), impoundment of funds, illegal bombing campaigns, ingenious manipulation of the income-tax system, etc. Indeed, he seems to hedge, if not contradict, his arguments in the very next sentence: "The inner structure was meant to insure accountability by trauma, accountability tending to shade into retribution." Such "accountability," I would argue, is not accountability . . . but "shock treatment."

In discussing the context of corruption in recent American history, Mr. Bickel notes that "the Vietnam war has produced no major scandal of corruption." I am not sure what a "scandal of corruption" . . . is, but I would argue that Mylai, indeed the whole "bookkeeping" system of "body counts," the dual recording system for bombing missions into Cambodia, and the newspeak which accompanied so much of the war ("free-fire zone" and "protective reaction" are perhaps the most notorious) were "scandals of corruption," not materially, but morally, legally, verbally.

A bit later, we learn that "the legal order may be said to countenance conscientious disobedience." In the interests of accuracy, and for the sake of the thousands of Americans who are in prison or exile, I suggest that Mr. Bickel qualify his statement so that the last part reads "countenance *absolute* conscientious objection." In other words, one must be an absolutist pacifist on religious or moral grounds, or else one is obligated to fight. It might be worthwhile to compare the stringency of the American law of conscientious objection with Jewish law (see Deuteronomy 20, verses 1-9, and especially the flexible verse 8, in the Soncino edition of the Pentateuch, pp. 832-33). . . .

Mr. Bickel writes: "Violence must be a monopoly of the state. In private hands, whatever its possible misuses by the state, it is always an unjust weapon." An extraordinarily absolutist, yet at the same time fuzzy, statement for a legal scholar! Note first that Mr. Bickel is speaking of violence, a term he never defines, yet which surely must mean not only killing and murder, but lesser acts of coercion and destruction as well. Thus, anything from assassination to, say, the pouring of napalm over draft files, seems to be subsumed under this term. Yet only a page earlier, Mr. Bickel states that "civil disobedience has accompanied so many of the most fruitful reform movements in America." Is Mr. Bickel willing to maintain that all these acts of "civil disobedience," from the American Revolution onward, have been nonviolent?

And as Mr. Bickel goes to one extreme—the case of Karl Armstrong and the blowing up of the University of Wisconsin Mathematics Research Center—let us take him to the other: would he argue that a Jew who in 1938 assassinated Adolf Hitler was acting "unjustly"? If so, what are his criteria for that adverb?

Finally, and in the light of recent history, perhaps the most compelling question: what if the state does more than "possibly misuse" power, but regularly and systematically uses terror? Exhibits A, B, and C are Stalin's purges, Hitler's Holocaust, and this country's systematic bombing of the people and land of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. (I do not mean to equate these three acts of terror, but wish to show the prevalence of what is more than occasional or incidental state violence.) Is there then no right to resistance and revolution? . . .

To return to civil disobedience (disobeying the system but accepting its basic premises on the

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assumption that they can be reformed): Mr. Bickel states ". . . the use of civil disobedience, not to redress grievances on the assumption of the continued operation of the system and by plausible appeal to its own principles, but against it, ought not to be tolerated." But what if the premises of civil *obedience* . . . are wrong? What if one can "redress grievances" only by replacing either the system or those who administer it, as in the case of Locke's monarch who breaks his contract (cited by Mr. Bickel himself)? And following Mr. Bickel's argument further (with the help of Max Weber), if violence is [Mr. Bickel writes "must be"] a monopoly of the state, how can the state be effectively challenged without violence in return? (To say this is of course not to condone all types or degrees or duration of violence.) For example, can Mr. Bickel cite a single anti-colonialist fight which has not involved violence?

Mr. Bickel comes up with the rather antiquated *(pace* Thomas Hobbes) argument that "disobedience is attended by the overhanging threat of anarchy," and cites the examples of our universities in the 60's. . . . I wish Mr. Bickel, or anyone else who uses this argument, would document how many of the several thousand American colleges and junior colleges in the 60's, not to mention now, were/are in "anarchy," whatever that means. And has it ever occurred to Mr. Bickel that, given both the nature of the campuses in the 60's (the overcrowding, the long, sometimes demagogic, reaction to the McCarthy and Eisenhower years of passivity) and the political and moral turmoil this country was undergoing, there might have been reasons for a good deal of the discontent?

I am a little confused, to say the least, by what Watergate is supposed to be the culmination of. Near the end of the article we read of Watergate as the product of a strong Presidency produced by an ongoing "populist fixation" with that office (though when and how all this began is never really analyzed). But Mr. Bickel also says that Watergate is seen as the culmination of the "assaultive politics" of radicals from white Southerners in the 50's to leaders of the civil-rights movement to middle-class anti-war people in the 60's. . . . And there is scarcely mention of the contradictory background and checkered (forgive the pun) career of Mr. Nixon, as so interestingly analyzed by Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab in "An Appointment with Watergate" (COMMENTARY, September 1973).

DAVID M. SZONYI
West Berlin, Germany

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Alexander M. Bickel makes, unmakes ("blurs" is his own word), and then remakes a distinction between conscientious objection and civil disobedience. Now things distinguished can certainly admit (except to an intellectual zealot) of degrees and overlappings, and it would be abstractly possible for conscientious objectors, politicized and acting in concert, to be "assimilated to the ranks of civil disobedients." But Mr. Bickel is simply wrong in saying that conscientious objection is a "withdrawal" . . . while civil disobedience is "ineluctably an attempt to coerce the legal order."

To think, in the privacy of one's study, that killing is wrong might be a condition of withdrawal. But it does not object to anything and it is not conscientious. The classical conscientious objector, however, who refuses to fight and accepts imprisonment—whether he acts alone or in concert with others—is not withdrawing and he is challenging the legal order, at least part of it.

Mr. Bickel defines civil disobedience as "the act of disobeying formally binding general law on grounds of moral or political principle without challenging the validity of the law; or the incidental disobedience of general law which is itself neither challenged as invalid nor disapproved of in the course of agitating for change in public policies, actions, or social conditions which are regarded as bad on grounds of moral or political principle—all in circumstances where the legal order makes no allowance for the disobedience." Here we have a superfine distinction between two presumed kinds of civil disobedience which entirely ignores the specific defiance of law that has usually been part of such disobedience. Such disobedience, in fact, has "challenged the validity" of laws on the grounds that they were inconsistent with a larger system of laws that do or ought to prevail. The civil disobe-

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

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dient (in contrast to the revolutionary) operates with the hope that bad laws can be modified by appeals to corrective procedures that obtain under the system of laws. He accepts justice and punishment under that system of laws, and to say that the disobedient "coerces" the legal order more invidiously than, say, peaceful demonstrators, petitioners, and lobbyists is itself a moot moral judgment.

How our sensibilities vary with respect to perceived coercions! Mr. Bickel writes: "Much of the disobedience of the late 60's was aimed not at the government of the day, but the system, and it opposed the system, not as flawed and perfectible, but as evil and abominable. The rhetoric was loud and it was reckless and vicious. It abandoned all pretense of allegiance, it acknowledged no restraint and no bounds." But rhetoric, by definition, acknowledges the bounds of language, and a defendant shouting in a courtroom is not the same as a revolutionary bombing the courthouse. . . .

MORRIS GROSSMAN
Fairfield University
Fairfield, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Not unexpectedly, Alexander M. Bickel has made more sense of the Watergate mess than anyone else. I've learned a great deal from his article.

One minor cavil. Mr. Bickel holds that civil disobedience is "ineluctably" coercive "in its ultimate intent." Not necessarily so. It comes in at least two kinds: 1) Suasive: a defiance of law without an attempt to prevent others from obeying it. However illegal, this expression of opposition to a law or policy is intended to persuade the government and community to change the law or policy in question. 2) Coercive: this can be and often is but a more forceful attempt to persuade, by preventing others coercively, at least in selected instances, from obeying the law or doing lawful things. Burning draft files or sitting-in has this effect. However, unless concerted efforts bordering on revolution are made, coercive civil disobedience too is mostly an attempt to persuade—by illegal means—the majority and the government to give in. The coercion is used demonstratively to impress more than to compel.

Where opposition can be legally expressed, either kind of civil disobedience is rarely justified morally (both are always illegal). Coercive civil disobedience, since it attempts something between persuading and compelling people to resist the majority will, is very rarely justifiable. Still, although coercive in its means and direct aims, it need not be coercive in its ultimate intent. Only in revolution does the coercive altogether dominate the suasive element. The borderline can be blurred, of course, and often is, but the distinction remains worth making nonetheless. (I regret that in my *Political Violence & Civil Disobedience* I was not as clear on coercive civil disobedience as I now wish I had been.)

ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

First, I owe an apology to Alexander M. Bickel. . . . I have been inclined to class him with those who attempted to justify Watergate and political "dirty tricks" on the basis of ostensible lawlessness on the part of civil-rights and anti-war activists during the 60's. In "Watergate and the Legal Order," for example, he states that "much of what happened to the legal and social order in the fifteen years before Watergate was prologue." . . . But he then gives us the perspective for interpreting that remark when he makes the further point that "In our federation there are laws within laws and laws above laws," that defiance of authority and disorder "is often invited by the many-tiered process of law formation that is characteristic of our system."

Mr. Bickel stops, however, a tier short of the level achieved by modern jurisprudence when he faults Daniel Ellsberg for "coercive acts of conscience" which "should require a much higher moral threshold" than that involved in the release of the Pentagon Papers. At the same time Mr. Bickel gives us an example of adequate moral thresholds, the discovery ". . . of plans to herd people into concentration camps or gas them, or evidence of treason."

Ellsberg has written that his early study of the Nuremberg documents gave him a good idea of what the documentary record of decision-making in an aggressive war looks like—"it looks like the Pentagon Papers." In accepting the Quincy Wright Award for Service to the Rule of Law (presented

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by the Lawyers' Committee on American Policy toward Vietnam, of which I am a vice chairman), he said that it was the realization of the extent to which the Papers duplicated the Nuremberg trial record that weighed most heavily in his decision to make the Papers public.

A study of the Pentagon Papers in the Gravel and in the official (Government Printing Office) editions sustains Ellsberg's judgment in this respect. The New York *Times* (Quadrangle, Bantam Books) edition, on the other hand, would seem to have been edited to avoid this imputation; it is widely regarded as demonstrating nothing more than the innocuous proposition that politicians lie.

The very tribunal that adjudged genocide to be a crime also judged the waging of aggressive war, the murder of hostages, and the opening of dikes to be crimes of war—the last a crime against humanity comparable in its degree of military and political turpitude to the gas chambers. On this count the Papers report the following deliberations at the highest levels of our government:

> . . . Destruction of locks and dams, however—if handled right—might (perhaps after the next pause) offer promise. It should be studied. Such destruction does not kill or drown people. By shallow flooding the rice, it leads after a time to widespread starvation (more than a million?) unless food is provided—which we could offer to do at the conference table (Gravel, IV:43; Official, Book 6, Vol. II, p. 36).

Ellsberg's conduct, then, must be deemed to have achieved the standard which Mr. Bickel would approve had he studied the same record that Ellsberg studied and were he to accept the Law of Nations (which, at Nuremberg, this nation called a "generally superior system"), by appeal to which our laws relating to warmaking and selective service may be called into question, as were, indeed, the laws of the Third Reich. This is specifically what William Sloan Coffin and Dr. Spock sought to do; it is precisely what the government sought to avoid when it took a dismissal of that case after the First Circuit Court of Appeals had cleansed the record of other error.

While many peace activists may not have pursued the rationale for their conduct this far, the defiance and disorder which led up to, and followed upon, and emulated the Spock-Coffin actions and the Ellsberg disclosures—all of which Mr. Bickel might and ought to find justified in a many-tiered system that includes the Law of Nations—do not fall within the definitions of civil disobedience and acts of conscience. Rather, what was sought in these various activities was the vindication of law, of the entire structure of law. Watergate and the acts and conduct associated with that term show a totalitarian contempt for law, of which the preceding eighteen-year history of our involvement in Vietnam was indeed a prologue.

MALCOLM MONROE
White Plains, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The "morality of mind" to which Alexander M. Bickel calls us; his respect for "diffusion of power, pragmatism, the relativism of values, gradualism, institutionalism, process, procedure, legality, technicalities"; and his fear that morality, these days, "threatens to engulf us"—these are admirable and civilized qualities. But in respect to Watergate, stress on these qualities alone may generate an opposite moral danger.

Characteristically, the liberal imagination exhibits two tendencies. The first is a rather conservative respect for personal rights, due process, established procedures. In this sense, the liberal imagination is tolerant of ambiguity, irony, complexity, and is opposed to simple moralism, whether of the Left or of the Right. The second tendency of the liberal imagination is respect for the moral claims which yet-unachieved justice makes upon the status quo. In this sense, the liberal imagination restlessly seeks a newer, better world.

It is a paradox of American life that many who are conservative in philosophy and temperament share the first of these two defining qualities of liberalism; further, in contrast to the shallow and unprincipled "conservatism" of many of their fellow citizens, they gain a reputation as "liberal."

It is a second paradox that many who are anti-liberal, but of the Left (whose vision derives, for example, from various forms of utopianism, from Rousseau, or from Marx), share the second of these two lib-

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eral tendencies. Most of those on the Left, indeed, feel torn between these two tendencies of liberalism. At times, they feel like "conservative liberals"; at times, they feel like "radical liberals."

Highly ideological and tough-minded men of the Right are sometimes intelligent enough to know how to exploit this split in the liberal temper; and, consequently, how to divide the Left. Let me propose as types two Nixon men who have not been linked to the Watergate scandals, Patrick Buchanan and William Safire. Such men knew, indeed, how to catch "the liberals bathing," and how to "walk off with their clothes."

In 1971-72, the approach of such men was not really "Gaullist" or even "plebiscitary." Theirs was not truly a form of "populism," nor was it their intention to hold a "plebiscite." Until well into the spring of 1972, indeed, they expected a close election. Only the nomination of George McGovern allowed them to imagine "a new majority," an overwhelming "mandate." They were able to demonstrate on a Presidential level that the candidate of the Left had lost the Left's traditional base in "the people." One of the instruments of their success was their ability to split quite liberal persons (Irving Kristol, Sidney Hook, and others), faithful to the first tendency of liberalism, from those who felt the pull of the second tendency, and who stayed with the Democrats either because or in spite of McGovern.

The exultation of such Nixon men after the election of 1972—Buchanan's little volume, *The New Majority,* written over Christmas 1972, is now that era's classic expression—no doubt contributed to a moment of *hubris,* upon which the expected retribution of the Fates fell with uncommon speed and fury.

Meanwhile, others in the Nixon entourage, and Nixon himself, have long revealed themselves as men of resentment and punitive instinct. It was not populism, nor moralism, nor plebiscitary ideology that ruled their spirits. The helplessness of their enemies whetted their appetite for "revenge," a stupid emotion to indulge in politics. One recalls Nixon saying: "When you've got them, that's the time to plunge the knife and twist it slowly."

There are times when the good name of pragmatism and even the

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"morality of process," which Mr. Bickel commends, can be put to uses as immoral as the moral righteousness and the superficial populism which he deplores. The Nixon men were capable of using both sets of instruments, whichever promised power. They prided themselves both on evangelical moralism and on tough-minded pragmatism. In using Watergate as a club to strike at the moralistic excesses of the Left, then, Mr. Bickel is accurate enough on the level of politics; the excesses of the Left did remove the political check on Nixon. But he is not quite on target at the level of moral and political philosophy. His pragmatism, alone, is also dangerous.

There are inherent limitations to "the politics of the computing principle"; and Mr. Bickel gives insufficient purchase to the criticism on which the second tendency of the liberal imagination will legitimately insist.

MICHAEL NOVAK

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Alexander M. Bickel is of the opinion that Daniel Ellsberg's decision to release the Pentagon Papers did not qualify as a justifiable act of civil disobedience because the ethical issues in question failed to attain a high enough moral threshold. Mr. Bickel writes: "Certainly the Vietnam war raised moral issues. But the secrecy of the Pentagon Papers did not raise the same ones, by any means, even though the mendacity of government is a serious matter. And it was self-deception to think that release of the Papers would solve the moral problem of the war."

I hardly think Daniel Ellsberg believed his actions would answer all the moral questions raised by the Vietnam war. It seems clear, however, that he felt the release of the Papers would focus needed public attention on the very issue, mendacity of government, which Mr. Bickel refers to as "a serious matter," but evidently not a serious moral matter. Given Mr. Bickel's penchant for moral thresholds, it might be helpful if he would inform us why the sustained policy of three administrations to present the American people with fabricated involvement in Vietnam fails to arouse his personal standards for ethical behavior.

This attitude is especially disturbing in light of Mr. Bickel's judgment that Ellsberg's actions would have been justified had the Papers revealed evidence of treason. By virtue of what moral principle does a long history of purposive governmental decisions to hide and distort damaging political facts . . . pale in moral significance when compared with individual and collective acts of treason?

Mr. Bickel may be right in saying that "an insufficiently differentiated exaltation of wrongs to the same moral level is quite the same as, and no less dangerous than, moral blindness." The Pentagon Papers, like the Vietnam war, raised numerous moral questions. But recognition of complicated and differentiated moral contingencies does not free one from the obligation to sort through the tangle and tease out those issues most worthy of special consideration. It is not clear that Daniel Ellsberg failed to do this. It is possible that Mr. Bickel may have.

JAY WISSOT

Champaign, Illinois

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL writes:

Let me deal first with some misunderstandings and misreadings—my fault, no doubt, but perhaps not in every instance—and with themes and arguments only remotely, if at all, related to the limited points I tried to make.

The contrivance of checks and balances is working reasonably well, I wrote and readily repeat, to halt further abuses of power, to fix responsibility for past ones, and to visit retribution. Like David M. Szonyi—and I don't see why he protests—I also said that this is not good enough, and proceeded to inquire why the legal order did not operate to prevent the abuses.

What I meant by "corruption," which like "violence" is a word much played upon in the last decade, was plain in context. I meant theft. I don't like body counts either, but it must be possible, without incurring moral culpability, to try to say something about theft and not necessarily be required at the same time to discuss body counts, free-fire zones, and the like as well. The term violence does cover all the acts Mr. Szonyi mentions, and some civil disobedience has in the past been attended by violence. I think that is deplorable. And that's what I wrote. All I wrote was grounded in the assumptions and the realities of the American system and the American society, so that the Wisconsin Mathematics Research Center is clearly distinguishable from Adolf Hitler, as incidentally in my judgment are Stalin's purges and Hitler's Holocaust from the Vietnam war. If one wishes to replace a system of government entirely, tear it down, and erect something different, one must, I suppose, make a revolution, and as they say, omelets are not cooked without breaking some eggs. But it is ridiculous to expect the system one proposes to tear down to grant one a right to do so, or in any way to tolerate the effort once it becomes serious. I was writing about civil disobedience, not revolution, and trying to discern the limits within which, I believe, our system ought to tolerate it. One of those limits is described—from the point of view of the system itself, which was the point of view of my article—by the difference between the objectives of civil disobedients and of revolutionaries.

My drawing and then crossing and recrossing of the boundary between conscientious objection and civil disobedience gives trouble to Morris Grossman and Ernest van den Haag. Certainly the conscientious objector as much as the civil disobedient violates the law, and at least in that sense challenges it. But the difference between them is shown with great lucidity by Mr. van den Haag in the book to which he makes reference: "Conscientious objectors demand exemption. . . . They disobey the law only if the privilege they seek is not granted. . . . In contrast, civil disobedience always demands not a special dispensation from, but a general change of, laws or policies, e.g., not exemption from, but abolition of the draft." In this sense, because it brings pressure to bear on the legal and political order from without, by illegal means, civil disobedience seems to me always coercive as contrasted with conscientious objection, regardless of the means employed. But if the means are civil, and within other limits, I consider civil disobedience justifiable in more instances than would Mr. van den Haag.

Mr. Grossman mistakes my definition, which Malcolm Monroe understands and would extend. I offered it after having drawn distinctions between civil disobedience and all manner of methods of self-help that are available for challenging laws by appeal to the institutions of law themselves.

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

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ing, but the one is sometimes the prelude to the other, and rhetoric, in any event, if sustained and apparently serious, gives us to understand the intentions and objectives of the speaker. Alluding to Hitler, as we apparently cannot avoid doing, *Mein Kampf* was given an insufficiently attentive reading in many quarters before the bombs began to fall.

Mr. Grossman is unimpressed by rhetoric, and among Mr. Szonyi's numerous complaints is that I have fallen for an antiquated concern over the danger of anarchy. Well, the antiquity of the concern does not put me off, and the anarchy of many a campus in recent years is for me a vivid memory. Reasons for discontent there were and there are, and Mr. Szonyi may deprecate my attachment to institutionalism, to gradualism, to process, and so to order as most often itself the highest moral value, but it is no answer to tell me that demonstrators and rioters are impelled to their actions by discontents which we sometimes all share—not that Mr. Szonyi's list is persuasive in each of its entries.

This brings us really to Michael Novak. I agree with him and with Gilbert and Sullivan that every little child born into this world alive is either a little liberal or a little conservative, and I agree also that later on a bit of cross-breeding and some confusion of species take place. I have shared and do share the tendency of the liberal imagination to respect the moral claims of justice against the status quo. All in all, however, Mr. Novak is right to suggest that I insist more strongly, even passionately, quite as if I were talking about justice, on a politics of the computing principle. It seems to me to make everything else possible. Without it, in the stark universe of imperatives, in the politics of ideal promises and inevitable betrayals, justice is not merely imperfect, as under the computing principle, but soon becomes injustice. Simple pragmatism is another matter, and it can operate either within or without the morality of process. I make no plea for just pragmatism, godless pragmatism, as one might say. It was process that the Nixon men abandoned, I think, as had the Left and much of liberalism. The roots of Watergate, I don't doubt, are many. I did not set out to name and classify them all, and I have no quarrel on this score with Mr. Novak, and none I care to pursue with Mr. Szonyi.

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I am thus left with Daniel Ellsberg and the judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal. The mendacity of government is a many-splendored thing, and there is, I daresay, no one who would not consider it righteous in some circumstances. Mr. Ellsberg disclosed a history of it in order to further a political objective, not with any conceivable expectation of preventing some impending moral outrage or of causing a past one to be punished. That is why I set aside, say, evidence of plans to herd people into concentration camps. Mendacity as such cannot in my judgment be enough to support the breach of the obligation that rested on Mr. Ellsberg. Evidence of treason seems to me quite different because the ultimate obligation does not run personally to a superior officer, but to the government and its constitution—a point some of Mr. Nixon's men apparently failed to take.

As for Nuremberg—would that it were so simple. I really do not see that we waged aggressive war in Vietnam in the Nuremberg sense, much as I hated that war. The means we used, which I equally hated and often protested against, do not seem to me so different from those we and the British used in World War II.

World Politics

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I share many of Eugene V. Rostow's internationalist conclusions without necessarily agreeing with the premises from which he starts ["America, Europe, and the Middle East," February]. And sometimes when I agree with the premise, I do not agree with the evidence on which Mr. Rostow bases it. I think that for reasons of ideology, political organization, the erosion of regime legitimacy, the quarrel with China, and economic rigidities, the Soviet Union is potentially capable of pursuing policies, including the use or threat of force, that could prove extremely damaging to other nations. This is one of the reasons why I have always regarded the position on the defense budget of the Democratic majority in the Senate as so foolhardy that I have compared it to playing Russian roulette. On the other hand, the Russian posture in the current Middle Eastern crisis appears fully consistent with Brezhnev's policy of détente. Although it is possible that the Russians supplied the Egyptians with the advanced weaponry that produced the attack to break the stalemate, this policy would only parallel the policy they followed in Vietnam: a resort to third-party force designed to produce a settlement. Russian policies subsequent to the attack with respect to both Egypt and Syria have pointed toward such an end. One may deplore such policies, if I have correctly described them, as both clumsy and risky without failing to note that the aims of the policy are distinctly limited and perhaps even constructive from a wider point of view.

An assertion that Brezhnev is currently committed to a policy of détente is not inconsistent with Soviet policies that would push the U.S. out of Europe and that would Finlandize that important peninsular area. On the other hand, if we are honest, we will recognize that many of us would have no objection to policies that

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broke up the Warsaw Treaty Organization and that produced democratization within the nations of that bloc—at least if these policies could be pursued without substantial risk. And such policies could be consistent with détente. Quite apart from abstractly ideological impulses, institutional requirements push both the Soviet Union and the United States in this direction: vigorous processes of democratization throughout the world would erode the legitimacy of the Soviet regime to the point of instability, and our own democratic values would probably collapse in a world that had become authoritarian. A contest is going on, and how it proceeds depends upon how we formulate and pursue our policies.

There is a sense in which an isolationist policy for the U.S. might work. Despite the garbage being peddled by the Club of Rome, we have access to virtually unlimited resources. Indeed, the rest of the world is probably more dependent upon us than we are upon it, for it appears unlikely that hydroponic farming can be adapted economically in the intermediate future to the production of grains and hence of meats. Resources and ecology are economic problems far more than they are even technological problems. If crises arise for us, it will be because we have failed to foresee and provide for them. Isolation would be costly, although not so costly as some suspect and not inconsistent with a policy of long-term growth. If necessary, we could provide for our military security by a concentration of resources in that area. However, such policies would work at high cost in terms of our self-assurance, our faith in our democratic values, and our domestic harmony. Moreover, there is little doubt that the external world would be more hostile and that the incidence of possible threat would rise.

I agree with Mr. Rostow that the alternative is international cooperation. However, I do not agree that the world is more bipolar than ever. And it is because it is not that we have more to work with in pursuing cooperative policies. The nations of Eastern Europe do not desire the Finlandization of Western Europe, for that would decrease their autonomy, which they do value. The large Italian Communist party, and other smaller ones as well, share this perspective. Yet a bipolar policy would make it more difficult for these nations and agencies to provide us with subtle assistance and to resist Soviet demands. Even though it remains true that strategic nuclear power is essentially bipolar and that Europe still requires an American nuclear guarantee and conventional presence, the forces that are muting bipolarity can be of great assistance in making effective American policies that foster democratic values.

A greater problem is that just as we misused the United Nations in the late 40's to foster immediate American policies, we are misusing the rhetoric of internationalism—and I exculpate Mr. Rostow from this—to foster immediate American security policies. The Year of Europe was designed to aid current American policies on money and trade. Our talk about a common oil policy is geared to the immediate needs of American policy. We badger the Japanese, whose vulnerability is extreme . . . in an attempt to produce support for us on Middle Eastern policy that is neither necessary nor even extremely helpful. Furthermore, a combined Western stance on oil might have threatened the stability of the Saudi regime—certainly not a result that either the U.S. or Israel should have desired. Indeed, there is no sign that the United States is capable of recognizing an area where international cooperation may be required until there is a crisis of policy.

The notion of bipolarity may have played a positive role in bringing about the current more relaxed international posture despite the animadversions of revisionist historians. However, it did emphasize the coordination of international policies along a single line of cleavage: that between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Even during the height of the cold war bipolarity was sometimes pushed to counterproductive limits, as in the attempt to bring Egypt within CENTO and in the setting up of SEATO. Coherence was purchased at the price of adaptability. And unfortunately for American policy, the external requirements of that policy were often inconsistent with the internal aspirations of élites in developing countries.

If Europe should decide to go it alone with a genuine nuclear force and an adequate conventional force, I see no reason why the U.S. should oppose or deplore such a

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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development. On the contrary, useful assistance would be more likely to maintain those elements of common endeavor that are generally important. Our bases in Japan probably could not be used in defense of South Korea in the future but do prejudice our alliance with Japan.

The alliances with Europe and Japan are important, given the vulnerabilities of both Western Europe and Japan. However, it is urgent that we disentangle security policy from those other aspects of statesmanship that are required for the direction of international strategy. We had a genuine interest in disentangling Japan from the Middle Eastern question. On the other hand, we have a joint interest with the Japanese and Europeans and also with the oil-producing states in coordinating an energy policy. This should be accomplished in a manner that takes into account some of the important interests of the oil-producing states. And it should do so with their cooperation, if they are willing. We should plan the development of alternative energy sources while at the same time negotiating the extent to which they will be developed and used. We should bargain for an assurance of supplies and of reasonable pricing policies in return for assisting the oil-producing nations to develop other sources of productivity to advance their development after their oil is used up.

For years underdeveloped countries dependent upon single types of raw-material exports have been complaining that their political planning and economic development are subject to the vagaries of a world market that overwhelms the local economies. We have not responded to these needs. Perhaps we will understand these complaints better now. The policies suggested for oil should be extended to the entire realm of resources, including those in the ocean.

Moreover, the speculation that the oil-producing states may buy up American industries, although probably somewhat far-fetched, should perhaps make us more receptive to the hostility of some countries to foreign capital that dominates their economies. In developing new sources of raw materials, we should plan to do this on a capital-liquidating basis that fosters locally-controlled development while obtaining assurances of supplies and pricing in return. These

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policies should not be linked to the security axis lest they create unnecessary suspicion and resistance. The Soviet Union and China should be invited to participate.

Policies of this suggested kind might do much to diminish some of the extremes of nationalism and some of those political convulsions that appear dangerous to the U.S. I am not projecting a world of harmony, for there will be important conflicting interests and some issues that may have to be hammered out in very hard bargaining. But I am suggesting that this mode of procedure has much to recommend it and that it may be more supportive of genuine American interests than the linking of oil and resources policies to the security axis.

I agree with Mr. Rostow that it may be possible at last to attempt an agreement on settling the Middle Eastern question. I think that we will require the cooperation of the Soviet Union in doing so, and I believe that it will be important to conduct the main negotiations privately. I do not believe the negotiations can succeed, and they may not do so in any event, unless we give serious attention to the legitimate demands of both sides.

The interest of Israel is relatively simple, although the instruments to sustain that interest are subject to debate. Israel is interested in surviving as Israel. No settlement that threatens this objective can or should be forced upon the Israelis. The Arab states demand the restoration of the territories seized by Israel in the 1967 war. This demand is legitimate. The world cannot recognize the seizure of territory by force. On the other hand, the Israelis would be foolhardy to give up any substantial amount of this territory in the absence of a settlement that provides reasonable minimal guarantees for their security. If the 1973 war helped unfreeze the situation, it also demonstrated that an Arab first strike can be extremely costly to Israel and that it might be deadly in the future if launched from the pre-1967 borders. In addition, the Arab states have some complex interests in the Old City of Jerusalem and in the future of the Palestinian refugees.

How can we reconcile these legitimate interests? We cannot simply go back to the 1948 boundaries. There has been too long a history of Arab hostility toward Israel. Indeed, to suggest such a retreat by Israel would sustain both the Arab and the Israeli hawks. On the other hand, the idea that a settlement can avoid a return of these territories is also delusory. This is Israel's dilemma. How can a state that is scarcely fifteen miles wide between the border with Gaza and the border with Jordan survive in a sea of hostility? Israel could scarcely place any credence in a United Nations guarantee; the voting history of that organization in the last decade has shattered any belief in its neutrality on this issue. Israel will scarcely forget that the Johnson administration did not honor the Dulles guarantee with respect to the Straits of Tiran. And this was even before the age of Fulbright.

The following terms outline a settlement that might be acceptable, although perhaps it should be imposed in stages. All of Gaza and Sinai would be returned to Egyptian civil rule. The area would be completely demilitarized except for joint Israeli/Egyptian military patrols of designated size and scope. The Golan Heights would be returned to Syrian civilian control. It would be demilitarized except for specified Israeli/Syrian units. Because it dominates northern Israel, Israeli military elements would remain atop the Heights and at the base on the Syrian side. Syrian military elements would be stationed on the Israeli side of Lake Galilee. All of the territory taken from Jordan except the Old City of Jerusalem will be returned to some form of Jordanian/Palestinian civilian rule. The former Jordanian territory that Israel returns will be demilitarized except for joint Israeli/Jordanian military patrols. The Old City of Jerusalem will remain united with modern Jerusalem for municipal purposes. It will be Jordanian/Palestinian, however, for national purposes. It will be demilitarized except for small Israeli/Jordanian military units. The Muslim mosques with the exception of the Western Wall itself will be put in the custody of the Saudi-Arabian king. The Western Wall, cemeteries, and synagogues will be placed under the Israeli religious ministry. Christian churches will be placed in the custody of a Christian council headed by the Pope. Israel shall be assured access through the Suez Canal and the Tiran Straits. Jordan shall be assured access through Jaffa. The entire agreement shall be sealed by a peace settlement reached by all parties in council. Remilitarization of the demilitarized territories or obstruction of assured access shall constitute a *casus belli*.

In addition to the peace settlement, new political institutions shall be established in the area. The territory on which the Israeli and Syrian troops are stationed shall be made into a confederation. The territory on which the Jordanian and Israeli troops are stationed shall be made into a confederation. The territory on which Egyptian and Israeli troops are jointly stationed shall be made into a confederation. In addition, there shall be a supra-confederation of all these states and also of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. . . .

One additional federation shall be established unless implementation of this last proposal would interfere with implementation of the previous proposals. An additional federation excluding Israel but including Kuwait, the Trucial States, and Yemen shall be established, the purpose of which shall be to use the oil wealth of the region for the benefit of all the associated states.

The peace settlement will take account of the interests of the Palestinian refugees. Repatriation, where desired, will be fostered provided its scope does not threaten the political integrity of the Israeli state. Financial indemnities shall be paid to Palestinian refugees, but these shall be balanced against indemnities to Jewish refugees from Arab and Muslim states.

Although the settlement does not fully meet the claims of the states that are party to the conflict, it meets them to the maximum extent that is possible without frustrating even more basic claims. It is consistent with the national integrity of Israel. Additional concessions to Arab claims either would be inconsistent with the survival of Israel or would place that survival at Arab mercy—a circumstance no sovereign state can be expected voluntarily to accept. Therefore the response of the Arab states to such a proposal will test the seriousness of their desire to make peace.

MORTON A. KAPLAN
Center for Policy Study
The University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

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EUGENE V. ROSTOW writes:

I find it difficult to parse Morton A. Kaplan's letter. He writes that he agrees with many of my conclusions (which he labels "internationalist") without necessarily agreeing with the premises from which I start, and sometimes, he says, with the premises, but not with the evidence on which I base them. But his letter gives little concreteness to these categories, except for the influence of nuclear weapons on the structure of world politics. It remains true, Mr. Kaplan writes, that strategic nuclear power is essentially bipolar, and that Europe (and presumably other areas protected by American nuclear power) requires the presence of American conventional forces to make the American nuclear guarantee credible—and to avoid the necessity, during crises, of considering the use of nuclear weapons. But he adds, inexplicably, that the world is not becoming more bipolar than ever, as if political and economic policies could be divorced for long from relations of security.

Clearly, Mr. Kaplan's heart is with a policy of old-fashioned isolation, backed by enormous military budgets, although he says that a policy of "Fortress America" would have high costs. It might be difficult for us, he concedes, to remain a democracy if Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and other areas came under Soviet control. If we did pursue an isolationist policy, he says, the external world would be more hostile and more threatening. In the end, he does not quite opt for a return to isolation, although it is hard for this reader to be sure.

I thought I had made my own answer to these questions clear. The foreign policy I advocate is not "internationalist," whatever that word may mean, but national—a policy of protecting the basic interest of the United States in its own security and prosperity. In that perspective, the first national interest of the United States is to achieve and maintain a balance of world power, on the basis of which we could hope to deter Soviet imperialism, and, at some point, to persuade the Soviet Union to accept and respect the rules of the charter governing the international use of force.

For me, this must be the essential meaning of the word détente, a political condition which the American government and its allies have sought to achieve since 1943, at least. It is obvious that Mr. Kaplan does not agree, although he offers no alternative definition of détente. He says that Soviet policy in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia is "fully consistent" with Brezhnev's policy of détente, and represents only a "distinctly limited" and "perhaps even constructive" use of force "to produce a settlement."

The Declaration of Basic Principles to Govern the Relations of the United States and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, provides, on the contrary, that in conducting their relations the two governments will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence. To fulfill that principle, they promise to work together to achieve peaceful solutions for situations of tension in many parts of the world, to exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and to negotiate and settle all differences by peaceful means. Whatever Brezhnev thought these words meant, it is clear that Nixon believed they meant, *inter alia,* that both countries would support diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace agreement in the Middle East pursuant to Security Council Resolution 242, and the negotiation and then the full enforcement in East Asia of the agreements finally reached in January and March 1973 regarding peace in Indochina.

But there is no sign of a Soviet effort to carry out the Geneva agreement of 1962 about Laos and Cambodia, or the Indochinese peace agreements of January and March 1973. On the contrary, it seems apparent that the Soviet Union is moving heaven and earth to nullify those agreements.

Similarly, in the Middle East, far from working with us to induce Syria and Egypt to make peace under Security Council Resolution 242, which was surely the President's legitimate expectation when he signed the Moscow declaration, the Soviet Union prepared, encouraged, and indeed incited the October War against that resolution, and only desisted when the Arabs were defeated by Israel, with our staunch help.

Since the Soviet goal in the October War was NATO, and the American link to Europe, not Israel alone, the issue is absolutely vital to the security of the United States and of its allies.

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

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Jacques Lipchitz was the last survivor of the grand avant-garde of modern art, the last link with the heroic cubist period of the School of Paris. A friend of Picasso, Braque, Modigliani, and Le Corbusier, his death in May of this year at the age of 82 brought to a close the era in which they effectively revised the twentieth-century image.

Yet if Jacques Lipchitz was one of the first to apply the principles of cubist form to sculpture—and if, as he said of himself, he was "always a cubist"—it is in another sense that he finally commanded international attention. Cubism had always been an art of heroic form rather than of heroic themes. Lipchitz, turning his attention to the grand subjects of mythology and the Bible, forged a style that could accommodate such material. In some ways he ceased to be a modern artist. Working within an emotional climate that recalled the great efforts of Michelangelo and Rodin, he created monumental works that transcended our own time. In so doing he set aside his youthful experiments in favor of an art that would be capable of sustaining his own mature passion and eloquence.

The central figure of Jacques Lipchitz' mythology was Prometheus—who stole fire from the gods and brought it to mankind. Zeus punished Prometheus by chaining him to Mt. Caucasus, where a vulture fed upon his liver until Heracles—with the consent of Zeus—interceded and set him free. For Lipchitz, Prometheus symbolized the triumph of light over darkness, of education over ignorance, of the effective struggle for liberation in the face of arbitrary punishment and hardship. His interest in the figure apparently traces to 1931; but, with the Hitlerian threat of 1933, Prometheus took on new significance for him. By 1936, the Prometheus he created for the Paris World's Fair was not only chainless but had triumphed over the vulture.

It is this triumphant vision of Prometheus—with the Menorah held high—that Lipchitz chose in his last year to express Israel's determined battle for survival and freedom.

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Mr. Kaplan seems to believe that in both the Far East and the Middle East, Soviet policy is "constructively" addressed to producing a settlement. To me, this assertion is simply incredible. In both regions, Soviet policy deliberately employed military force to produce total victory for itself. In the Middle East, both in 1967 and in 1973, the Soviet Union would not discuss a cease-fire until the Arab armies were defeated. And in East Asia the Soviets continue to support North Vietnam in completely ignoring its promise to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia, and to cease from interfering in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

Mr. Kaplan remarks that we should be happy to witness the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, and the democratization of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Of course that is true. The point, however, is that since World War II we have not used force to achieve that goal, whereas the Soviet Union is deliberately using force, and the threat of force, to attain its goals. From the point of view of the charter and the possibility of peaceful coexistence as a political reality, the difference is fundamental, and defines the meaning of the word détente. For Mr. Kaplan, détente is indistinguishable from cold war. To accept this definition would be an abuse of language.

Two points of detail:

Mr. Kaplan says the Arab demand for all the territory Israel occupied in 1967 is legitimate, since "the world cannot recognize the seizure of territory by force." Whatever weight one may give to that debatable thesis, it cannot apply equally to territory seized in the course of a war of aggression and one of self-defense. Taking Mr. Kaplan's comment as an absolute would make aggression costless. If the attack failed, the aggressor would automatically return to the *status quo ante*. This cannot be—and is not—the rule of international law, as the armistice agreements of 1949 attest.

Secondly, Mr. Kaplan says that the Johnson administration did not honor Eisenhower's guarantee with respect to the Straits of Tiran. This is not correct.

Religion in a Free Society

To the Editor of Commentary:

Marshall Sklare's reply to his critics [Letters from Readers, December 1973, in a discussion of Mr. Sklare's article, "The Conversion of the Jews," September 1973] was, I think, both disingenuous and off the mark.

The issue is basically rather straightforward: given the fact that in a democratic society all groups—ethnic, religious, economic, sexual, etc.—are subject to all sorts of ideological activity which seeks to persuade one group to another's outlook and practice, how can these interactions be managed with minimum conflict? With much pain and difficulty American society has solved this problem by letting the marketplace of ideas mediate these encounters.

Mr. Sklare and some leaders of Jewish service or defense organizations clearly do not favor this solution with regard to religious ideas and practice. They prefer instead that Jews, as Robert Carlen remarks in his letter, "be exempt from this process." But as David Riesman argued twenty-three years ago in a seminal and courageous essay on this problem, "The 'Militant' Fight Against Anti-Semitism" (Commentary, January 1951), such exemption is unacceptable.

For one thing, the process by which a policy of exemption is realized would be gravely detrimental to the nature of freedom in our society. Above all, who, alas, considers himself—or what ethnic or religious group considers itself—endowed with those awesome qualities that the execution of a policy of exemption in a manner conducive to a free society would require?

I can do no better than inform Marshall Sklare and his supporters of David Riesman's wise counsel on this problem a generation ago: if you cherish the delicate fabric of a free society, then think again about what you are proposing. It is already later than we think. Like some militant blacks who in their fight against white racism have injured the quality of ideological encounter between blacks and whites, some Jewish groups have taken their ethnic militancy much too far—as evidenced by pressure that terminated the TV serial, *Bridget Loves Bernie*.

A free society like ours cannot withstand too much of this sort of thing. It is distressing that Mr. Sklare and his supporters refuse to face this matter squarely.

Martin Kilson
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

To the Editor of Commentary:

Rabbi Henry Siegman's statement in the December 1973 issue, that "What the early interfaith activists had in common was the conviction that it is un-American to take religious faith so seriously as to allow it to make for any real differences," is an annoying misstatement of fact.

What the early interfaith activists had in common was the conviction that Protestants, Catholics, and Jews should retain the unique features of their religions and be informed sufficiently about the other faiths to view them with respect, rather than with fear and hostility. This is still the only sensible approach to interfaith relations. . . .

(Rabbi) S. Andhil Fineberg
Mount Vernon, New York

Marshall Sklare writes:

It is a little difficult for me to see how Martin Kilson can consider that a decision which would have to be arrived at freely on the part of Christians for détente with Judaism—especially in respect to mounting campaigns to convert Jews—could be construed as "gravely detrimental to the nature of freedom in our society."

To be sure, it is my Jewish identity that makes such détente appealing. I do indeed support the position taken by the late Reinhold Niebuhr, who came in his later years to adopt the view that the missionary impulse to convert Jews is a disaster for Christianity. Niebuhr saw it as subverting the Christian's understanding of Christianity by necessarily diminishing the status of the Old Testament as a religious document. He also came to view missionizing activity in connection with Jews as a form of behavior which would necessarily preclude the Christian from confronting the horrendous record of Christianity's persecution of Jews and Judaism, as well as being an affront to Jews who had endured great suffering for so many centuries because of Christian "love" for Jews and Judaism.

As much as I would like Christians to adopt Niebuhr's perspective, is it conceivable that my desire indicates that I do not cherish what Mr. Kilson terms the "delicate fabric of a free society"? I think not. If anything, I believe that the adoption of Niebuhr's position would serve to strengthen and reinforce the delicate fabric of our free society.

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Comprehending the Holocaust

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Did Leon Wieseltier, in his review of Elie Wiesel's *The Oath* [Books in Review, January 1974] ask himself why Mr. Wiesel chose the mythical town of Kolvillag rather than select one of the many historical episodes of blood-libel? Could it be precisely because the human mind has not been able to comprehend the enormity of the Holocaust or the pogroms that Mr. Wiesel has sought to bring them to the level of human understanding? Could it be that Kolvillag speaks for "all mankind," from the Hebrew word "all" and also from the Hebrew for "voice" which is transliterated the same way?

Did Mr. Wieseltier understand the role of contrasts in *The Oath*, beginning with the structure of the novel itself? If Azriel is Wiesel, is not the young man also Wiesel? Azriel is the Wiesel who left the concentration camp a quarter of a century ago and said, "If we had known that you knew, we could not have survived"; and the young man is the Wiesel of today who says, "We know that you knew and we still have chosen life." Why doesn't Mr. Wieseltier understand what it was that the young man found in Azriel's tale to transform his pain through an understanding of Jewish history? Isn't the example of the recent October War enough? Did it not bring all the characters of Kolvillag to the center of the world stage once more? . . .

How can Mr. Wieseltier say that Elie Wiesel robs the Holocaust of its force, that "Wiesel's art is no match for the truth," when it is Kolvillag which does not accept this truth? . . . What more need one say? "For in order to realize himself man must fuse all levels of being into one, every man is all men" (*The Oath*, p. 190). . . .

BLANCHE E. SOSLAND
Mission Hills, Kansas

LEON WIESELTIER writes:

Blanche E. Sosland is of course correct that "the human mind has not been able to comprehend the enormity of the Holocaust," and that just such an understanding must be won if that catastrophe is to be meaningfully assimilated into Jewish consciousness and tradition. But it is Elie Wiesel who makes understanding all the more inaccessible; it is the exotic symbols and histrionic postures of his tales which erode our sense of the brute factuality of the event. A really responsible commitment to understanding must begin with the demythologization of the Holocaust, with the rather unimaginative reminder that it was historical, that it happened. The survivors of the camps with whom I am acquainted are not existential heroes, but scarred people coping with their loss in a commonplace world that insists upon continuing; and when they speak of their experience they do not tell of dramatic choices, of battles with God and Jewish fate, but of crusts of bread and the numbness induced by suffering. There is no place for these real sufferers in Elie Wiesel's fiction.

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Liberated Marriage

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

David Gutmann, in his response to Nancy Datan's letter [Letters From Readers, February, in a discussion of Mr. Gutmann's article, "Men, Women & the Parental Imperative," December 1973], seems to have a strange concept of "liberated marriage," an ideal much too recent to have produced "children who trust impersonal sources of comfort and security." I know such children in my own generation and others. They are usually the products of nice, middle-class, traditional marriages in which Mommy stays at home with the children and provides them with an impersonal, plastic environment which Daddy finances with his aggressive forays into the plastic jungle. A truly liberated marriage, in which both parents are human beings first, and both take an equal interest in love and nurturing, might allow us to break out of the traditional plastic mold.

KAY STONE

Winnipeg, Canada

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In the February letters columns I was disappointed to see David Gutmann resort to ridicule in responding to my criticism of his article because the issue at stake warrants more thoughtful deliberation. Mr. Gutmann's conclusion that sex-role differentiation has survival value is both self-evident and trivial. Warnings involving survival value are traditionally issued by those who resist change. We must always be ready to re-examine the dynamics of a vital system to see if it can function more efficiently and produce fewer undesirable by-products.

Mr. Gutmann offers a conjecture regarding the roots of sex-role differentiation but does not deal with the mechanisms that actually forge the behavior in question. My concern is with the powerful forces of socialization that relentlessly chisel personality and value structures according to masculine and feminine models and with the nature of their impact. These forces may well have evolved from man's preoccupation with survival, and may or may not reflect Mr. Gutmann's hypothesized trans-social parental imperatives. The question of their origin and universality is less important than the rigidity and power of their operation, the way in which they bludgeon people into behavioral grooves that do not reflect their individual needs or wishes. We do not have to deny the reality of all biological and psycho-social differences between the sexes in order to recognize that sex-role differentiation proceeds too grossly and forcefully, opposes individual expression, and creates rivalries and exploitative relationships that impede emotional growth. Nor do we have to accept all of the radical proposals for change that have surfaced in order to support the current reappraisal of the issue. At a time when the threads of a stultifying and undermining social fabric have begun to be identified and seem capable of being unraveled, it is distressing to find Mr. Gutmann attempting to discredit this effort.

HERBERT ZIMILES

Bank Street College of Education
New York City

DAVID GUTMANN writes:

Kay Stone is wrong to think that the so-called "liberated marriage" came into being simultaneously with its discovery by the Sunday supplements and the trendy publishing houses. It has been visible in certain Wasp and Jewish echelons for a long time, and the clinical evidence suggests that it produces an inordinately high proportion of what I call "premature gerontocrats"—children who show many of the psychological stigmata of aging before they are even out of their teens. I do think that Miss Stone is right to point out that the "traditional plastic" marriage (though since when has plastic been a traditional substance?) can also produce its quota of psychic cripples; and that housewives who maintain an artificial, inhuman environment in the home can be as lethal to their children as those career women who bring the "plastic" world home with them from the office. The real point is that couples who have not accepted the "parental imperative," those parents who do not surrender personal claims to full "liberation" in favor of their children's requirements, are going to turn out damaged children no matter what format they choose for dividing sex roles, household chores, or whatever. There is nothing innately wrong with "liberation" and "self-enhancement," but individuals who give life-long priority to such purely personal goals should probably abstain from having children. Otherwise, as part of the new gluttony, parenthood becomes just another "experience" to be consumed, a piece of adult "self-actualization" for which children are apt to pay the ultimate price.

For similar reasons I cannot work up much enthusiasm for Miss Stone's idyllic picture of the marriage in which both parents are "human beings first, and both take an equal interest in loving and nurturing." In a more perfect world this worthy though vague arrangement might even work. But I still share with George Gilder—whose book *Sexual Suicide* was discussed in my article—much mistrust of this option. Brutes that we are, men have rarely taken easily to domesticity. Men recognize that their contribution to their children's emotional security can rarely be as pivotal as that provided by mothers. Accordingly, they must be assured of some unique and crucial role—different from that of the mother—in maintaining the home. Otherwise, they will, and in disastrously large numbers, look for the sources of satisfaction and self-esteem outside of the home: in barrooms, bedrooms, or battlefields. Worse yet, they can turn the home itself into a battlefield, again with disastrous consequences for children. Already the liberated women of the communes are complaining that, despite the rhetoric of unisex, their "hip brothers" slope off to leave them alone with the children.

I regret that Herbert Zimiles takes my rejoinder to his first letter as a ridicule, but that, I am afraid, is his problem. I meant to demonstrate, quite seriously, the contradictions inherent in the monolithic environmentalist interpretation of sex roles, and I meant every word of it. Mr. Zimiles's second letter is a more strident repetition of his original comment. It does not add anything to our debate beyond his wish to have the last word. As far as I am concerned, he can have it.

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"I appeal to you with respect and hope."

ANDREI SAKHAROV

[At the Award Dinner of the Social Democrats, U.S.A. on February 1st, the courageous Soviet dissenter, Andrei Sakharov, was presented with the Norman Thomas Freedom Award in memory of the great American civil libertarian. The Award was accepted on Sakharov's behalf by his close associate and fellow dissenter, Dr. Yuri Glazov. Participating in the award program were I. W. Abel, President of the United Steelworkers of America, Sol C. Chaikin, Secretary-Treasurer of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Jacob Clayman, Secretary-Treasurer of the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, and Bayard Rustin.

In accepting his award from the Social Democrats, U.S.A., Andrei Sakharov described the "extremely grave situation" facing the Soviet dissenters and appealed for support in the West for a six point program to aid their cause. In response to the great urgency of the appeal, the SDUSA is publishing Sakharov's message and calling for support for his program.]

It is a great honor for me that my voice will be listened to by Social Democrats, and representatives of U.S. trade unions. Your movements' dedication to the defense of human rights, openness of society, and principles of true detente, is very important for the people of our country.

We all welcome the negotiations that are now being held aimed at preventing a thermonuclear world war, as well as the armaments race, and to promote negotiations directed to increased trade relations—in short, all that is denoted by the word 'detente'.

But at the same time, there continue to be arrests, interrogations, and searches of dissidents, religious persecutions (for instance in the Baltic area), harassment of honest writers, obstacles placed in the way of free emigration and discrimination against national minorities. In an irrefutable way, this shows that the external detente is tragically not accompanied by an internal and human detente.

It seems to me, however, that now in the West forces are appearing with a beginning awareness of the danger of such a situation. Your response to our cause is one of the proofs of that concern. I should like to take this opportunity to appeal to you for support for a number of urgent social campaigns:

1. **A campaign for free access by the Representatives of the International Red Cross and World Health Organization to inspect the Soviet places of incarcerations and mental hospitals.**
2. **A campaign for amnesty of Soviet political prisoners. I should like to call to mind once again such glorious names as Vladimir Bukovsky, Peter Grigorenko, Semen Gluzman, Valentin Moroz, Leonid Pliushch, Vladimir Borisov, and Yuri Shikhanovitch. A great number of other names should be added to this list.**
3. **A campaign to end discrimination against such national minorities as the Crimean Tartars, Germans of the Volga area and the Turk-Meskhs.**
4. **A campaign for freedom of emigration.**
5. **A campaign to defend Solzhenitsyn, linked with free distribution of his book in the U.S.S.R. Our official propaganda insists that the crimes described in The Gulag Archipelago have already been condemned. But it is necessary to consistently emphasize that if for the typing of this manuscript persons are to be imprisoned, then a cover-up and even support of the crimes will be expressed, rather than their condemnation.**
6. **A campaign to defend all the honest writers who have been harassed, including Galich, Maksimov, Chukovskaya, Nekrasov, Marchenko, Amalrik and many others.**

I shall now give you the latest information. On January 30th the Union of Writers of the U.S.S.R. (prose section) expelled Vladimir Voinovitch, the gifted author of many books, including a brilliant and funny satire about the soldier Ivan Chonkin. He joins the list of those honest writers who have been expelled for ideological reasons—a list which already includes Solzhenitsyn, Galich, Maksimov, Chukovskaya—as happened previously to Pasternak, Akhmatova, and Zoshchenko.

Ideological freedom in our country and the survival of great literature as such is impossible if we do not struggle to defend every honest writer.

I now appeal to you with respect and hope. I take upon myself the liberty of expressing my gratitude to you on behalf of all Soviet dissidents.

Sponsored by

Social Democrats, U.S.A.

Bayard Rustin and Charles S. Zimmerman
Co-Chairmen
1182 Broadway, Suite 802, New York, New York 10001 / (212) 532-1452

Public support in the West and the bravery of Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and others keep the dissident struggle in the Soviet Union alive. This support must grow. It is a matter of life and death!

Bayard Rustin, Chairman
Dr. Robert Wallace Gilmore, Treasurer
Andrei Sakharov Campaign
Suite 802, 1182 Broadway, New York, New York 10001

Yes, I want to help the campaign and I will ask my organization to become active in it.

☐ **Enclosed is $_____ to reprint and distribute this statement as widely as possible, and to build public support for the Soviet dissenters.**

☐ **Please send me information about the Soviet dissenters and suggestions for activities on how to help in my community.**

Name _____

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(Please make checks payable to Andrei Sakharov Campaign)

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The End of the Postwar Era

Fritz Stern

A great victory is a great danger. Human nature bears a triumph less easily than a defeat: indeed it might even be urged that it is simpler to gain a victory of this sort than to turn it to such account that it may not ultimately prove a serious rout.

—Nietzsche

WHEN the Egyptians captured the thinly-held Bar-Lev Line, they shattered more than the illusions which a great victory had nurtured in Israel. They destroyed a pervasive illusion that most of us had clung to: the illusion that the postwar world, as it had come into being twenty-five years earlier, would somehow remain intact—with changes, of course, but in its essence, intact. The world that collapsed in the October War was not the world created by the six-day victory of 1967; it was the world created in 1948, when Israel was born at the same time as Western Europe was reborn, under the aegis of an America of such unimaginable power that this power could safely appear in the guise of benevolence. The Arabs destroyed the illusion that this world could be salvaged indefinitely. Encouraged by the Soviets, whose very existence had brought that world into being, the Arabs stumbled upon a weapon, as simple in its execution as it is devastating in its consequences: by alternately cutting off oil and quadrupling its price, the Middle East had found a weapon that would insure the end of that world, perhaps to the surprise of the Arabs themselves.

To understand the magnitude of the change that the war has revealed and brought about, it may be useful to recall the world-historical context of the preceding years. The twenty-five years that separated the spring of the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift, the birth of the Federal Republic and the birth of Israel, from the fall of 1973, may well have marked one of the least expected and one of the most promising leaps forward that our civilization has had to record. It began with the total collapse of Europe. As a French historian recently put it: "Europe in 1945 was a beggar supported by its American ally, incapable of revival through its own powers."* The revival proved so astounding that it disguised the fact that in some ways Europe never had to face the consequences of its self-destruction. (By Europe, I mean the countries now linked in the European communities, and those others that share a common democratic tradition and remain unshackled by a faith in historical inevitability.) The American nuclear shield and Europe's own economic and intellectual vitality, facilitated by the creation of a Common Market and infused with the hope that this Common Market might prove a stepping-stone to European unity, gave Europe a chance to build a society that was more prosperous and less bellicose, more stable and more egalitarian, than any it had enjoyed in its history. The very greatness of the success displaced the realization that Europe had been fighting a rearguard action against its own decline since the beginning of the century, certainly since World War I.

In the last few years, then, the Europeans had come to accept their economic miracle as a commonplace, as their due, which, with the inevitable fluctuations, would continue indefinitely. The Israelis with their military miracle of the Six-Day War succumbed to the same fatality: the results of the miracle were gradually domesticated into one's thinking and planning. As Israel's economy flourished and its people began to taste the fruits of prosperity, the myth of Israeli invincibility was a necessary psychological buttress. Unconsciously, both Europeans and Israelis began to live on bluff and on illusion: a prosperous Europe would somehow remain prosperous, would find its European identity while retaining America's shield; the Israelis thought that their new, convenient boundaries would remain inviolable, that perhaps the Arabs would get used to them, and in any case that they would remain weak and divided. Many Americans shared these assumptions and cherished their own illusions about the possibilities of a cost-free détente. Resulting rifts within our alliance (with Europe and with Japan) could be

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* Maurice Crouzet, *The European Renaissance Since 1945*, translated by Stanley Baron (London, 1970), p. 15.

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papered over by the incantations of pieties, a Year of Europe could perhaps resolve a decade of trouble.

Perhaps time could have given the Americans and the Europeans a chance to find temporary accommodations that might have led to more permanent structures. The October War denied us that time, and the war imposed on all nations immediate choices which belied the preceding hopes of harmony.

The war would not have had such a profound impact if it had not been preceded by fundamental changes that had occurred discretely, so to speak, and thus without forcing us to change our perceptions. Let me but mention three changes. First, the postwar world had been built in fear of Soviet expansionism. The simultaneous opening to the East which went under the name of *Ostpolitik* and détente went to great lengths implicitly to deny the dangers of such expansionism. The pursuit of détente conjured up again European suspicions about a condominium of the superpowers and necessarily called into question the *raison d'être* of NATO. Second, the postwar world was based on American strength. In the second half of the 60's that strength seemed to be dissipated as our forces and our energies were mired in an endless and divisive war in Vietnam. The Europeans worried about America's strength and purpose—the more so as the internal turmoil of the 60's and Watergate of the 70's seemed to reduce the country to something akin to paralysis. Third, the postwar world was based on close European-American ties; these, too, had been in jeopardy well before the October War. At a later time, historians will have to analyze the multiplicity of causes that led to the strains in the Atlantic relationship. Here it suffices to say that one of the proximate causes was America's sudden reassertion of its economic egoism which caused a shock. August 15, 1971—the date that President Nixon announced his new economic policy, followed shortly by John Connally's arrogant bullying of the Europeans—is an important landmark in the decline of the alliance. By the fall of 1973, there was intense wrangling between Europe and America over the wording of Secretary Kissinger's new Atlantic Charter. What might be called Henry Kissinger's realistic Gaullism—as well as his seeming neglect of allies in pursuit of taming old adversaries—had helped to bring relations between Europe and the United States to their lowest *point* since 1956—invisibly; the October War brought these relations to a visible collapse.

II

THE Arab attack shattered illusions and created new realities; it also revealed the contours of a new world. Israel found herself vulnerable, isolated, and totally dependent on the United States. The Arabs' oil weapon proved far more effective than their military power: it threatened the Europeans with economic collapse. By the instant use of its power, the United States saved Israel. At the same time, it worked in closest contact with the Soviets who had incited the Arab aggression against Israel and Western Europe; most of the time the superpowers subordinated their separate and opposing interests to their common interest of avoiding a nuclear confrontation; at one time during the crisis, they exchanged military threats in order to avoid policies that could have precipitated a direct confrontation. In the end, the two superpowers imposed a cease-fire on the Middle East, which Henry Kissinger, acting as the honest broker, converted into an American-sponsored, limited plan for a more permanent settlement.

While America rediscovered its power and recovered its initiative, Europe discovered its weakness, its impotence, and its isolation. Both sides saw the contrast between them in all its starkness; it confirmed antagonisms and fed suspicions, as both sides acted out the preconceived fears of the other. The European governments complained that they had been ignored by the United States; worse, they suspected that America's intervention for Israel heightened their own vulnerability vis-à-vis the Arabs and they suspected a Russo-American condominium in the Middle East. The Americans resented Europe's pro-Arab maneuvering, the denial of bases—in short, they resented what they regarded as Europe's "desertion" during the days of crisis. There was far less "consultation" between Washington and the European capitals in October 1973 than there had been during the missile crisis in October 1962; in Harold Macmillan's just-published last volume of memoirs we can see how important Kennedy's nightly phone calls to London were, as a form of transatlantic hand-holding. In a worse crisis, there was still time and thought given to the sensibilities of allies. This time around, the alliance had been sufficiently eroded and the behavior of the allies so quickly diverged that even the conventional pieties about the Atlantic relationship were replaced by displays of public ill-temper. In substance and in spirit, the alliance had suffered its worst defeat since its inception. It was hardest on the weakest—who acted most recalcitrantly.

Most people were surprised by the European response to the Arab-Israeli war and to the ensuing embargo. In 1967, Europe was exuberantly pro-Israel; de Gaulle was the only European leader to proclaim and pursue a policy that was hostile to Israel—France's ally before, and accomplice during, the Suez expedition. In 1973, popular pro-Israel sentiment, while still strong, was more muted; the support of Israel had eroded. There was anger at Israel's past *hubris;* two days after the Arab attack on Israel, Michel Jobert, French Foreign Minister, denied that aggression had taken place: "Is it necessarily unforeseen aggression to try to go home?" (It was an odd thing for a

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French Foreign Minister to say: suppose the Germans, suppose all the Europeans, whose boundaries had been brutally changed in 1944-45, were to "try to go home"?) No doubt, the range of sentiment in Europe regarding Israel was broad; no doubt, there was more "Gaullist" anger in 1973 than in 1967, just as New Left ideology, with its denunciation of Israel as "aggressive," as "the imperialist pawn of the United States," had found considerable resonance in many quarters. Israel was saddled with the burden of anti-Americanism in Europe. Not that Israel was entirely innocent: Israeli hawks (and Israeli actions) had made the task of anti-Israeli groups easier. In short, public opinion imposed far fewer restraints on governmental actions than in earlier crises.

But the fact that public opinion had changed and that there was a pronounced non-pro-Israel feeling among a large segment of Europe's population was not the surprise. It was the official policies of France and Britain that caused surprise.

In the face of the oil embargo and Europe's perception of American indifference to potential European deprivation, the major European powers sought safety in submission. Britain and France—the countries with the longest record of Middle Eastern imperialism—led the way. Perhaps the British were less ostentatious in their submissiveness than the French; there was something painfully symbolic in the picture of President Pompidou's cordial reception of Colonel Qaddafi. At a time of real illness, Pompidou feigned diplomatic health in order to entertain and entice the most irresponsible, the most irrational, Arab leader. In his extremism, Qaddafi was something of an embarrassment to his fellow Arabs. But not to Pompidou; the French have long believed in Libyan Mirages.

Why did Pompidou and Heath almost immediately opt for going it alone—knowing that their action would affront the United States and jeopardize European unity? Why were there not even gestures of solidarity toward the Dutch—the most European of the Europeans—who had incurred the special wrath of the Arabs? Why this haste to adopt craven policies that would offend allies without necessarily appeasing adversaries?

The full answer will emerge only much later. But a few conjectures may be justified. Certainly the leaders of Western Europe understood the magnitude of the Arab challenge; the oil embargo, if maintained, could have wrecked the European economy in a matter of months. But the European Community did have impressive assets; these were defined last year by François Duchêne, a perspicacious observer of the European scene, thus:

> The enlarged European Community will represent nearly 10 per cent of the population and arms budgets, over 20 per cent of the annual output, 30 per cent of the trade, and 40 per cent of the money reserves of the world. These are figures with bottom, even by superpower standards.*

Why did the Europeans then not launch some effort at collective counterpressure instead of embarking at once on private deals and public declarations—which went beyond the demands of President Sadat? All at once, the European leaders confronted their military impotence and the civilian outlook of their peoples. Europe had also fallen into a kind of psychological disarmament vis-à-vis the Arabs. This was particularly true of the French; the bankruptcy of their anti-Arab, especially their Algerian, policy of the 50's had left deep marks. Hence this shrinking back to nationalism, to the old habits of *sauve qui peut*, old habits and traditions which decades of NATO and the European Community could not overcome.

It might be added here that for years France has acted as a leader in disaster—despite the fact that the French achievements at home have been great, despite the fact that their perception of American and Soviet aims has often been unsentimentally true, and despite the fact that de Gaulle's extrication of France from Algeria was impressive. But in foreign policy, the French have consistently sought *grandeur* out of fear: a difficult combination. They have graduated fears; they have always feared the Germans, and at the time of planning a European Defense Community a wit remarked that France wanted a German army that would be larger than the Red army and smaller than the French; France then proceeded to hobble NATO while demanding (as she still does) continued American presence in Europe. From the 60's on—but even before—the French feared that their independence would be squashed by a condominium of the superpowers. At the same time, France obstructed the development of a strong European Community. France was not successful with her anti-Arab policy at Suez and she was the first to become anti-Israel and pro-Arab.†

But I think there was another motive for Europe's responses since the war, and one that has not generally been reckoned with. The anonymous European writing in the January 1974 issue of *Foreign Affairs* maintained his optimism by neglecting to look at the domestic side of European politics. I think the leaders of

* François Duchêne in *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems Before the European Community*, edited by Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (Halsted Press 1973), p. 8.

† In 1971, there was a brief rapprochement between France and the United States, and President Pompidou remarked on returning from a visit with President Nixon: "I felt that France counted. She counts because of her geographical situation, her intellectual quality, and, I believe, her moral quality." How strongly felt is that quality today—in Europe, in France? Quoted in Dorothy Pickles, *The Government and Politics of France* (London, 1973), p. 336.

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Europe already knew in October what a few weeks later became abundantly clear: that their countries were in political disarray, and that the economic consequences of the Arab war could spell a dramatic worsening of political stability. In October, the malaise was evident in Italy and England; gradually it spread. The chronic crisis in Italy and the dramatic sharpening of the social crisis in England need no comment. Pompidou's illness may result in a leadership crisis at a time of growing social restiveness in France. Developments in the Federal Republic were less spectacular, but no more reassuring. The radicalization of German politics has gone largely unnoticed—at least in the United States.* Even a partial revolution in the educational realm cannot help but have an effect on the mood of the electorate. The ruling Social Democrats must contend as well with their critics on the Left, most specifically with the Jusos (the Young Socialists) who in their election in January adopted a still more radical program, demanding immediate socialism and neutralism, while insisting on their tactics of internal softening-up. "The long climb through institutional ranks" would be a free translation of their motto. Meanwhile, in the Federal Republic, as elsewhere in the Western world, political leadership has become further discredited—part of a more general loss of authority. Willy Brandt had been genuinely popular; he also had an aura of statesmanship about him. His stock had been inflated; it has now plummeted—excessively. More and more, he is likened to Ludwig Erhard—whose star also faded, and who suddenly lost the capacity to lead even his own coalition. All of this led an old German expert, Fred Luchsinger, editor of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, to write a front-page editorial on the Federal Republic (January 13, 1974). Luchsinger sees the seriousness of the German crisis "aside from the sharpening economic problems, in a background of instability, disintegration [*Zersetzung*], and polarization in public opinion. The aggressive elements [of this public opinion] are more malevolent, more cynical, more intolerant, more arrogant than elsewhere; the elements disposed toward protecting what has been achieved are more deeply anxious, made insecure [*verunsichert*], with worn-out nerves, and hence disposed as easily to radical reaction as to quickly succumbing resignation, its intelligence has less backbone and is more disoriented, its middle is less capable of initiative or support." Such anxiety about the future has not been heard for years—and Luchsinger's warning about the "softening up" of Bonn has had a considerable echo.

For some twenty-five years, or for the length of the postwar era, a steadily expanding economy protected Europe from major political upheavals. Young radicals might thunder against the *société de consommation*, against the endless *ennui* that is to come with bourgeois life, but the workers of Europe found *embourgeoisement* a novel and, on the whole, exhilarating experience. Inequalities persisted, perhaps in some respects worsened; but workers *lived* differently, as each year, in every European country, more workers were able to afford cars, take vacations, dream of country bungalows, hope for a better life for their children. For the first time they reaped the benefits of the industrial revolution—after so many generations of their ancestors had suffered from its hardships. The satisfactions which capitalist productivity afforded seemed to compensate for the remaining inequalities.

Among radical reformers and cultural pessimists, the attack on this materialist existence mounted. Taking prosperity for granted, they pressed for a "better quality of life," for a saner use of the environment. It became fashionable to flirt with the technical ideas of "no growth" which the Club of Rome propounded. But while the economists of the Club of Rome theorized, the oil-producing states acted. Unless there is a sudden and far-reaching reversal in the present pricing policies of the Middle Eastern countries, the European economies are headed for "zero growth"—at best.

For some time now, economists have been confounded by reality—as have other social scientists. In the present uncertainty, contradictory predictions and prognoses of calamity abound. But it would seem self-evident that the quadrupling within a year in the price of Europe's oil imports will have dramatic consequences for the European economies, already struggling with the problems of inflation. (It is estimated, for example, that because of the rise in oil prices Italy will have a balance of payments deficit of $3.5 billion in 1974.) The entire European balance of payments will suffer this year—and Saudi Arabia, with its population of six million people, is likely to have an income this year of $25 billion. Some experts estimate that by 1980 the Middle East will have accumulated $600 billion—a prospect and a sum that boggle the mind.† Never before have so few mulcted so many for so much—in such a short time.

The prospects for Europe are grim. No wonder

* In its special fifty-page report on Germany (December 1), the *Economist* places proper emphasis on the implications of radical and in some cases Communist takeovers in German education, as I did at the end of an OECD inspection of German education in 1971. It is a misfortune, most notable in time of trouble, that we have no American equivalents of the *Economist* or the *Guardian*—and that even our newspaper coverage of Europe seems thinner than before. A part of our growing insularism is ignorance.

† How to conceive of such a sum? By way of one, perhaps parochial, example the magnitude of the sum may be made clearer: in 1970, the total endowment of all American colleges and universities was just below $11 billion—or less than 2 per cent of what Middle Eastern countries may accumulate in six years.

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that the major countries of the Community are vying for bilateral agreements with oil-producing states; the French, as always, are in the lead to offer Middle Eastern countries arms and technical assistance in exchange for long-term oil supplies. No doubt successful competition in bilateralism will result in a short-term mitigation of economic hardship. Will it suffice? Can France really prosper if Italy collapses? Is France really prepared to scuttle the European Community, with its agricultural policy protecting French farmers and its very existence a promise of expanded unity? Or have France and England in the winter of 1973 concluded a tacit *Entente Déloyale*—an entente that would virtually sacrifice the Community for the sake of their special deals? Have they learned nothing from the 30's, when nations sought—in vain—safety in autarky and barter, in short, in economic nationalism?

In a period of contraction, the weakest will suffer the most: the millions of "guest workers" will find their hosts suddenly less hospitable. The old and retired in Western Europe will end their lives, as they had begun them, in uncertainty and misery. Thanks to the strength of their organizations, the workers may suffer relatively less than other groups.

Europe's carless Sundays were greeted with pleasure and aplomb: it seemed as if one had stumbled on yet another luxury—the luxury of intermittent, morally inspiriting austerity. But long-term contraction is different, and already the signs of social radicalization and political polarization abound. Britain—long the sick man of Europe with the healthiest constitution—is undergoing its most divisive conflict in decades. In the Federal Republic, the union of civil servants, representing some two million workers (including railway men and postal clerks), struck for a 15 per cent wage hike, while inciting its members by maligning "the employers," who happen to be socialists in office. No wonder that so seasoned and wise an observer as Marion Dönhoff ended her front-page column on these demands in *Die Zeit* (February 1, 1974) with the warning: "Most men, organizations, and peoples, too, destroy themselves—it is rare that one can hold others responsible. We have a special talent for this." If stable Britain and prosperous Germany face such calamities, is it even necessary to speak of Italy?

Capitalism in contraction is as much of a social and political monster as capitalism in expansion tends to be a miracle. The oil crisis and a resurgent nationalism, exploited by desperate men on the Left and on the Right, will bring with it further polarization and a definite trend to economic illiberalism. An anxious Right will confront a shrinking, reasonable Left under ever-growing pressure from a resurgent radical Left. The result will be a contracting area of freedom; the present furor over the international oil companies—part culprit, part scapegoat—will accelerate the drive toward corporatism or nationalization. The rumored effort of the Swiss government to develop its own oil company (by buying Swisspetrol) is but a straw in the wind.

TO UNDERSTAND the depth of the present crisis it may be useful to view it from yet another perspective. It has been remarked, correctly I think, that by the end of World War I, Western Europe was ready to replace capitalism with democratic socialism. In retrospect, it may be argued that it was Russian Bolshevism that played the decisive role in saving European capitalism—by splitting European labor and by presenting conservatives with a challenge and a convenient and genuine *bête noire*. What Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin worked and hoped for—the collapse of European capitalism—they in fact helped to prevent. King Faisal may succeed where Lenin failed—though such a success is the last thing he desires. Neither revolutionaries nor rightists can expect to escape the unanticipated consequences of their decisions. It is the innocent objects of their decisions who suffer the most.

The prospects for Europe are bleaker than at any time since 1948. The alliance with the United States—on which the defense of Europe rests—is at its weakest; at a time of unprecedented crisis and strain all the smoldering resentments have come to the surface. Worse, the unity of Europe is in jeopardy and the fabric of European society threatened. The French are overtly compromising the future of the European Community, while the Germans are growing ever more restive. The habit of cooperation, so painfully acquired, is being eroded, while long-suppressed suspicions are coming to the fore again. In late January the ablest and politically the most ambitious commission that the European Community has ever had issued an unprecedented statement: "Europe is being put to the test. It is faced with a new situation, which is pitilessly highlighting its weakness and its dependence, but which is also revealing how badly it is in need of unity." That unity was being sabotaged from within the Community, and the commission warned: "If European unity is only a fair-weather phenomenon, none of the ambitions we have set for ourselves can be realized, either in the short term or in 1980." Under some conditions, the very "machinery of the Common Market would break down," and the commission, through its French head, François-Xavier Ortoli, hinted at the possibility of collective resignation.*

The process of tearing down is notoriously easier than that of building up. It is remarkable how quickly old antagonisms revive: the French have long distrusted the Germans, and their actions are reawakening similar feelings among

* New York *Times*, February 1, 2, 1974.

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the Germans. It is frightening even to speculate on what could happen to a Europe whose long, and seemingly so brilliantly successful rearguard action against facing the consequences of its own self-destruction had collapsed. Will the present constellation of national and international factors drive Germany ever closer to an Eastern orientation—the very thing that the French have always been most afraid of and are now unwittingly doing their best to realize? The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (January 21, 1974) greeted the news of France's unilateral decision to float the franc (and flout the Community) by speaking of "a classical tragedy" that Europe was witnessing: "The process now races downhill with a speed that leaves even the clairvoyant breathless: one pillar after another is broken out of the edifice of European solidarity. No means is visible to prevent the disaster or to bring it to a standstill at a half-way point. Will it finally end at a place where wars in Europe are suddenly thinkable again?"

The future of European democracy is no less alarming. There too the unthinkable has suddenly become thinkable. Is there anyone who has the temerity to assume that the range of freedom in Europe will be as great in five years as it is now? Would anyone be so rash as to assert that faceless colonels seizing power are only a Greek phenomenon? Or that Allende and Allende's end can happen only in Chile? It was in Europe over the centuries that the noblest dreams of man's freedom and autonomy were dreamed; at rare moments and in some countries, some of these dreams were approximated in reality. But the history of tyranny is even older in Europe, and our hope that the worst tyranny that Europe ever saw would also be the last will have to be defended to remain true.

III

THE implications of these changes for Israel are incalculable. Israel was the immediate target of the Arab attack last October; it was also the proximate victim of the Arabs' oil offensive against Europe and Japan. Its own survival, certainly its welfare, is bound up with the future of Europe.

Israel was born into the postwar era; its birth occurred in the same year as the postwar constellation emerged in Western Europe. It was born of Zionist hopes and European genocide; the former sprang from the belief, nurtured in part by the Dreyfus affair, that European nationalism would present a recurrent threat to European Jewry and that only a Jewish national homeland (with its own nationalism?) would offer an acceptable alternative to continued insecurity. The near-extinction of European Jewry made the claims morally irresistible, and in the aftermath of World War II and as a consequence of the collapse of British imperial rule, the United Nations assigned a part of Palestine to Israel and left the state to fend for itself. Another, and very compressed, reading might be that the Palestinian Arabs are necessarily going to tip the balance in country had been made to suffer for the crimes of omission and commission that the Europeans had committed against their Jews. A pro-Israel policy for most European countries sprang from a felicitous coincidence of political and moral considerations. An offspring of Europe in Asia, Israel evolved what to many at the time seemed a promising new experiment: a democratic-communitarian society. The West Germans acknowledged their guilt—and hence their special relationship to Israel—in a tangible manner: with German billions, Israel could build a modern economy and equip a modern army, with weapons purchased from France, Britain, and the United States.

As mentioned above, the pro-Israel sentiment in Europe had weakened before the October War. The Six-Day War had been a heady experience for Israel. But much of the world, especially the young, had sympathy only for the underdog. For some people, it gradually became a truism that Israel was expansionist and aggressive; it became not uncommon to think of the Palestinian refugees as the "Jews of today." It was part of the Israeli *hubris* to pay little heed to these changes in world opinion. De Gaulle had sown the seed of this distrust in 1967 when in his press conference he called the Jews "an elite people, self-confident and domineering."* The New Left continued its own brand of anti-Israel sentiment. No doubt there was anger as well at Israeli putative intransigence—which was blamed for the war of 1973. Perhaps more important than either strain of criticism was a general change in mood—partly connected with the simple fact that a new generation in Europe has grown up that does not want to be reminded of its fathers' sins, that indeed does not remember the world that existed before the postwar world. The six million Jews, whose fate is burned into the consciousness of most Israelis, are only dimly remembered. They no longer have a lobby in Europe.

The picture of course is more complicated: there remains in Europe a reservoir of pro-Israeli sentiment, evident in public opinion, and in the media (which tend to favor Israel over the Arabs). Some of it, however, echoes Willy Brandt's statement before the European Parliament last November: "With regard to German-Israeli rela-

* Raymond Aron instantly understood the ambiguity of the phrase and of de Gaulle's denial that it was intended as anti-Semitic. Recalling the General's famous reply to the masses of French Algerians cheering him in June 1958, Aron wrote: "The anti-Semite [listening to de Gaulle's description of the Jews] recalling a famous phrase, will reply—and justly too—'I get your point' [*je vous ai compris*]." Raymond Aron, *De Gaulle, Israel et les Juifs* (Paris, 1968), p. 11.

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tions nobody will be surprised if I say that they have a special character. . . . For us there can be no neutrality of the heart and the conscience. . . . I strongly emphasize, however, that our deep involvement is also to the benefit of the Arab world."*

Brandt's ingenuous statement points to a division that will become ever more important in Europe—and not only in Europe: the division between what the heart might desire—or put differently, what morality might seem to dictate—and the demands of realism. The moral sympathy for Israel had become weaker and more ambiguous even before the war; the exigencies of a vulnerable economy made "realism" seem inescapable. The consequence for Israel is clear: at the governmental level, Israel is isolated in the world—save for the United States. Its support in the UN has vanished, its standing in world opinion has suffered. It has become Europe's rejected child. It is cut off from Europe's armament industries—while France has been peddling its latest equipment to gain Arab oil. The military and political isolation may to some extent entail a moral isolation as well. This will be hard on Israel whose population—the larger part of it at least—is European by origin or descent. The scientific-academic elite of Israel is European by orientation; in some ways it continues, perhaps not even consciously, what might be called the Weizmann tradition of anglophilia, of feeling close to European ways. Isolation from Europe will not only be painful to Israel; it may strengthen the very nationalism that the Europeans have objected to.

ISRAEL'S total dependence on the United States is a grim prospect for the Israelis—and for world peace. Perhaps "the new realism" among Arabs and Israelis, brilliantly nurtured and guided by Henry Kissinger's energetic diplomacy, may bring peace to the Middle East. Perhaps. But even under the best of circumstances, such a peace would have to be defended against eruptions of future Arab extremism. In the first twenty-five years of its existence, Israel benefited from Arab disunity. In the future, it could well be that Arab disunity might spell an internecine fight between what the world hopes are moderates like President Sadat and what might be called political Qaddafites. The latter will certainly seek to exploit growing Arab strength and Israeli isolation. They may want to do so in acts of open violence or they may wish to conduct a campaign against the Jewish position in Europe, backed by their virtually unlimited funds. The attempt of an Arab boycott organization, supported by Libya, to have the Jewish editor of *La Stampa* removed—under the threat that otherwise Fiat, which owns *La Stampa*, would be barred from the Arab market—may have been an isolated because abortive attempt. But is it reasonable to suppose that the growing strength and immeasurable wealth of the Arabs are necessarily going to tip the balance in favor of the moderates? Has this happened in other areas in the past—when there was so much power behind so strong a grievance? The uses of Arab power will depend in no small measure on European responses and policies.

It would be tempting for the Europeans to think that none of this is their problem; that Israel has become the ward of the United States and that Europe should treat Israel's existence and survival as it would treat the survival and existence of any other state. The new realism may dictate such a policy, much as the "hearts" of some statesmen might object. But how realistic would such a policy be? Do there not remain the strongest reasons for European nations to use their power and influence, individually and collectively, against Arab extremism? The next war in the Middle East may well begin where the last one ended: with a direct confrontation between the superpowers. One of the keenest experts on the Middle East, Nadav Safran, has warned: "And if the whole balance collapses once more, as it already did twice—in 1967 and in 1973—then the ensuing war would be so destructive, and its ramifications would reach so far, that the chances of the superpowers staying out of it would be practically nil."† There are few political scientists and analysts who have more consistently championed "realism" in the perception of foreign policy than Hans Morgenthau. His analysis of Israel's position in any future war cannot easily be dismissed: ". . . Had the October War started at the 1967 frontiers, Israel would have been in mortal danger. . . . And given the unfavorable geopolitical configuration, if it is in mortal danger, it is likely to be doomed. . . . Foreign intervention on its behalf, assuming it were available, would come too late—and its availability is moot."** That the nightmare of a war that could lead to Israel's extinction or to a nuclear showdown or both is not a figment of Jewish or pro-Israeli fear can perhaps be inferred from the statement that Jean-Paul Sartre—no enemy of the Third World or uncritical friend of Israel—made: ". . . I could not fail to be gravely concerned by the destruction of Israel which [given Egyptian aims] is discernible on the horizon."†† Earlier Simone de Beauvoir and others had denounced the war against Israel as "not progressive . . . an enterprise of destruction."***

All of this suggests a grim continuity in Jewish history. For two centuries now, the Jews of Eu-

* *European Community*, January 1974, p. 13.

† "The War and the Future of the Arab-Israel Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 2, January 1974, p. 222.

** Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Geopolitics of Israel's Survival," the *New Leader*, December 24, 1973.

†† *Le Monde*, October 27, 1973.

*** *Le Monde*, October 19, 1973.

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rope have been a kind of bellwether for European liberals. They were the first to flourish in a liberal-capitalistic order, the first to realize the promise of a society open to talent. They were also the first to suffer when that world was threatened by contraction, adversity, and a new wave of illiberalism. It appears as if the story has to be repeated again—transposed to a new, the international, plane.

IV

THE prospects for peace, for freedom, for civility, and for a relatively stable economic order are bleak. In the cold war, we lived in an uncomfortable world, divided along ideological lines and threatened by the nuclear annihilation which a clash of the two hostile superpowers could induce. After the present crisis, we live in a global minefield, where many of the connecting wires lie buried beneath the surface and where the danger of deadly accidents is perhaps still greater. In the Arab-Israeli war and in its aftermath, we have seen this global interconnectedness of war, threatened economic collapse, and political and moral upheaval.*

The upheavals of the last few months might be said to have resulted in one thing: Henry Kissinger's world was restored. He has long seen the world in Hobbesian terms: power was the ultimate reality, and all nations subordinated morality to self-interest; the United States was and must act as the strongest power with global interests, while Europe and Japan had mere regional interests. It is a world in which he has proved to be an ingenious builder of bridges; he is less interested in repairing bridges. It is not as if he had willfully acted to realize his world, nor was it inevitable that it would emerge so starkly at this time. I mean to suggest that people will put less energy into staving off what is deemed inevitable.

Yet between Europe and America (and among them and Israel) there exists a community of fate, if not always of interests. The differences between us and the Europeans—and among the Europeans themselves—are staggering, and the pull toward a return to nationalist insularity is at least as great as the pull toward finding a new system of multilateral ties. The stakes are immense, too. As Secretary Kissinger said last December: "The problem before us is whether the nations of the Atlantic area as well as Japan, faced with self-evident problems that affect them all, can develop a common approach or whether they will consume themselves in the sort of rivalry that has destroyed other civilizations."†

One of these "self-evident problems" is the disparity of power among nations belonging to the same civilization. This disparity was always there; it is now greater than ever. In the next decade or so, the United States is likely to become once again the greatest world power. Its economy, its resources and vast market, will insure that, and the rising dollar is already a symbol of our renewed strength. It is an extraordinary reversal of fortune—or perhaps only of our conception of it—that after all the traumas of the 60's, after the prolonged agony of Vietnam, and after all our devaluations, we should return to the pinnacle.

It is a sobering prospect for us—and a chilling prospect for our partners. The last time we possessed this kind of global power we had as well certain intangible assets: the moral approbation of much of the world and our own exuberant self-confidence. Contrary to the fashionable views of our revisionist historians and despite our self-serving and at times bellicose conduct during the late 40's and 50's, we discharged our responsibilities with a certain beneficence—certainly as compared to imperial powers that preceded us or competed with us at the time. Perhaps we are today a wiser people, chastened by the 60's, but we are also a nation without friends or foes, and a nation in the midst of its worst constitutional crisis. Domestic instability renders world leadership infinitely more difficult.

In his Reith Lectures on the BBC, Alastair Buchan warned against the possibilities of a new American nationalism, fostered by President Nixon and his Secretary of State:

> But the United States still possesses so much weight in international politics that this would disorganize a vast fabric of alliance, trade, and monetary relationships, possibly drive Japan into irredentism and Western Europe into a sulky neutralism, risking the creation of that Fortress America, colder, poorer, less secure, which it is their prime objective to avoid. There is a more disquieting variant on the same theme, namely that under the leadership of these two figures [Nixon and Kissinger] who have no deep roots in their own society, the United States may be lured into perceiving a greater coincidence of interests with her fellow superpowers than with her fellow democracies.**

Alastair Buchan's warnings must be reckoned with. In the name of a new *Realpolitik*, deals and

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* I realize the inappropriateness of most historical analogies. Let me propose one, nevertheless, not for the sake of any particular exactitude but as a possible illumination of the magnitude of the changes we have undergone. It seems to me that the present crisis may be likened to the political crises of 1904-06, where the unexpected victory of the Japanese over the Russians triggered a revolution in Russia and helped to precipitate the first Moroccan crisis, during which France and Germany for the first time in thirty years confronted the possibility of another war. It was a global crisis which few people at the time recognized in all its stark implications. The world drifted on as before—to a world war and to another revolution in Russia.

† New York *Times*, December 28, 1973.

** New York *Times*, January 31, 1974.

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tacit bargains may be struck that bring short-term advantages but that may in the process weaken long-term goals and by accepting the morally unacceptable may compromise the moral economy of the world. This too can be argued in strictly "realistic" terms. A Europe permanently divided from America would hardly enhance the chances of détente; it would almost certainly tempt the Soviets into actions that would necessarily destroy détente. The great *Realpolitiker* of the past have often been able to perform brilliant feats of diplomacy, but they often forgot that power needs a consensus at home. It needs a moral resonance and a clarity of vision. The "routinization" of realism can easily degenerate into little more than what the British call bloody-mindedness.

As Henry Kissinger himself implicitly recognized, the disunity among nations of similar interests and political systems threatens the extinction of our civilization. Our civilization can also be subverted if tactical considerations of détente lead us to mute our sense of outrage at the suppression of human decency in a rival civilization. No problem is more difficult or more urgent than the attempt to forge new ties with Europe. In the relations between Europe and America, a kind of self-fulfilling paranoia has crept in: each side fears itself persecuted and betrayed—and its preemptive hostility brings about what it most fears. To slow down, perhaps to reverse that process, will require attention to diplomatic style as well as substance. Nations (and statesmen) resent the successive insults or snubs as much—or more—than carefully explained and unavoidable infringements of their interests. Within the transatlantic world, the quantum leap in incivility is not only an aesthetically displeasing fact; it is a political fact to be reckoned with. (One of the historic estrangements of two friendly peoples—the estrangement between Britain and Germany before 1914—was rooted in material antagonisms, gratuitously exacerbated by the bullying of the stronger and the suspicions of the weaker power.)

I have argued that the postwar era is over. Gone, too, are the simple—perhaps dangerously simple—certainties that went with it. At present, we live by improvisation. But decisions must be taken with some goals in mind, and these goals—in their broad perspective—must be clear to our peoples and consonant with their aspirations and traditions.

To offer prescriptions would be foolish. Much will depend on the Europeans—whether in the face of their newly discovered vulnerability and of new dangers they will succumb to a "sulky neutralism," to a collapse of will, to a "European Buddhism," that Nietzsche long ago foresaw as a particularly pernicious form of nihilism. The United States will have to assign the first priority to its dealings with Europe—and a new patience. We have not been innocent in the breakdown of the alliance, nor would we be immune to the terrible dangers that could once again emanate from Europe. We will need a combination of virtues that few nations have been able to summon and none perhaps had to summon under conditions more trying than ours. Our collective predicaments, rightly understood, may yet call forth collective efforts of intelligence and humane imagination that will devise ways to save the essence of our civilization in new and perhaps humbler forms.

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Journalism and Truth

Edward Jay Epstein

THE problem of journalism in America proceeds from a simple but inescapable bind: journalists are rarely, if ever, in a position to establish the truth about an issue for themselves, and they are therefore almost entirely dependent on self-interested "sources" for the version of reality that they report. Walter Lippmann pointed to the root of the problem more than fifty years ago when he made a painful distinction between "news" and truth. "The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act." Because news-reporting and truth-seeking have different ultimate purposes, Lippmann postulated that "news" could be expected to coincide with truth in only a few limited areas, such as the scores of baseball games or elections, where the results are definite and measurable. In the more complex and ambiguous recesses of political life, where the outcome is almost always in doubt or dispute, news reports could not be expected to exhaust, or perhaps even indicate, the truth of the matter. This divergence between news and truth stemmed not from the inadequacies of newsmen but from the exigencies of the news business, which limited the time, space, and resources that could be allotted to any single story. Lippmann concluded pessimistically that if the public required a more truthful interpretation of the world they lived in, they would have to depend on institutions other than the press.

Contemporary journalists would have some difficulty accepting such a distinction between news and truth. Indeed, newsmen now almost invariably depict themselves not merely as reporters of the fragments of information that come their way, but as active pursuers of the truth. In the current rhetoric of journalism, "stenographic reporting," where the reporter simply but accurately repeats what he has been told, is a pejorative term used to describe inadequate journalism; "investigative reporting," on the other hand, where the reporter supposedly ferrets out a hidden truth, is an honorific enterprise to which all journalists are supposed to aspire. In the post-Watergate era, moreover, even critics of the press attribute to it powers of discovery that go well beyond reporting new developments.

Yet despite the energetic claims of the press, the limits of journalism described by Lippmann still persist in basically the same form. Individual journalists may be better educated and motivated today than they were fifty years ago, but newspapers still have strict deadlines, which limit the time that can be spent investigating a story; a restricted number of news "holes," which limit the space that can be devoted to elucidating the details of an event; and fixed budgets, which limit the resources that can be used on any single piece of reportage. Today, as when Lippmann wrote, "The final page is of a definite size [and] must be ready at a precise moment."

Under these conditions, it would be unreasonable to expect even the most resourceful journalist to produce anything more than a truncated version of reality. Beyond this, however, even if such restraints were somehow suspended, and journalists had unlimited time, space, and financial resources at their disposal, they would still lack the forensic means and authority to establish the truth about a matter in serious dispute. Grand juries, prosecutors, judges, and legislative committees can compel witnesses to testify before them—offering the inducement of immunity to reluctant witnesses and the threat of perjury and contempt actions to inconsistent witnesses; they can subpoena records and other evidence, and test it all through cross-examination and other rigorous processes. Similarly, scientists, doctors, and other experts can establish facts in a disputed area, especially when there is unanimous agreement on the results of a particular test or analysis, because their authority and technical expertise are accepted in their distinct spheres of competency. Such authority derives from the individual reputation of the expert, certification of his *bona fides* by a professional group which is presumed to have a virtual monopoly of knowledge over the field, and a clearly articulated fact-finding procedure (such as was used, for instance,

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in establishing the erasures on the Nixon tapes). Even in more problematic areas, like the social sciences, academic researchers can resolve disputed issues. Acceptance of such an academic verdict, however, will depend heavily on the qualifications of the researcher, the degree to which his sources are satisfactorily documented, and the process of review by other scholars in the field through which, presumably, objections to the thesis are articulated and errors corrected. In all cases, a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for establishing the truth is the use of an acceptable procedure for examining, testing, and evaluating evidence.

Reporters possess no such wherewithal for dealing with evidence. Unlike the judicial officer, journalists cannot compel a witness to furnish them an account of an event. Witnesses need only tell reporters what they deem is in their own self-interest, and then they can lie or fashion their story to fit a particular purpose without risking any legal penalty. Nor can a journalist test an account by hostile cross-examination without jeopardizing the future cooperation of the witness. Indeed, given the voluntary nature of the relationship between a reporter and his source, a continued flow of information can only be assured if the journalist's stories promise to serve the interest of the witness (which precludes impeaching the latter's credibility). In recent years, journalists have cogently argued that if they are forced to testify before grand juries about their sources, they will be cut off from further information. The same logic applies with equal force to criticizing harshly or casting doubts on the activities of these sources. The misreporting of a series of violent incidents involving the Black Panthers in 1969 is a case in point: the reporters closest to the Black Panthers could not dispute their public claim that an organized campaign of genocide was being waged against them without jeopardizing the special access they had to Panther spokesmen.*

Moreover, since journalists generally lack the technical competence to evaluate evidence with any authority, they must also rely on the reports of authoritative institutions for their "facts." A reporter cannot establish the existence of an influenza epidemic, for instance, by conducting medical examinations himself; he must rely on the pronouncement of the Department of Health. (A journalist may of course become a doctor, but then his authority for reporting a fact rests on his scientific rather than journalistic credentials.) Whenever a journalist attempts to establish a factual proposition on his own authority, his conclusion must be open to question. For example, following the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 1973, *Newsweek* carried a dramatic report by a correspondent who claimed to have gained entrance to the Santiago morgue and personally examined the bodies of those killed after the coup. By inspecting the hands of the corpses, and the nature of their wounds, the correspondent concluded that these were workers with calloused hands who had been brutally executed. When the *Wall Street Journal* challenged these findings (on the basis of inconsistencies in the description of the morgue), the reporter acknowledged that he personally had spent only two minutes on the scene, and *Newsweek* fell back on an earlier unpublished report of a UN observer who claimed to have witnessed something similar in the Santiago morgue at some different time. While the dispute remained unsettled, the burden of proof was shifted from *Newsweek*'s own reporter to an outside "authority."

Finally, journalists cannot even claim the modicum of authority granted to academic researchers because they cannot fulfill the requirement of always identifying their sources, let alone documenting their claims. Protecting (and concealing) the identity of their informants is a real concern for journalists, and one on which their livelihood might well depend, but it also distinguishes the journalistic from the academic product. Without identifiable sources the account cannot be reviewed or corroborated by others with specialized knowledge of the subject. Even the most egregious errors may thus remain uncorrected. For instance, in what purported to be an interview with John W. Dean III, the President's former counsel, *Newsweek* reported that Dean would reveal in his public testimony that some White House officials had planned to assassinate Panama's head of government, but that the plan was aborted at the last minute. This *Newsweek* "exclusive" was circulated to thousands of newspapers in an advance press release, and widely published. When it turned out that the story was untrue—Dean did not testify about any such assassination plot, and denied under oath that he had discussed any substantial aspects of his testimony with *Newsweek* reporters—*Newsweek* did not correct or explain the discrepancy. Presumably, Dean was not the source for the putative "Dean Interview," and the unidentified source had misled *Newsweek* on what Dean was planning to say in his public testimony. Since the error was that of an unidentified source, *Newsweek* did not feel obligated to correct it in future editions.

It is not necessary to belabor the point that gathering news is a very different enterprise from establishing truth, with different standards and objectives. Journalists readily admit that they are dependent on others for privileged information and the ascertainment of facts in a controversial issue (although some might argue that the sphere of measurable and non-contro-

* For a fuller account, see my article, "The Black Panthers: A Question of Genocide," in the *New Yorker*, February 13, 1971.

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versial issues is larger than I suggest). Indeed, many of the most eminent journalists in America submitted affidavits in the Pentagon Papers case attesting that "leaks" and confidential sources are indispensable elements in the reporting of national news. And despite the more heroic public claims of the news media, daily journalism is largely concerned with finding and retaining profitable sources of prepackaged stories (whether it be the Weather Bureau, the Dow-Jones financial wire service, public-relations agencies, or a confidential source within the government). What is now called "investigative reporting" is merely the development of sources within the counter-elite or other dissidents in the government, while "stenographic reporting" refers to the development of sources among official spokesmen for the government. There is no difference in the basic method of reporting.

Even in the case of Watergate, which has become synonymous with "investigative reporting," it was the investigative agencies of the government and not the members of the press who assembled the evidence, which was then deliberately leaked to receptive reporters at the Washington *Post,* the Los Angeles *Times, Time,* and other journals. Within a week after the burglars were caught in Watergate in June 1972, FBI agents had identified the leaders of the break-in as employees of the Committee to Reelect the President (and former employees of the White House), traced the hundred-dollar bills found in their possession to funds contributed to President Nixon's re-election campaign, and interviewed one of the key conspirators, Alfred Baldwin, who in effect turned state's evidence, describing the wire-tapping operation in great detail and revealing that the transcripts had been delivered directly to CRP headquarters.

This evidence, which was presented to the grand jury (and eventually in open court), was systematically leaked by investigative agents in the case. (Why members of the FBI and the Department of Justice had become dissidents is another question.) The crucial evidence which the FBI investigation did not turn up—such as the earlier burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the offers of executive clemency, the intervention with the CIA, the suborning of perjury, the cash payoffs made from campaign contributions, the "enemies list," and the 1970 subversion control plan—came out not through "investigative reporting," but only when one of the burglars, John McCord, revealed his role in the cover-up to Judge John Sirica and when John Dean virtually defected to the U.S. prosecutor and disclosed the White House "horror stories." Indeed, it was John Dean, not the enterprising reporters of the Washington press corps, who was the real author of most of the revelations that are at the heart of the present Federal conspiracy indictments and the impeachment inquest. (And it was Ralph Nader, another non-journalist, who unearthed the contributions from the milk industry.) To be sure, by serving as conduits for the interested parties who wanted to release information about Watergate and other White House abuses of power, journalists played an extremely important role in the political process—but not as investigators or establishers of the truth.

THE reliance on "leaks" or "authoritative" sources might not be an insoluble problem for journalism if reporters had some means of evaluating them in advance, and publishing only those portions which did not distort reality, by being either untrue or out of context. Unfortunately, however, the inherent pressures of daily journalism severely reduce the possibility of verifying a leak or disclosure in advance of publication. Reporters can of course seek out more than one source on an issue, but there is no satisfactory way available, other than intuition, to choose among conflicting accounts. The democratic criterion of adding up confirming and disconfirming interviews, as if they were votes, produces no decisive result, as even total agreement might simply mean that a false account had been widely circulated, while total disagreement might mean that only the original source was privy to the truth tbout an event.

"Plausibility" is also an unsatisfactory criterion for evaluating leaks, since the liar is always capable of fashioning his account to fit the predispositions of the journalist to whom he is disclosing it, and thereby to make it appear plausible. Nor can a reporter simply give weight to the source that is most intimately involved with the issue, since those closest to a dispute might have the greatest interest in distorting or neglecting aspects of it, and might well be the least impartial. In certain instances, leaks, if publication were delayed, could be tested by the direction of unfolding events—for example, the advance disclosure of John Dean's testimony could have been refuted if *Newsweek* had delayed its story until Dean actually testified—but such a procedure would undercut the far more basic journalistic value of signaling the probable direction of events before they fully unfold. Given these circumstances, a journalist has little basis for choosing among conflicting sources. The New York *Times* thus carried two completely contradictory reports of the same insurrection in the Philippines in different sections of the same Sunday edition (February 17, 1974). The "News of the Week" section placed the casualties at 10,000 dead or missing, while the general news section refuted this higher figure and placed the total casualties at 276. Both accounts were based on sources within the Philippine government, and the editor of each section simply chose the account he preferred.

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WHEN journalists are presented with secret information about issues of great import, they become, in a very real sense, agents for the surreptitious source. Even if the disclosure is supported by authoritative documents, the journalist cannot know whether the information has been altered, edited, or selected out of context. Nor can he be certain what interest he is serving or what will be the eventual outcome of the leak.

Consider, for example, the disclosures by the columnist Jack Anderson of the minutes of a secret National Security Council meeting on the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war for which he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. Anderson claimed that the blunt orders by Dr. Henry Kissinger in these private meetings to "tilt" toward Pakistan contradicted Kissinger's public professions of neutrality; this claim received wide circulation, and sharply undermined Kissinger's credibility (although the *Wall Street Journal* demonstrated by printing the public statements to which Anderson referred that Kissinger was in fact consistent in both his private and public statements in expressing opposition to the Indian military incursion into East Pakistan). At the time it was generally presumed that the leak came from a dissident within the administration who favored India, or, at least, opposed the administration's policy in the subcontinent. Only two years afterward, as a byproduct of the Watergate investigation, was some light cast on the source of the leak. A White House investigation identified Charles E. Radford, a navy yeoman, who was working at the time as a stenographer, as the proximate source of the National Security Council minutes supplied to Anderson. But the investigation further revealed that Yeoman Radford was also copying and transmitting to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff highly classified documents in a "surreptitious operation" apparently designed to keep them aware of Kissinger's (and the President's) negotiations. And Yeoman Radford has testified that he acted only on the express orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and not on his own initiative, in passing documents. If this is indeed the case, it would appear that members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authored the Anderson leak in order to undermine the authority of Henry Kissinger (who was involved in developing the détente with China and Russia at that time). In this case, Anderson was used as an instrument in a power struggle he probably was unaware of—and which might have had nothing to do with the Indo-Pakistani war he was reporting on.

The important question is not whether journalists are deviously manipulated by their sources, but whether they can exert any real control over disclosures wrenched from contexts to which they do not have access or with which they are unfamiliar. In most circumstances, the logic of daily journalism impels immediate publication which, though it might result in a prized "scoop," divorces the journalist from responsibility for the veracity or consequences of the disclosure. Jack Anderson was thus able to explain a blatantly false report he published about the arrest for drunken driving of Senator Thomas Eagleton, then the Vice-Presidential nominee of the Democratic party, by saying that if he had delayed publication to check the allegation he would have risked being scooped by competitors.

But even in rare cases in which newspapers allot time and manpower to study a leak, as the New York *Times* did in the case of the Pentagon Papers, the information still must be revised into a form and format which will maintain the interest of the readers (as well as the editors). Since the *Times* decided not to print the entire study of the Vietnam war—which ran to more than 7,000 pages and covered a 25-year period—or even substantial parts of the narrative, which was complex and academic, sections of the material had to be reorganized and rewritten along a theme that would be comprehensible to its audience. The theme chosen was duplicity: the difference between what the leaders of America said about the Vietnam war in private and in public. The Pentagon study, however, was not written in line with this theme: it was an official Department of Defense analysis of decision-making and, more precisely, of how policy preferences crystallized within the Department. To convert this bureaucratic study into a journalistic exposé of duplicity required taking certain liberties with the original history: outside material had to be added and assertions from the actual study had to be omitted. For example, to show that the Tonkin Gulf resolution (by which in effect Congress authorized the escalation of the war, and which was editorially endorsed at the time by most major newspapers, including the New York *Times* and the Washington *Post*) resulted from duplicity, the *Times* had to omit the conclusion of the Pentagon Papers that the Johnson administration had tried to avoid the fatal clash in the Tonkin Gulf, and had to add evidence of possible American provocations in Laos, which were not actually referred to in the Pentagon Papers themselves.

Journalists, then, are caught in a dilemma. They can either serve as a faithful messenger for some subterranean interest, or they can recast the message into their own version of the story by adding, deleting, or altering material. The first alternative assures that the message will be accurately relayed to the intended audience, although the message itself might be false or misleading. The latter alternative, while lessening the source's control over the message, increases the risk of further distortion, since the journalist cannot be aware of the full context and circumstances surrounding the disclosure. In neither case can journalists be certain of either the truth or the intended purpose of what they publish.

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Such a dilemma cannot be remedied by superior newsmen or more intensive journalistic training. It arises not out of defects in the practice of journalism, but out of the source-reporter relationship which is part and parcel of the structure of modern journalism.

To some degree, the tension in the dilemma could be alleviated if journalists gave up the pretense of being establishers of truth, recognized themselves as agents for others who desired to disclose information, and clearly labeled the circumstances and interests behind the information they reported so that it could be intelligently evaluated. By concealing the machinations and politics behind a leak, journalists suppress part of the truth surrounding the story. Thus the means by which the medical records of Senator Thomas Eagleton were acquired and passed on to the Knight newspapers (which won the 1973 Pulitzer Prize for disclosing information contained in these records) seem no less important than the Senator's medical history itself, especially since copies of the presumably illegally-obtained records were later found in the White House safe of John Ehrlichman. (In rifling through Larry O'Brien's personal files, the Watergate burglars were probably looking for material damaging to O'Brien and the Democrats; if they had succeeded, such material would no doubt have found its way into print by being leaked to "investigative journalists.") Similarly, the motives and circumstances behind the well-timed leaks to the press by elements in the Nixon administration which ultimately forced Justice Abe Fortas from the Supreme Court do not necessarily make a less important part of the story than any of the alleged improprieties committed by Fortas. And the leaks provided by senior executives in the FBI and other investigative agencies in an attempt to resist White House domination still remains the unreported part of the Watergate story.

Since journalists cannot expose these hidden aspects of a story without damaging the sources they are dependent on for information (and honors), they cannot realistically be expected to label the interest behind any disclosure. (Indeed, it is a practice among journalists to mislead their readers by explicitly denying as occasion arises that they received information from their real source.) Under these conditions, journalism can serve as an important institution for conveying and circulating information, and signalling changes in the direction of public policy and discourse, but it cannot serve as a credible investigator of the "hidden facts" or the elusive truths which determine them.

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Is Isolationism Possible?

Raymond Aron

A SMALL power restricts its ambitions to physical survival and the preservation of its legal independence and its institutions. A great power, over and above physical security, moral survival, and the well-being of its inhabitants, acts to achieve an ill-defined purpose, which I should call the maintenance or creation of a favorable international environment.

The meaning and scope of the notion of a favorable environment vary with circumstances. In the balance-of-power system which prevailed in Europe between 1876 and 1914, for example, the potentially leading power, the Reich of Bismarck, contented itself with diplomacy in the narrow sense, to prevent the formation of any coalition likely to overtake it and its allies in resources and military strength. During that period neither Bismarck nor Wilhelm II was ruled by ideological considerations. The conservative outlook shared by the Prussian and Russian dynasties was displayed on several occasions, but it did not stand in the way of the Franco-Russian alliance or the alignments in 1914, which, despite the bombardments of propaganda, echoing the guns, hardly depended at all on ideological affinities.

This cleavage between the relations among states and the relations among regimes or societies is not a constant in European history; it became a necessity on two occasions, however—to put an end to the wars of religion in the 17th century, and to put an end to the wars growing out of the French Revolution. On the first occasion citizens had to be members of the state church except where the state had succeeded in excluding religion from the sphere of politics by declaring itself neutral and non-partisan. On the second occasion, after 1815, the sovereigns first tried for some years to buttress the balance among states by joint action to keep the monster of revolution in fetters, but later reverted to greater moderation in practice (although the Russian army intervened on behalf of the emperor of Austria in Hungary in 1848).

The fact that American diplomacy after 1947 was at least negatively ideological will not surprise any observer with a historical memory. What other course was open when the United States was confronting Stalinist Russia, and when diplomatic alignments between states seemed to depend on their internal regimes? Inevitably the resistance to Soviet expansion took two forms, a defense of the lines of separation (which implied an acceptance of spheres of influence) and support for the established parties or powers at odds with a Marxist-Leninist minority. In Europe the first form may be construed as a variation on the traditional diplomacy of the balance of power; in Asia it led, perhaps accidentally, to a war (Korea), and this war in turn continued in a confrontation between Communist China and a United States enmeshed in its system of military alliances with the insular states, including Nationalist China in Formosa. The second form of resistance included several spectacular episodes, such as the overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran with some aid from the CIA, and the military interventions in the Caribbean (Guatemala and the Dominican Republic), an area which American diplomacy even during the isolationist era traditionally regarded as a private American preserve; and it also included constant semi-clandestine activity in a number of countries. The Vietnam war lies, so to speak, at the point at which these two forms of resistance meet, for the defense of the demarcation line went hand in hand with the attempt to establish a regime in South Vietnam capable of surviving on its own.

The "para-Marxist" critics—or at least some of them—assert that in order to preserve its system of imperialist exploitation, the United States must stand guard everywhere in the world, and that the entire system will crumble if even a single component is impaired. The liberal critics—who originate in the postwar Establishment, and look back with pride to the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine—find fault with the militarization of containment or its globalization (the transfer to Asia), the failure to take account of

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the changes within the Soviet world since 1947, and the disproportion in the Vietnam war between aims and costs. Certain neo-isolationist commentators argue, finally, that nuclear weapons have radically altered the conditions of physical security. For a country like the United States, they maintain, security diminishes as external interests or commitments increase. With a thousand intercontinental ballistic missiles, forty-one nuclear submarines each armed with sixteen Polaris or Poseidon missiles, to say nothing of long-range bombers and aircraft launched from carriers, what has the United States to fear from any power, even one that were master of the Eurasian land mass from Brest to Vladivostock?

This argument seems to me obvious rather than paradoxical. No one has ever been able seriously to believe that the alliances with Australia and New Zealand, or even with Formosa, the Philippines, and Japan, contribute to the security of the United States in a nuclear era. What they in fact contribute to is the security of the allied countries, while also enhancing the American Republic's ability to intervene with armed force, if need be, to consolidate a form of order.

It is preferable, however, to avoid "escalation to extremes." *In theory,* deterrence would work just as effectively against a nuclear force installed in Cuba as against Soviet missiles four or five thousand miles from New York or Washington. Without taking into consideration the reduction of the time interval between the launching of a missile and its strike on the target, the United States must not, in a strategy based on deterrence—or, in other words, on the presumed determination of the head of state—create the impression, even if illusory, of a weakening of its will. With this reservation, I do not see how anyone could reject the proposition on which the new isolationism is based. The real question seems to me to be something else: is the situation so new as all of us are prone to think? That is, would German victory in 1917 (or a compromise peace) or even the victory of the Third Reich and Japan in World War II really have endangered the physical security of the United States?

The doctrinaires of the balance of power all answered these questions in the affirmative, because, being against crusading and in favor of intervention, they wished to defend intervention without transgressing the bounds of a realistic philosophy of inter-state relations. Since, to say the least, their thesis has never been evident and has never been demonstrated, they never succeeded in fully convincing their fellow countrymen. If revisionist schools have arisen to contest the Establishment's conventional version following both world wars, the cause is not, or not solely, moralism or populism, the revolt against the bankers, the arms merchants, or the intellectuals of the Eastern seaboard. The reason is that as an insular power in relation to the Eurasian land mass, the United States has never been directly threatened by the breakdown of the continental balance, as Great Britain felt itself threatened for centuries.

Would the ambitions of the Germany of Wilhelm II, had it won the war, have expanded beyond the Old Continent? Would a threat of German invasion have compelled the United States to militarize its civil life to an extent incompatible with the preservation of its institutions? I simply do not believe it. Because of the size of its population, the abundance of its resources, and its geographical location, the United States had little to fear in 1917 from German hegemony, at any rate not for ten or twenty years to come.

Advances in military technology did somewhat impair the American Republic's insular advantages and invulnerability twenty years later; but neither Japan's empire nor Hitler's directly endangered the country. If its Co-Prosperity Sphere had been established, Japan would have had enough to deal with for decades without launching an assault on the West Coast of the United States or even its outer defense bases. On the other hand, having become an Asian power by annexing the Philippines, the United States would have had to live with the possible loss of its possessions or an order incompatible with its conception of the just and unjust: in short, in a hostile environment.

As for Germany, after his victory over France, Hitler hoped to treat with Great Britain, for he admired its empire. He preferred to destroy the empire of the Czars, which had become the Soviet Union. A totally unscrupulous and non-ideological American diplomacy with complete freedom of movement, could such be conceived, would not have been irresistibly drawn by an evident military threat from Hitler or Japan into the choice which the United States actually came in time to adopt.

Drawing a distinction between physical security and the creation of an environment favorable to the expansion of the national values, though valid analytically, is rather hazardous. No great power defines its national interest simply as its physical security. Diplomats think and act within a world already structured by animosities or sympathies which cannot be reduced to calculations of strength or considerations of balance. The animosity against the empire of the Rising Sun and against the Third Reich in that era of fascism and imperialism left American diplomacy no choice but futile protest or war. In retrospect American foreign policy in the 30's seems execrable because it refused to choose. Most Americans knew that they would not tolerate the victory of Hitler or Tojo's Japan. They also knew that they were not in the front line. In the course of the

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30's they devised the least rational combination, the enactment of legislation designed to *prevent* what had happened once before, 1914-17, and a hostile attitude toward the two states they finally fought after 1941.

Isolationism, as defined by *a refusal to take an explicit and resolute stand in European and Asian conflicts,* is discredited in the 20th century because at the moment of truth the decision-makers, public opinion, and events have twice brought about intervention. The question is not so much whether, if American diplomacy were governed solely by considerations of physical security, it could or should stand aside from the turmoils of history; the real question is whether nonalignment and the refusal of "entangling alliances" would not give rise some day to crises from which once again, however much it wished to abstain, the American Republic would be incapable of standing aside. If, as I believe, American diplomacy was not determined by military danger or calculations of equilibrium either in 1917, or in 1941, or in 1947, the security enjoyed by the American Republic today in the shadow of the nuclear apocalypse is no guarantee at all against the dialectic of politics or the waves of passion that were responsible for two interventions, which, had forewarning of them been given, might perhaps have prevented the wars themselves.

Hence I do not attach much importance to the argument for a new isolationism based on the atomic revolution in weapons. Not that it is false, it is manifestly true.* But it has always been true that the less the United States concerned itself with the affairs of Europe and Asia, the better was its chance of escaping war, and that it owed to its insular position and its size a security not directly or immediately threatened by European or Asian empires. The nuclear revolution forced critics to discard statistical comparisons and to participate in the real debate, which is whether the American Republic is willing to play a part in the inter-state system similar to that of all great states in the past, not in order to insure its physical security, which is taken for granted in any case, but to exert its power and influence.

To descend from this lofty level of abstraction to the world of history as it unfolds before our eyes in the early 1970's, the rejection of an imperial role could, basically, take three different concrete forms: an attempt to establish an autonomous equilibrium at both ends of the Eurasian land mass without any guarantee or prior commitment by the United States; a growing lack of American interest in local conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast Asia; an indifference to political disturbances within other countries, even if they favored or made possible the accession to power of a Marxist-Leninist party. Would all this be desirable? Should the United States, in its own interest, in its allies' interest, or in the world's interest, maintain its two major alliances, those with Western Europe and Japan? Should it abdicate its exorbitant pretension to quell revolutionary movements?

The rupture or relaxation of the American-Japanese alliance and the Atlantic alliance would probably involve nuclear proliferation in the short or long run. If the United States were publicly to announce its refusal to insure its allies' future security in the belt of islands girdling the Asian continent, Japan would undoubtedly have no alternative but to reconsider the policy on which it has presently staked all: the policy of being a great economic power rather than a great military power, of possessing conventional weapons only, with an air force and navy designed for areas near the islands rather than distant expeditions.

In the abstract, the two arguments adduced by the isolationists are plausible, namely that the new nuclear states would not necessarily behave less rationally than the five, or the two, earlier nuclear states, and that conflicts in Asia, even nuclear conflicts, would not jeopardize American physical security because the United States would not be involved. But the attitude suggested in reasoning of this kind is not really compatible with historical experience. To suppose that regions or countries that play a leading part in the world market can be involved in hostilities disruptive of trade relations without the slightest intervention by the paramount state or the dominant economy, is to concoct a scenario which any historian would on the face of it find highly improbable.

Isolationism in Asia is the extreme reaction to an extreme "militancy." In northern Asia the Soviet Union, Japan, and Communist China already constitute a subsystem, whose equilibrium would be upset by a complete American withdrawal. Neither the Soviet Union nor China has any territorial claims on Japan.† Neither of them contemplates invading the islands. The wealth of Japan is not of the sort that can be seized by armed force. It is the two Communist states with common frontiers and alien populations on the marches of their empires that in fact have motives for fighting each other, according to historical experience. By taking the initiative in rapprochement with Peking, the United States has upset the system built up after the Korean war and has promoted the emergence of another system more consonant with the traditional logic of diplomacy. The United States both gains and

* Intercontinental missiles do not change the situation; the United States needed bases abroad to defend others rather than to defend itself. After 1945, bombers and aircraft carriers gave the United States all the means of deterrence it needed before the latest nuclear revolution, missiles.

† Japan has secondary territorial claims on the Soviet Union (some of the Kuriles) and on China (Peking or Taiwan) regarding some small islands to the north of Taiwan.

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loses thereby: it gained Sino-Soviet neutrality toward a negotiated settlement in Vietnam and it gains the role of a third party standing between Moscow and Peking; it loses to some extent the preponderant role in Asia it held for twenty-five years, for Japan will now conduct a diplomacy of its own, concerned as much with opportunities in Siberia and China as with scowls in Washington. Since in the perspective of the next ten years the military alliance between Japan and the United States is not likely to involve any risks, the new system will probably stabilize itself calmly and peacefully. The real question concerns the psychological balance *within* the United States between commercial rivalry and political-military alliance.

In Europe, isolationism would mean the dissolution of the Atlantic alliance, with the Europeans themselves assuming responsibility for their defense. In choosing withdrawal, after arguing in favor of nonproliferation for fifteen years, American decision-makers would be setting a possibly unfortunate, although not unprecedented, example. By preaching nonproliferation, American Presidents implicitly undertook to guarantee the security of those of their allies who followed their instructions and obeyed their injunctions. If they suddenly lost interest in those who had put their faith in them, they would be playing false both to their commitments and to common sense.

Nobody, the isolationist will reply, proposes any such revision. What is unreasonable and ultimately unacceptable is that two-hundred-fifty million Europeans with a per-capita income far higher than the Eastern European countries should confess themselves incapable of undertaking their own defense and rush to Uncle Sam like frightened children begging him not to withdraw a few thousand troops—troops that President Roosevelt had said were not going to stay in Europe anyway after the end of World War II.

I must confess to some sympathy with this line of argument. I even believe that if the United States were to follow the neo-isolationists' advice in this matter, it might perhaps render political Europe a service similar to that which it rendered economic Europe a quarter of a century ago.* If the Europeans were confronted now with a vague uneasiness about a possible withdrawal, but with the certainty that the last American soldier will have recrossed the Atlantic by a stated date, would they not find in themselves and in the smell of danger the initiative they need to rise above their status as protected states? In this case too, of course, nuclear proliferation would have to replace nuclear nonproliferation as the catchword of American diplomacy.

The obstacles to this are familiar. If there were an Anglo-French deterrent force, what authority would control its use? Would the Germans trust it as they trust the American force? Would they pay part of its cost without having their finger on the trigger? Do Europeans not prefer equality in dependence to the inequality which the possession by some of the weapons regarded as decisive would create? And so on. Shock treatment—the announcement that the American army will withdraw by a stated date—confronts isolationists with a difficult choice: either the United States maintains its guarantee without sealing it by the presence of troops, in which case it is accepting the same responsibilities with augmented dangers; or it withdraws both troops and guarantee and trusts to the Europeans' instinct of self-preservation, in which case the same contradiction would arise as in Asia between economic interdependence and political-military dissociation.

In the abstract again, the proponents of a doctrine of moderate isolationism are quite right to argue that the United States has no need to guarantee the security of Japan and Western Europe in order to trade with these two partner-rivals. It remains to be seen whether its political and strategic withdrawal does not lead to protectionism (the phenomenon typical of the 30's) or, more likely, to an aggressive attitude toward its allies in trade and monetary negotiations. A majority of Europeans, especially the Germans, still consider an American military presence necessary to their security. Not that they fear aggression in the traditional sense; what they do fear is that in the event of a local disturbance of the equilibrium, they may lose the freedom of action of which they feel assured by the reciprocal paralysis of the two superpowers. Isolationists contend in reply that Americans will no longer fight for anyone in any event, not even to preserve the existence of Israel. This the Europeans simply do not believe, and they hold that the Soviets still have a healthy respect for the might of the American Republic and mistrust the giant's reactions, which are still liable to be irrational or unpredictable.

Not only the cold war, but the entire postwar era, came to an end with Nixon's first term, his visits to Peking and Moscow, and the winding up of the Vietnam war. Two major uncertainties loom over the evolving new system, one depending on circumstances, the other of historical significance.

* The United States would not, however, be rendering itself an economic service. The cost in foreign exchange of stationing the American troops in Europe is at most between $1 and $1.5 billion (taking German purchases of equipment into account). In budgetary terms American troops cost less in Europe than in the United States. The threat of withdrawal (a threat presented as due to pressure from the Senate) is used by U.S. negotiators as a covert form of blackmail to extract commercial or monetary concessions. The position of strength insured to the United States by the military protection afforded the Europeans is undoubtedly worth, from its point of view, more than a billion dollars.

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The first uncertainty lies in the mood of the American people and the extent to which the makers of foreign policy are dependent on it. It is as if the intellectuals, academics, and journalists have not yet accepted the fact that it is entirely *normal* for the American Republic to participate in the play of inter-state relations. In their revulsion from the horrors and absurdities of the Vietnam war they have conjured up, in order to rationalize their detachment from the outside world, an imaginary picture of spheres of influence stabilized once and for all, a Soviet Union permanently satisfied with the status quo, Japan and Europe already great powers, and armed force finally inoperative. Some of them reconstruct an imaginary history in which the United States is supposed to have provoked Stalin into a policy of expansionism, while others attribute urban decay, crime, racial tension, and all the ills with which American society is manifestly afflicted to the cost of exercising global power.

No one can tell what the money spent on Korea and Vietnam might otherwise have been used for. But to ascribe the urban crisis merely to lack of funds is to fall into the same error as that which was responsible in part for the Vietnam tragedy, the belief that the key to the solution of all human problems is simply economic or technological. The social processes which caused the crisis cannot be halted by the application of a few billion dollars more. The black minority has made more progress in the past fifteen years than in the whole of the previous half-century despite all the expenditure lavished on the war in Vietnam. An injection of dollars will no more abolish the abject poverty of the misfits and the frustrations engendered or intensified by progress itself than it will wipe out the anomie and crime spawned by the urban ghettos. A sector of Americans—not solely the young—rejected the values and virtues proper and propitious to a consumer society before the Vietnam war and will continue to do so now that America has left Vietnam.

An isolationist who harbors no illusions—I refer to Robert W. Tucker—sees quite clearly the price to be paid: a reduction in American power and prestige all over the world. Yet as Tucker expressly states, the decision-makers in Washington, if not the American people, have acquired a taste for power. Senators and journalists denounce the "arrogance of power" all the more bitterly in that power is the appurtenance of the President and his entourage, of diplomats, of the military, of agents of the intelligence services or the CIA. Anyone who has had much to do with ministers and their aides, whether American or French, knows how greatly attached—professionally, so to speak—they are to power and how much they insist on being heard and obeyed. What the Senate has lost the Executive has appropriated both at home and abroad. The Vietnam war provided the legislature with the chance to recover some of its prerogatives which had fallen into abeyance, but I can hardly see the President and his advisers and the organizations that serve them voluntarily surrendering the status they enjoy by virtue of their function in the inter-state system and their weight in the world market. American anti-Communism, Tucker himself tells us, is based quite as much on the wish to retain an influence over other countries as on an ideological obsession.

Some might also say that an imperial state has never abdicated without being compelled to do so. This may be true. On the other hand, I believe that it is dangerous to put one's faith in historical precedent. Public opinion has not been won over once and for all to imperial diplomacy; the political class which took up the international challenge after World War II no longer exists and has not been replaced by another to which it can hand the torch; the dual crisis, socio-moral and monetary, conventionally attributed to the Vietnam war, conduces to withdrawal or an aggressive dollar diplomacy—two attitudes equally unpropitious to a necessary, but not necessarily agonizing, reappraisal.

A phase of relative lack of interest in the world at large will therefore succeed the quarter-century of American paramountcy, a paramountcy which has now in any case been relegated to the past. Brezhnev's Soviet Union is a bore; the United States is still interesting, but as a laboratory rather than a model. The two superpowers have now genuinely accepted a status of equality; but when it comes down to bedrock, to the question of determination, does this equality still hold good? Is it true, as some commentators like to think, that armed force exercises smaller and smaller effect on inter-state relations?

This brings me to the historical uncertainty. Since 1945 the Soviet Union has made use of its armed forces only twice, both times against its brother-socialists, the second with restraint and care to insure the minimum loss of human life. The United States has waged two land wars in Asia and now says—just as it did after 1953, but this time with bitter determination—that it will never again fight a land war in Asia. In all probability the decision-makers will learn to live with revolutionary movements, even if their allegiance is Marxist-Leninist (purely rhetorical in most cases, if they are not adjacent to the Soviet Union). Of their own accord they will adopt the line advocated by the isolationists, but also recommended by the moderate critics of American "globalism."

None of the standard devices of historical experience, such as spheres-of-influence or the balance of power, can be applied as it stands to the system into which President Nixon wishes to fit the American Republic. Its break-up into parts, the *horizontal* or

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geographical (the subsystems projected on the map of the world) and the *vertical* (the spheres of military, political, commercial, and ideological relations); the shaping of a transnational economic system; the contrast between the wealth of some and the poverty of others; the doubts of the wealthy about the route that led them to wealth, and their disillusion with it, even as the poor are eager to take the same route—all these factors make for a world of unprecedented complexity. The United States will exert less influence on this world than it has exercised in the past twenty-five years; this will perhaps enable it to avoid some of the frustrations of impotent might.

To the American paramountcy of this quarter-century the Europeans owe, in part at least, both their progress and their security. They do not, however, feel bound by any gratitude—a term and sentiment alike unrecognized by states—but henceforth they have an opportunity to forge a future for themselves. The paradoxical situation of geographical proximity to the Soviet universe and moral kinship with the Atlantic world exists, and will continue to exist, as long as the Communist party of the Soviet Union continues to subject the Soviet economy to administrative planning, and thought to a stifling discipline. According to George F. Kennan, containment was to last until Soviet power became unsettled by its own contradictions or was mitigated by the erosion of time. Yet the decay of ideology has divested Soviet power of its revolutionary intent and its force of attraction, but has not divested the men in the Kremlin of their ambitions.

IN MATCH play the only way to become champion is to challenge the titleholder. Not so in the inter-state tournament; here it is the titleholder who must perpetually put his claim to the test. The isolationist will prefer to sulk in his tent; the globalist will try to win every match. What tradition teaches is not cynicism but Aristotelian prudence—the supreme virtue in this world under the now-visited moon.

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Sylvia Plath Reconsidered

John Romano

They will wonder if I was important.
—Sylvia Plath, "Last Words"

As a general rule, no writer is responsible for the vagaries of his posthumous literary reputation. His life may come in time to attract and sustain more interest than his work. A significance extraneous to the real nature of his achievement as a writer may attach itself to his name. Eventually he, or she, may become the object of blind esteem and cultish adulation. But where the art is of demonstrable value, we can still assume that it is not the writer but his audience who has strayed from the center of artistic concern. As a general rule. There are more equivocal cases—F. Scott Fitzgerald is one—in which a lack of real fulfillment in the work serves unintentionally to invite the intervention of the reader among the variables of life and art. A great writer interprets his biography for us, and locates and defines its significance too persuasively for us to interfere. The life of a Yeats or a Rilke, whatever its inherent charisma or cultural relevance, cannot easily be cheapened into images of martyrdom and archetype.

Sylvia Plath, martyr and archetype in the imagination of many, dangerously courted some portion of the blame for these irrelevant labels in more than one aspect of her poetry. Admiring critics in the decade since she committed suicide at the age of thirty have tried assiduously to dissociate her from the death-happy exultation of her cult. Yet this very ghoulishness has marked, often enough, their own accounts of her talent. It was A. Alvarez who, shortly after Sylvia Plath's own solemnizing gesture, established the orthodox tone of her praise:

> When Sylvia Plath died I wrote an epitaph on her in *The Observer,* at the end of which I said, "The loss to literature is inestimable." But someone pointed out to me that this wasn't quite true. The achievement of her final style is to make poetry and death inseparable. The one could not exist without the other. And this is right. In a curious way, the poems read as though they were written posthumously. It needed not only great intelligence and insight to handle the material of them, it also took a kind of bravery. Poetry of this order is a murderous art.

Murderous, that is, rather than suicidal: Sylvia Plath is a martyr in this view to the demands of her art. It follows that to appreciate her poetry we must recognize the rightness, even the value, of her self-destruction.

The aesthetic that underlies this claim is not only confused but disastrous; though Alvarez's sympathy for the poet is incontrovertible, what he urges is ultimately unfeeling and inhumane. And though not all subsequent appreciation of Plath has struck his peculiar and abyss-dwelling note, it has been decisive for the conventional understanding of her poetry until now, and may be heard even in the more responsible views of Stephen Spender. Of the crisis of the spirit from which Plath produced "these disconcerting, terrifying poems," Spender has written: "The guarantees of the authenticity of the situation are insanity (or near-insanity) and death." Her poetry is the proof that she meant what she said. One inspired disciple of this view has gone so far as to sneer at Kafka for lacking Plath's "final courage," though he shared her vision of life's meaninglessness. A special case is her canonization by the New Feminists, several of whom have suggested that if there had been a movement for Women's Liberation in 1963, her suicide might not have been necessary. Alvarez has done much—very nearly everything—to influence our way of receiving the poems, and some of it has been useful; for example, his sketch of the poet's last, dismal weeks, alone with two children in a cold and depressingly Victorian flat in London, the phone out, the muse violent. But his disservice may be more enduring still.

What is most suspicious and disconcerting, however, about this intense and apparently irresponsible collation of her suicide and her poetry

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is the ease with which the case may be supported by citation from the poems themselves:

The blood jet is poetry,
There is no stopping it.

Equally troubling are those moments, for example in "Lady Lazarus," when Plath envisions suicide attempts, quite as the cult of Plath does, as fundamentally performances, pieces of art, like poetry itself:

The peanut-crunching crowd
Shoves in to see

Them unwrap me hand and foot—
The big strip tease.
Gentlemen, ladies,

These are my hands,
My knees.

The notion of theatrical suicide is satirized, of course, but it is also relished, even sexually relished: "The big strip tease." (It may be said that the analogy between suicide and strip tease is not obscene only in the complicated sense in which Fellini is not obscene.) The poem records a series of three unsuccessful suicide attempts, each of which the lady is proud of having performed, proud of having survived:

I have done it again.
One year in every ten
I manage it—

A sort of walking miracle . . .

The tone is weirdly masochistic and show-offy. ("I guess you could say I had a call") and remarkably free of dread. But it's not the private and discreet suicide that appeals to her, nor, indeed, the successful one. Rather,

It's the theatrical

Comeback in broad day
To the same place, the same face,
the same brute
Amused shout:

"A miracle!"
That knocks me out.

I do not mean to say of such a poem that, having written it, Sylvia Plath had invited the "peanut-crunching crowd" to a celebration of her own, real suicide, though come they did. Nor does she imply that a performance of this kind could be painlessly observed: "There is a charge/ For the eyeing of my scars." But even in this detail, self-importance mixes with self-loathing: a decidedly public self-immolation.

THE most suitable defense against the charge I have just made is that the "I" of Sylvia Plath's poetry is an artificial construct, and not Sylvia herself—in spite of the avowed "confessional" models, such as Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton, in spite of the unmistakable and direct autobiographical inspirations, in spite of the fact that more than a few of her poems, and among them the most important, are partially or wholly unintelligible without autobiographical gloss. It is not Sylvia Plath, but the *persona* of "Lady Lazarus," who is self-aggrandizing, the *persona* of "Daddy" who is vindictive, etc. I am not convinced by this defense, though it has New Critical good sense behind it, because in the case of Plath it leaves too much excepted, too much in awkward doubt. I suspect that when it is rigorously prosecuted, and it rarely is, it would end in a preference for the earliest Plath, the poems of *Colossus* (1960), a technically sure but derivative and generally bland first book. Plath's achievement, whatever its merits, rests on the posthumous collections, *Ariel* (1966), *Crossing the Water* (1971), and *Winter Trees* (1971), where indisputable originality of voice and subject matter abounds. One has the feeling, in turning from *Colossus* to these, that a mask has been dropped, and any understanding of her poetry which depends upon the assumption of a mask must stop where these begin. Her husband, Ted Hughes, said of the horrific "Last Words" ("I do not want a plain box, I want a sarcophagus/ With tigery stripes, and a face on it/ Round as the moon . . .") that it "would have been safer said by a *persona* in some kind of play," but implicit in his words is the concession that the speaker is Sylvia Plath.

Moreover, it is not the autobiographical nature of the poems that wants defending. To find the occasions of poetry in the events of one's life is, after all, the rule and not the exception. But where the poet chooses a method especially "confessional" and direct, as in Plath's poetry, or as in Robert Lowell's *Life Studies,* there are two contingencies. First, the poet runs the risk, more openly than ever, of sheer self-absorption. He is granted unusual privileges of egotism, and his art may fall victim to the pleasures of performance. Secondly, the obligation to be shrewd and knowing about the self becomes especially keen: a lack of self-knowledge can have dire aesthetic consequences. By self-knowledge I mean not some tidy, amateur delineation of psychic cause and psychic effect, but a sensitive, probative apprehension of root contradiction, root ambivalence in the self, without which the poetry, however "felt" or strident, must be shallow, unsponsored from within. The poem "Lady Lazarus" is, in the end, not autobiographical enough: it tells us something about how much she suffers, and less about how, and nothing about why. And that is true of Sylvia Plath's presentation of the other themes of her poetry: death, and bearing children, and hating one's father, and going without love.

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I DON'T well see how anyone who has read James Dickey's *Deliverance* could call Plath's *The Bell Jar* (1963) a "poet's novel," though that is the rather evasive description it is usually given. It is composed "almost in stanzas," Mary Ellmann has written. "Each episode brief, brittle, encapsulated. . . . The progress from one to another is poetic, too, less in time than in image." It is true that there is a tendency in the prose to dilate upon analogies and images until they achieve an autonomous significance rare in conventional novels:

> I kept hearing about the Rosenbergs over the radio and at the office till I couldn't get them out of my mind. It was like the first time I saw a cadaver. For weeks afterward, the cadaver's head—or what there was left of it—floated up behind my eggs and bacon at breakfast and . . . pretty soon I felt as though I were carrying that cadaver's head around with me on a string, like some black noseless balloon stinking of vinegar.

All of this novel's successes are of this sort; as a narrative it is pedestrian. The chapter in which Esther Greenwood learns to ski, for example, could hardly be duller. But when we find her poised, alone, at the top of the slope, the novel becomes, for a paragraph, a "poet's" again:

> The great, gray eye of the sky looked back at me, its mist-shrouded sun focusing all the white and silent distances that poured from every point of the compass, hill after pale hill, to stall at my feet.

This has some of the elegance, though none of the power, of the fine "Sheep in Fog" from *Ariel.* Halfway down the slope, however, she is deserted by poetry:

> I felt my lungs inflate with the inrush of scenery —air, mountains, trees, people. I thought, "This is what it is to be happy."

Of course, the genre to which *The Bell Jar* genuinely belongs is unmistakable. It would have been hard indeed to write a novel about adolescent *Weltschmerz* in the early 50's without feeling the influence of J. D. Salinger, even if one hadn't been an undergraduate of modish literary pretensions at the time. The confrontation between innocence and the big city, the embarrassed and embarrassing pretense at knowing its ways; the sexually advanced roommate, the first sexual encounter and its horrors, the inevitable boozy nausea; the return to a distant and uncomprehending parent, the withdrawal and mounting fascination with death, the ultimate breakdown. The novels are similar enough, in fact, and *The Catcher in the Rye* sufficiently out of fashion, to have taunted one sympathetic reader of Plath's into an ill-tempered defense. After noting that Esther is "more intelligent" than Holden, and "a potential artist" besides, Charles Newman makes the point that

> Holden Caulfield, for all his charm, is a psychotic; which is to say, his world is the pure world of his own distortion, and no conflicting interpretation is allowed to obtrude upon his narration. The fascinating and terrifying technique of *The Bell Jar,* on the other hand, is the continuous conflict between the real world and the narrator's desperate reconstruction of it.

He raises the question upon which any judgment of *The Bell Jar* must turn: to what extent does the world beyond the parameters of Esther's psychosis seem real? Sylvia Plath is reported to have said of the novel that she tried to "show how isolated a person feels when he is suffering a breakdown. . . . I've tried to picture my world and the people in it as seen through the distorting lens of a bell jar. . . . My second book will show that same world as seen through the eyes of health." It is certainly unfair to adduce the genius of Proust, which was to write both these novels at once; but no novel could be unvaryingly one or the other without a damning thinness, and in respect of this it may be that *Catcher* comes nearer the mark. Salinger succeeds in conveying to us that it is in his narrator's unwillingness to tell us "all that David Copperfield kind of crap"—the complex personal history, the why of suffering—that his trouble is fixed. The world beyond the parameters of the psychosis includes, then, not only the material world and its threatening "otherness," but the psychotic's own submerged past, the repressed realms of the self. It is here that *The Bell Jar* fails: we never see around the edges of the distorting lens, either outward into the world, or inward, into the self. But experiences whose effects the distortion of the lens will intensify—suicide, attempted rape, electroshock therapy —are here in abundant and vivid detail. They stack up like atrocities on the evening news.

The celebrated scene in which Esther visits her father's grave might have provided an exception to this: "I laid my face to the smooth face of the marble and howled my loss into the cold salt rain." Her anguish is movingly put before us, but the shortcoming is familiar: her father is not a real presence, not even a substantial memory. All but the intensity with which she feels goes unrealized, unarticulated.

We read *The Bell Jar,* finally, because it is a semi-autobiographical novel by one of the most interesting poets of recent date. It offers a second, less drastic image of Sylvia Plath, to set beside that of her suicide. In it, moreover, we may trace the lineaments of a native American experience: "Fifteen years of straight A's" in suburban schools and then at Smith, poems in fashion magazines and weekends at Yale, an "attractive coed" with an air of tennis-healthiness and wry good will.

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That the image is authentic may be known from her scrapbook account of the New York trip which takes place in *The Bell Jar:*

> Took a train to NYC for a salaried month working—hatted & heeled—in *Mlle*'s air-conditioned Madison Ave. offices. . . . Fantastic, fabulous, and all other inadequate adjectives go to describe the four gala and chaotic weeks I worked as guest managing Ed. . . living in luxury at the Barbizon, I edited, met celebrities, was feted and feasted by a galaxy of UN delegates . . . an almost unbelievable merry-go-round month—this Smith Cinderella met idols. . . .

George Stade has said of this passage that "it is both sad and infuriating. The accents are those of the American Girl as we want her; it is infuriating that we want her that way, as it is infurating and sad that Sylvia Plath was so anxious to comply." As we ponder her compliance, the notion of her martyrdom enters again. Now she is a martyr, not to the muse of poetic extremism, but to the Puritanical spirit of America, to the "dead stringencies" of the Suburban Way. In some grim sense, she is the patron saint of gifted children.

Especially she is a martyr, of course, to the American way of growing up female. *The Bell Jar* is ultimately the property of the Women's Liberation movement. The novel is read, while the poems are merely quoted. What feminism may be found in the poetry is mostly uninspired:

> And the white-haired jeweler from Denmark is carving
> A perfectly faceted wife to wait
> On him hand and foot, quiet as a diamond.

"Lesbos," which begins "Viciousness in the kitchen/ The potatoes hiss," expresses her impatience with the role of housewife, but not more strongly than it expresses her dislike of the nearest thing to a feminist position we find in her poems, when it is taken by a tiresome neighbor:

> You say your husband is just no good to you.
> His Jew-Mama guards his sweet sex like a pearl.
> You have one baby, I have two.
> I should sit on a rock off Cornwall and comb my hair.
> I should wear tight pants, I should have an affair.
> We should meet in another life, we should meet in air,
> Me and you.
>
> Meanwhile there's a stink of fat and baby crap.

No such treason to the cause mars the pronouncements of Esther Greenwood on love and marriage. "I began to think maybe it was true," she says, "that when you were married and had children it was like being brainwashed, and afterward you went about numb as a slave in some private, totalitarian state."

A more pertinent strain in Plath's work is her concern with a woman's experience of her own body. One essay in the volume *Radical Feminism* describes Plath as the poet of woman's body as "biological prison." Is is a fact that, early and late, the poet was preoccupied with the imagery of female genitals, menstruation and menopause, child-bearing and miscarriage. But, as in a line like "The womb/ Rattles its pods," the tone of such preoccupation is sour, the presumed distance between the self and the body is great. The recurring desire for cleanliness and purity—

> I am too pure for you or anyone.
> Your body
> Hurts me as the world hurts God.

—is really the desire not to have a body at all, and manifests itself in disgust with all bodily functions, and especially sex:

> Obscene bikinis hide in the dunes,
>
> Breasts and hips a confectioner's sugar
> Of little crystals, titillating the light,
>
> While a green pool opens its eye,
> Sick with what it has swallowed—
>
> Limbs, images, shrieks. Behind the concrete bunkers
> Two lovers unstick themselves.

There is some question about the value of the lessons women can learn about themselves from a text of such self-hatred.

At the time when Sylvia Plath ended her career, she was producing poems at the rate of several a day. That the poems of her final weeks and days are her bleakest will surprise no one, but it is characteristic of her art that they are among her most controlled and precise. The mood to which she finally succumbed was something other than rage. As she had explained in "Death & Co.," the attraction of death is twofold. On one hand, it is calmness, silence, and cold perfection. On the other, it is a violent, if "substanceless," apotheosis. "The piston in motion" and "the hooves of horses,/ Their merciless churn." From the vantage point of her suicide, it is easy enough to conclude that the choice was never one between life and death, but between these two versions of death's condition. There had been rearguard actions: for example, in the poem "For a Fatherless Son," where the nostalgia for her father's love is a source of tenderness for her own child, rather than a source of violent and radical despair. It was love for her children, no doubt, that provided whatever resistance the invitation to death encountered at the very end. At that time, she wrote of her son:

> You are the one
> Solid the spaces lean on, envious.
> You are the baby in the barn.

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With such evidence of her capacity to feel love for what is alive and well and living in the world, it is maudlin and depraved to speak of her death as if it were inevitable, or of her suicide as if it were murder. This, finally, is what Alvarez does, suggesting that the poet was (and is) a victim not in the sense in which we all are, but in some elect and especially stricken way. Plath herself goes further, and identifies suicide not only with murder but even with genocide:

my skin
Bright as a Nazi lampshade,
My right foot

A paperweight,
My face is a featureless, fine
Jew linen.

It is an image of herself she returns to often, as in "Daddy," where her father is a German "with a Meinkampf look" and the German language is an engine

Chuffing me off like a Jew.
A Jew to Dachau, Auschwitz, Belsen.
I began to talk like a Jew.
I think I may well be a Jew.

Her comparison of her suffering to the suffering of the six million has been, of course, one of the most controversial features of her poems, as it is one of their most striking. I have seen it defended on the grounds that the concentration camps offer a "ready-made modern example of hell on earth," though I think its ready-madeness one of the chief things to be said against the analogy. Sylvia Plath addressed the matter in an interview in 1962. "Personal experience," she said, "shouldn't be a kind of shut-box and mirror-looking, narcissistic experience. I believe it should be . . . relevant to the larger things, the bigger things such as Hiroshima and Dachau and so on."

But what relevance do her poems establish? In "Lady Lazarus," the Belsen allusions tell us that she is oppressed, now by the "brute amused" crowd, now by "Herr Doktor" and "Herr God, Herr Lucifer." We know that she takes over from her oppressors the act of her own persecution, perhaps to win their approval, or to give to herself the sense of identity and self-command. We know also that such reversals were common in the concentration camps. The allusion has intensified her suffering in our imagination, and lent to it an air of cultural and historical importance. But where is there even a pretense of its legitimacy, a shred of support for such claims? There is none; and granted this, can the Holocaust allusions be other than the "larceny" that George Steiner has called them? Moreover, what can Plath's claims for the "relevance" of her personal suffering mean? Despite the account of suffering it contains, and the larger amount that it invokes, "Lady Lazarus" conspicuously fails to tell us anything about the nature of suffering itself.

PLATH's commitment to death was obscure—obscure to herself, we can only assume, because obscure in her art—and in her failure of insight, she left herself only the choice between a cold, still death and a "bed of fire." The sardonic triumph of the former is recorded in "Edge":

The woman is perfected.
Her dead

Body wears the smile of accomplishment,
The illusion of a Greek necessity

Flows in the scrolls of her toga,
Her bare

Feet seem to be saying:
We have come so far, it is over.

Each dead child, coiled, a white serpent,
One at each little

Pitcher of milk, now empty.
She has folded

Them back into her body as petals
Of a rose close when the garden

Stiffens and odours bleed
From the sweet, deep throats of the night flower.

The moon has nothing to be sad about,
Staring from her hood of bone.

She is used to this sort of thing.
Her blacks crackle and drag.

In earlier poems she has been offended by this condition: "Perfection is terrible, it cannot have children." Now she sees only its desirability. Having achieved it, the woman wears "the smile of accomplishment." What precisely has she accomplished? The tidiest possible death. In what ought to be, but is not, a satire of maternal care, she has "folded" the children at her breasts. She does not disturb her clothing. But "the smile of accomplishment" has other, and subtly more terrible, associations, with Sylvia Plath's "fifteen years of straight A's": the implication is that all accomplishment, all the earnest endeavor of our lives, tends toward this final perfection. It is a perfection that is achieved, moreover, with "the illusion of a Greek necessity," that is, as if our state were naturally and necessarily so perfect, which it is not. Instead, we must accomplish death: we die by art. Her poem itself is the penultimate gesture, the cutting "Edge." The garden "Stiffens," the serpent is an infant child, and the myth of man's perfectibility has taken its grimmest turn.

Having given the poem this reading, very much on its own terms, it remains for me to say how mean a poem it is, how fundamentally cold-

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hearted and unkind. One may take as an example its very simplest unkindness: the image of the dead children "coiled" at the woman's breast. Their own deaths are, of course, irrelevant to the poem; they exist only as props. As such, they are examples of what the poet has called "flat," "cardboard" people, meaning "the other": ultimately, anyone but herself. The failure to imagine the other as having what George Eliot called an "equivalent center of self" is, of course, a moral lapse, but it is also an aesthetic one. Where Sylvia Plath's failure as an artist is not rooted in a failure to apprehend herself, it is rooted in a failure to apprehend the self in others.

Such judgments are possible—I would say, necessary—when we have wiped from our minds, "like chalk from a blackboard," the myth of Sylvia Plath's martyrdom. Her death, they say, begs all questions of sincerity in her poems. It may be so. It is impossible to read her poetry without being convinced of the pain in which it had its origin. It is impossible not to be moved. But in the end we must make judgments based upon our allegiance to life.

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Nuclear Strategy: The New Debate

Edward N. Luttwak

For many years there has been a broad consensus on strategic policy among academics, professional strategists, and their intellectual clientele in the media, Congressional staffs, and in many parts of the Executive. A majority in all these groups agrees that the only proper strategic doctrine for the United States is Robert S. McNamara's "mutual assured destruction" (or M.A.D. for short), according to which safety in the nuclear age is to be sought through the ability of each of the two superpowers to inflict devastation on the other even after absorbing a prior nuclear attack itself. This is the consensus that has guided American policy for more than a decade, which defeated the ABM (in the Moscow accords if not in Washington), and which the new Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, wants to break.

Until now, the Nixon administration's dissatisfaction with M.A.D. was only manifest in the rather tentative language of the annual Foreign Policy Reports to Congress. But with the arrival of Schlesinger at the Pentagon, and the appointment of Fred C. Iklé as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a much more energetic attempt is being made to dethrone M.A.D., define a new doctrine, develop new kinds of forces, change the American stance in the SALT talks, and thus construct a new strategic policy. Why?

For once, the answer is not the armed services' ever-present hunger for new weapons. In fact, the air force and navy are quite comfortable with M.A.D., and the army's ballistic-missile defense people, who are not, count for little in the hierarchy. Nor is Schlesinger's offensive the last twitch of a Nixonian attempt to undo Democratic policies for the sake of undoing them. Messrs. Schlesinger and Iklé are not pliant White House hacks but mid-size mandarins in their own right; besides, the discordant minds that make up what is left of the Nixon administration are far from enthusiastic about the politically profitless Schlesinger debate. Dr. Kissinger, for one, has done more to consolidate the hold of M.A.D. on strategic policy than anyone else since McNamara himself, through his unofficial control of the SALT talks. The interim agreement on offensive weapons and the ABM treaty reflect the M.A.D. doctrine at its purest, as well as the peculiar ruthlessness of the Nixon-Kissinger team in full pursuit of quick diplomatic results.

For once, then, a doctrinal controversy is really about doctrine. While M.A.D. retains the devoted support of many, a growing band of dissenters have become acutely dissatisfied with McNamara's orthodoxy, arguing that what started off as a harmless device for setting strategic priorities has become a paralyzing dogma which has crippled strategic innovation—while the Russians go merrily ahead—and which is undercutting American foreign policy.

The origins of M.A.D. go back to the first attempts of the Kennedy administration to cope with the problem of strategic arms. Having accused Eisenhower of fiscal timidity and a lack of drive in developing strategic weapons—thus bringing about the famous "missile gap" that never was—the Kennedy administration soon discovered that its central problem in strategic policy was not the lack of weapon-development work but rather its chaotic abundance. While on the Russian side, American satellite photographs were coming up with a great deal of empty steppe and tundra—and a handful of huge ICBM's obviously too cumbersome to be deployed in large numbers—on the American side, all three services were working at full steam to produce new weapons under "crash" program conditions, and with a generous degree of overlapping.

The air force had the mid-range Thor IRBM, produced in fierce competition with Wernher von Braun's team that developed the Jupiter for the army; the air force had no fewer than three competitive ICBM's, the monumental Atlas, the merely large Titan, and the small Minuteman. The navy, or rather Admiral Hyman Rickover's rebellious fiefdom within it, had already deployed the first Polaris boats after an astonishingly successful research-and-development program and was hard at work on follow-up missiles and boats. The army was in the anti-missile business, too,

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with a working prototype (Nike-Zeus) which it was eager to put into production. The missiles were stealing the limelight, but the bombers were still the largest element in the arsenal: the Strategic Air Command had 1,000 B-47's, 600 long-range B-52's, and 30 B-58's in 1961, and it was eager to deploy yet more B-52's, and proceed with the supersonic B-58. SAC also wanted a great deal of money to develop the B-70, a huge, beautiful Mach-3 bomber whose precise purpose was rather obscure.

If this messy proliferation of weapons offended McNamara's neat administrative instincts, it also threatened the new administration with a budgetary nightmare. Unlike candidate Kennedy, President Kennedy had to worry about the budget, and authorizing all the weapons which the services wanted would have resulted in an annual expenditure of $30 billion or more for strategic weapons alone (as opposed to less than half that in the peak years 1961-62). The administration needed a *sound and plausible* strategic doctrine that would serve to adjudicate among the rival claims of the services (and within them), and which could be sold to a Congress then in full cry over lack of "preparedness." M.A.D. was the product of this search, though in the beginning it was not "mutual" but assured destruction *tout court,* since in those days it had not yet become fashionable to assume a mutuality of interests between this country and the Soviet Union—even for survival. On the contrary, the Berlin crisis and the missile-gap deception (the result of carefully orchestrated Russian claims which were believed because of Sputnik) had made the strategic-nuclear realm the main arena of Russo-American competition.

McNamara and his associates, mainly nuts-and-bolts RAND types, began by giving a new and more precise definition to deterrence. The United States, they said, was to deter a Russian nuclear attack rather than attempt to *defend* against it, because no effective defense was yet possible against ballistic warheads only a few feet across and descending in space at several times the speed of sound. In order to deter, one must pose a retaliatory threat sufficiently devastating to nullify—in the minds of the Russians—whatever gains they might hope to get by attacking first. It was not enough to deploy powerful missiles and aircraft that could attack the Soviet Union; in order to deter, the weapons must be able to *counterattack*, after absorbing the full effects of a prior, all-out Russian offensive. In the unlovely language of the trade, this was a "second-strike" capability. With typical faith in the value of precise numbers in measuring the imponderable, McNamara's men actually published a definition of what would amount to "unacceptable" damage: 50 per cent of the Russian population and 75 per cent of Russian industry.

Without taking the analysis any further, there was already some useful doctrinal ammunition here in the bureaucratic struggle against service-promoted weapons. First, once it was agreed that the United States should rely on deterrence rather than defense, there was clearly not much of a case for the army's Nike-Zeus system of missile defense. The McNamara doctrine was also good for another fight, against the "soft" Thor and Jupiter mid-range missiles deployed at their forward launch pads in England, Italy, and Turkey. Arguing convincingly that these weapons were unnecessary, vulnerable, and not worth deploying or developing further, the administration was able to force the army's von Braun team out of the missile business (and into NASA), and to cut off the air force's residual IRBM program.

But the new McNamara doctrine could do much more than that. By working back from the goal of "unacceptable" damage, it seemed as if one could define a whole strategic policy by simple arithmetic. In order to kill X million Russians living in Y cities, one needed Z nuclear weapons of a certain "yield" (i.e., explosive energy). But the Z weapons were only the end product. To insure their safe arrival on target, many more weapons than Z were needed, since allowances had to be made for weapons that would be intercepted en route, for technical failures, and, above all, for the losses inflicted by a prior, would-be disarming, Russian attack. Tests and computation, at which the McNamara team excelled, were used to work out the technical questions, but the real problem was and is the third allowance, for the losses inflicted by a prior Russian attack on the American arsenal.

At the end of a long series of calculations, often made for effect to justify existing weapons and deny service pressures for more, the crucial Z figure was worked out and broken down into the bomber, land-based missile, and submarine elements. Taken together, these would amount to an assured-destruction capability, the guarantee of reliable deterrence. Congressmen were dazzled by the neat rows of statistics, and by McNamara's combination of the two personality types they most admired, that of the scientist and that of the successful big-time executive.

Even then, however, there were some dissenting voices in the wings. Inspired by the appearance of the Polaris submarine-borne missile which the Navy characteristically touted as the indestructible and unstoppable ultimate deterrent, a group of dovish scientists came up with "minimum deterrence." Its advocates claimed that it was unnecessary to build weapons that could kill 50 per cent of the Russian population since a reliable threat to even a few Russian cities, or just Moscow alone, would suffice to deter even the most rabid Russian leaders. Soon renamed "finite deterrence," since it was bad form to appear as a minimalist in matters affecting national survival, the doctrine

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called for the scrapping of the land-based missiles, bombers, and indeed everything strategic except for a few of the most reliable weapons, the Polaris boats.

Then as now, the main objection to minimum deterrence is that in the deadly business of nuclear deterrence it will not do to rely on a "fair-weather" system. Politically, it was not safe to assume that a country which had lost more than 20 million people in World War II (and whose leaders had killed many millions more) could be deterred in a deep crisis by the threat of killing "only" a few million Russians. Technically, it is not safe to assume that submarines are "invulnerable," just because *present* sonar equipment is often reduced to electronic imbecility by the peculiar properties of seawater.

Nowadays, of course, there is also a diplomatic objection to minimum deterrence. With political leaders the world over already far too impressed by the full panoply of strategic weapons deployed by the Russians, an American shift to a submarine-only deterrent could have grave political repercussions. Slide-rule strategists can go on "proving" that submarines are fully adequate on their own until hell freezes over without making the least impression on political observers who would naturally see the shift to minimum deterrence in *political* terms, i.e., as a further retreat.

The other line of attack on assured destruction was of an entirely different nature. Some critics, inspired by Donald Brennan of the Hudson Institute, challenged the theory of deterrence itself. They argued that in a world in which lunacy abounds, the fragility of the delicate psychological mechanism of deterrence represents an intolerable risk. Instead, they put forward their own *defensive* strategy, based on the building of large active defenses—including the ABM—and a reduction in offensive forces. Until 1967, the Russians held fast to their traditional preference for a defensive strategy, and so this group of dissidents could argue for a *cooperative* Russo-American shift to "thick" defenses, thus avoiding the danger of unleashing an arms race, since the two sides would not feel compelled to undercut the other's defenses.

Although there were some very complicated problems with Brennan's proposal, it was not the intellectual complications that brought about its defeat. In 1963-64, when McNamara decisively rejected the Nike-X program for a "thick" nationwide ABM, the "defensists" never got a proper hearing. M.A.D. had already become an exclusive doctrine which did not allow room for genuine debate.

THE hardening of theory into dogma is a fascinating process, but one difficult to reconstruct even in the over-documented field of nuclear strategy. Chronology indicates, however, that the crucial moment in this fossilization was the Cuban missile crisis. McNamara's initial reaction to the crisis was incomprehension. His numerate mind could not understand what all the fuss was about, what difference it made whether *X* warheads fired at American cities were launched from Cuba or from Siberia. The *political* significance of the Russian move quite escaped him; a warhead was a warhead, and never mind all the intangibles that could not be stated in numbers. Later, there was elation at the successful display of "crisis management" by the administration, but later still the shock of realization sank in: nuclear war had actually been contemplated, and it did not make a pretty prospect. From this moment there was a perceptible loss of faith in the controllability of nuclear force, and in the utility of nuclear weapons for anything beyond simple deterrence.

A few months before the Cuban missile crisis, in June 1962, McNamara had unveiled his "counterforce" strategy in a carefully worded speech at Ann Arbor. Counterforce was supposed to fill in for the inadequacy of Western *non-nuclear* power in Europe. Then as now, NATO forces in Europe were thought to be weaker than the Russian army. Then as now, those who had once asked whether it was worth dying for Danzig doubted whether the United States was willing to pay the ultimate price of all-out nuclear war in order to defend Europe. Under the simple rules of deterrence, the only answer to a Russian attack on Europe was an attack on Russian cities, thus sacrificing American cities to the inevitable retaliation. Counterforce was intended to provide a plausible nuclear strategy for European defense —without offering American cities as the hostage. In the first instance, American weapons would be aimed at Russian military targets—including ICBM sites—in order to deter any very large Russian attack, short of all-out nuclear war, on the United States. At the same time, the assured-destruction capability would remain in reserve, to make certain that the Russians would not retaliate for an attack on their *military* forces by attacking American cities.

Counterforce was thus additional to assured destruction which had not yet become exclusive, and the two together were intended to provide a measure of flexibility to American policy: with counterforce the United States would no longer have to choose between destruction or surrender in the event of a Russian attack that non-nuclear forces could not stop. (By making the use of nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe much more plausible, some even hoped that the French could be persuaded to abandon their own nuclear force, the *force de frappe,* which did not meet the exacting standards of reliability and efficiency set by McNamara's systems analysts.)

But in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis there was a loss in confidence in the feasibility of counterforce. The material condition for the

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strategy—i.e., a wide margin of American numerical superiority in nuclear weapons—was still there, but not the political will. For one thing, American planners began to view strategy from both sides of the fence, and when this was done it was immediately clear that counterforce must have looked very threatening indeed from the Russian point of view. The United States had more than four ICBM's for every Russian one, it had more than twice as many submarine-borne missiles (of far superior range), and it also had more than 600 heavy bombers as opposed to 150 far inferior Russian bombers. When these figures were put alongside the verbal strategy, counterforce was virtually indistinguishable from a disarming "first-strike" strategy.

Actually no one knew what the Russians thought, but McNamara's associates insisted that counterforce was dangerous and "destabilizing," and McNamara was not the man who would compare this mechanistic shortcoming with the very real *political* advantages of counterforce. Counterforce was short-lived: it was scrapped even before the more accurate and flexible weapons needed to implement the verbal strategy could be put into production.

After a flirtation with a highly diluted version of counterforce ("damage limitation"), assured destruction became the *only* strategy. It followed that American nuclear forces could be rationalized still further: only the small Minuteman ICBM's were to be deployed, as well as the still smaller Polaris, since highly accurate and large-yield warheads were not needed in order to attack cities. In the jargon, accurate weapons were "bad" since they were "destabilizing," while small inaccurate weapons were "good" since they could "only" destroy cities. This equation of genocide with virtue is still generally accepted, and the moral and political shortcomings inherent in a deterrence-only posture are equally generally ignored.

It is undoubtedly true that assured destruction in its new exclusive guise was very helpful as a bureaucratic device to control the armed services. Weapons which could not be sold as more efficient "city-busters" were not developed, while a good many of the less efficient ones already in the force were scrapped: the Atlas and Titan I ICBM's, the 1,000-odd B-47 medium bombers, and the carrier-based A-5's of the Sixth Fleet were all withdrawn by 1967. McNamara even managed to defeat the air force's campaign for a new bomber. The results were reflected in the budget: the direct cost of strategic forces declined from $13.6 billion in fiscal year 1961 to an all-time low of $6.7 billion in fiscal 1966. This was arms control at its best, even if it was a trifle one-sided.

THE doctrinal shift from the simple deterrence of assured destruction to the imaginary reciprocity of mutual assured destruction was the final step in the transformation of theory into dogma. In fact it was a heroic leap, for M.A.D., unlike assured destruction, assumed the *bilateral* desirability of "stable deterrence," as if it did not matter that the United States was a status-quo power on the defensive, while the Soviet Union was and still is very much in pursuit of further zones of influence and control. The symmetry of mutual assured destruction had an irresistible appeal for the a-political and essentially technical minds that had captured American strategic policy. Without having to worry about messy political factors that could not be computed, McNamara's planners could now assume that *both* sides only wanted to deter, and that instead of serving *American* interests in a global political conflict, strategy should aim at insuring the stability of "mutual" deterrence for *both* sides.

An immediate consequence of this sort of thinking was that ABM population defenses, which had never looked very good on technical grounds, now began to look very bad indeed on *strategic* grounds. By protecting people from nuclear attack, an ABM would weaken the threat of mass destruction which was the basic mechanism of deterrence; hence it was "destabilizing" and very dangerous. For a long time the Russians showed a distressing simplemindedness in these matters, and failed to see the superior merit of M.A.D. In the wording of McNamara's statements, which were often addressed more to Russian than American ears, and which became more and more obviously didactic, and in the "Pugwash" meetings, great pains were taken to "educate" the Russians. Observers had the distinct impression that McNamara's planners were not in the least worried about any increase in Russian ICBM forces at this time; apparently they thought that the Russians actually had too *few* ICBM's to insure a "properly equilibrated" M.A.D. force structure.

Until 1967 the increase in the Russian ICBM force was slow. With the American force unilaterally stabilized at 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan II ICBM's, the Russians only had 300 ICBM's in 1966. Satellite intelligence indicated that they were about to deploy many more, but McNamara repeatedly asserted his confident belief that the Russians only wanted to deploy a proper assured-destruction force, and that they would soon stop building new weapons.

In 1967, however, the Russians added 160 ICBM's; in 1968 they added 340, thus virtually doubling their force in one year. By 1969, they had come level with the United States at the 1,050 mark. Even then, the M.A.D. theorists insisted that the Russians would now stop adding more weapons since *their* theory "proved" that additional weapons would merely be useless, given that the Russians now had enough for mutual assured destruction. But their Russian

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pupils proved to be strangely obdurate on this small theoretical point, and went on adding more and more ICBM's. Worse still, McNamara and his theorists were distressed to see that the Russians had failed to understand the *technical* implications of the doctrine: instead of deploying neat little missiles like the Minuteman, cheap and reliable solid-fuel weapons good enough for "city-busting," they were producing a much larger standard missile (SS-11) and an exceedingly expensive extra-large missile (SS-9) that strangely enough had all the makings of a counterforce weapon, while being far too costly for mere "city-busting."

But it was an American and not a Russian move that really upset the devotees of M.A.D. In September 1967, for political reasons that the theorists found downright undignified, President Johnson forced McNamara to reverse himself and ordered work to begin on an ABM, the abortive Sentinel system for a thin "anti-Chinese" population defense. This was a frontal attack on the doctrine and it met with a fierce response. When the Nixon administration revived Sentinel under a different name, the equally abortive Safeguard, the M.A.D. theorists came out to fight it en masse, thus bringing about the great ABM debate of 1969. Safeguard passed through the Senate by one wavering vote.

ALTHOUGH the Nixon administration immediately trotted out its own strategic doctrine, "sufficiency," M.A.D. remained very much in the saddle even when its protagonists were out of office. In Congress, in the media, and even in the services, where new ideas are slow to penetrate but also slow to be changed once they have been accepted, M.A.D. remained the reigning orthodoxy. Only an a-political doctrine such as this could have rendered acceptable the gross numerical imbalance in strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union which emerged by 1971 (the rationale being that "strategic-nuclear weapons are good for nothing but deterrence," and that so long as you have your reliable deterrent, numerical superiorities are "meaningless"). M.A.D. theorists and their followers were not a bit disturbed by the fact that the 1972 SALT accords allowed 1,618 (larger) ICBM's to the Soviet Union as opposed to 1,054 smaller American ICBM's, nor were they disturbed by the Russian insistence on having a 950-missile ceiling on their submarine force as opposed to 710 for the United States. The difference was explained away by both the administration and the M.A.D. critics on the grounds that the United States had many more warheads, as if an essentially transitory advantage in warhead-design technology could be compared to the fixed, *contractual*, advantage in missile sizes and force-levels given to the Soviet Union.

But although the M.A.D. theorists approved, it was of course the administration's own team that had negotiated the agreement. Its leader, Ambassador Gerard Smith, was certainly a firm believer in M.A.D., but as we now know, he was not the real negotiator. In fact, there is now ample evidence to show that Kissinger handled SALT on behalf of Nixon with Nixonian priorities firmly in mind; like his boss, he was obviously more interested in achieving a Moscow spectacular than in insuring the negotiation of a properly balanced agreement.

The immediate aftermath of the SALT agreement was the passing of the Jackson amendment. Mindful of the grave political repercussions of publishing to the world the clear numerical superiorities allowed to the Russians, which reasonable men could only read as a sign of weakness, the suporters of the Jackson amendment wanted to impose a firm restraint on the administration to make sure that follow-up SALT agreements would redress the imbalance of the 1972 accords and establish a clear numerical equality. With characteristic duplicity, the White House supported the amendment, if only covertly. Gerard Smith was quickly replaced as director of the Arms Control Agency by Fred Iklé, and it was widely known that Iklé was no believer in M.A.D. In a thoughtful published paper on M.AD., Iklé pointed out that by emphasizing the targeting of urban populations and banishing any attempt at defense, M.A.D. was not merely a system of deterrence, but deterrence in its most extreme, genocidal form.

Iklé denounced the complaisant attitude toward the gross immorality of M.A.D. and drew attention to its dangers. With thousands of nuclear weapons permanently ready to kill tens of millions of people, the danger of an unauthorized launch could not be dismissed, as it must be in order to accept M.A.D. and ban an ABM. Iklé, moreover, pointed out that M.A.D.'s perfectly sound logic was based on very implausible psychological assumptions: the attacker is supposed to be safely deterred by his cautious calculations of the losses that retaliation would inflict upon him, while the victim is supposed to be entirely reckless in unleashing the reflex-like retaliation that M.A.D. calls for. This reverses the usual character attributes of victims and aggressors.

Iklé and other critics have also stressed another fundamental shortcoming of M.A.D., and one which is becoming steadily more significant. M.A.D. assumes not only that every leader who acquires nuclear weapons will be rational (no theory of deterrence has an answer for the madman with bombs), but also that he will hold a set of values which is Western-materialistic. The very idea that a nuclear attack is to be deterred by threatening to inflict "unacceptable" losses begs the question of what different parties will regard as unacceptable, or otherwise. A Hitler in his bunker would certainly not be deterred by

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any conceivable degree of destruction, and tomorrow another national leader whose country can build, buy, or steal nuclear weapons may also regard the death of millions as less important than the achievement of some transcendental goal. After all, President Sadat of Egypt repeatedly said that he was willing to sacrifice a million lives to reconquer the wastes of Sinai, and the men of Hanoi did sacrifice that many lives in the attempt to bring Vietnam under their rule.

Who is to say that every Russian or Chinese leader that the intra-party struggle may throw up in the future will be cautious, rational, and materialistic? One day an idealist may come to the top in China by some mischance or other, and he may not reject the option of nuclear war, especially since even an all-out triangular exchange which is liable to destroy many Russians and Americans would only kill perhaps 5 per cent of the Chinese population. By its self-denying ordinance against any form of defense for the American population (and the Russian one too, of course), M.A.D. would have the United States play the hostage game with every and any nuclear power that may emerge in the future. In the absence of any ABM defense, even a Libya that had somehow acquired a handful of ICBM's could threaten the survival of millions of Americans, and the fact that the three towns of Libya would be wiped out in retaliation would be of small comfort to the victims. And yet this type of retaliation remains the stock answer of the M.A.D. theorists to the entire problem of proliferation, irrational attack, and small-power blackmail.

If Iklé and other critics find M.A.D. dangerous and immoral, others stress its political inadequacy. As we have seen, the basic axiom of the "mutual" version of the doctrine is that strategic power cannot be applied usefully to political purposes. As late as 1967, when the drift to M.A.D. was complete, McNamara himself never quite went so far. In his famous, agonized San Francisco speech (in which he announced the deployment of Sentinel with a reluctance visible to the naked eye), McNamara made his strongest statement on the subject: ". . . our nuclear superiority does not deter *all* forms of Soviet support of Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia . . . we, and our allies as well, require substantial non-nuclear forces in order to cope with *levels* of aggression that massive strategic forces do not in fact deter" (emphasis added). In the same speech, McNamara stressed that "a substantial superiority of strategic weapons does not effectively translate into political control, or diplomatic leverage," but nowhere did he totally deny the political utility of strategic power. He merely pointed out the well-known limits set by credibility to the political application of this type of military power.

But McNamara's followers eliminated all the careful qualifications: "Strategic nuclear weapons, certainly as between the superpowers, are good for nothing but mutual deterrence," as McGeorge Bundy put it in a 1972 lecture. The catechism is familiar: it follows that only weapons needed for deterrence are of any use, and mere numerical superiorities are therefore quite "meaningless." McGeorge Bundy had no trouble in explaining why the otherwise hardheaded Russians were devoting such huge resources to building more and more of these "useless" weapons: ". . . the fact that a very expensive and essentially useless strategic rearmament [has] also emerged in the Soviet Union . . . is no more than another demonstration of the folly that seems to be a frequent accompaniment of essentially sober national policies."

It takes intellectual arrogance on a truly global scale to assert that the Russians *must* be wrong in believing that more weapons, and more powerful weapons, are politically more useful than fewer and less powerful ones. In dealing with a troublesome Israel, the Soviet Union has already resorted to the direct nuclear threat on more than one occasion—usually successfully. While the devotees of M.A.D. invite us to ignore the numerical superiorities that SALT-1 gave to the Soviet Union, the Russians may well have adopted a variant of counterforce as their own strategy.

Although this has not been said explicitly, there can be little doubt that Secretary Schlesinger is acting on the assumption that the Russians *are* after counterforce, and that the only way to counter this move is to shift over to a counterforce-plus-deterrence strategy too. In neither case is this a full, disarming, counterforce capability, if only because the bomber and the submarine forces are only marginally vulnerable to missile attack. But the counterforce capability that the Soviet Union is acquiring through the deployment of new ICBM's (SS-18, SS-19), and the counterforce capability that the United States will acquire if the Schlesinger proposals are accepted, would clearly be *additional* to the forces needed for simple deterrence.

Aside from the general need to counter Russian preponderance in *non*-nuclear power against an increasingly less convincing NATO defense, there is also a more urgent reason for moving toward a counterforce strategy. Since the SALT-1 Moscow accords were signed last year, the development which the vast majority of pro-SALT analysts claimed was still several years away has taken place: the Soviet Union has tested several types of MIRV multiple warhead systems. The United States, of course, already has MIRV systems on its newer missiles, but unlike the Russian ones, the individual warheads are very small—too small to destroy ICBM silos.

The emergence of a Russian MIRV force has added a military-technical dimension to the SALT-1 numerical imbalance, which before was

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only objectionable for diplomatic-prestige reasons. Clearly, whether the Jackson amendment is taken seriously or not, the United States must either bring about a simultaneous withdrawal of *both* ICBM forces through negotiations, or else withdraw its ICBM's unilaterally. The trouble is that the Russians do not like scrapping strategic weapons. Thus the only instrument that could possibly persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its very threatening large-ICBM program is the development of parallel American counterforce weapons.

The $37.3 million dollars that Secretary Schlesinger has requested in the fiscal 1975 budget for initial development work on an accurate ICBM is clearly a symbol of American willingness to pursue the path of forceful negotiation through the threatened deployment of counterforce weapons. There is no guarantee that the Soviet Union will respond to this token gesture (in the Pentagon's budget $37.3 million is scarcely visible) at the negotiating table. With three different new ICBM's already in advanced testing, and with at least two yet more advanced ICBM's in development, the Soviet Union may regard Schlesinger's program as a bluff that will not be backed up by any action, if only because of Congressional opposition. That is why Schlesinger has asked for a national debate on strategic policy, in the hope that a reappraisal of M.A.D. and its policy prescriptions will weaken the hold of dogma on the minds of Congress and the media. For if M.A.D. remains firmly entrenched as the sole path to stability, peace, and arms control, the Russian progress toward a preponderant ICBM capability cannot possibly be stopped, either by competitive deployments or through purposeful SALT negotiations.

Schlesinger's debate is thus intended to force the issue. Unlike his master in the White House, Schlesinger obviously does not believe in pursuing unpopular policies by subterfuge. Hence his challenge to the morality, adequacy, and political wisdom of M.A.D. If the attempt fails, it is plain that the Soviet Union will sooner or later acquire a full counterforce capability against the Minuteman ICBM's of the United States. This will by no means disarm the United States or deprive it of a "viable" deterrent, since the Polaris boats and the bombers would still provide an ample retaliatory capability for simple deterrence. But a unilateral American retreat from the ICBM sector would leave the Soviet Union as the sole possessor of a full panoply of strategic-nuclear power, and the United States would be reduced to a lesser position—still clearly superior to Britain, France, or China, but also visibly inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

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Emancipation and Jewish Studies

Jacob Katz

MODERN Jewish experience, to be fully understood, must be viewed under the aspect of emancipation, that process, starting in the late 18th century, whereby the Jews of Western and Central Europe achieved civic and social rights, thus paving the way for their entry into the larger society. The ramifications of emancipation are, of course, exceedingly widespread, not to say complex. In order to keep the present discussion within manageable limits, I shall restrict myself to some historical observations, with ultimate reference to the relationship between emancipation and the evolution of scholarly Jewish research. In this I take my cue from Leopold Zunz, the founder of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* —the scientific inquiry into Jewish history, literature, and religion that developed in Europe in the 19th century—who remarked that the political emancipation of the Jews would be attained only when the study of Judaism was similarly emancipated, that is, established within the academy.

Zunz, in turn, might very well have taken his cue from two intellectual events whose occurrence, a scant two decades apart, cannot have been altogether a coincidence. I refer to the publication, in 1663 and 1689, respectively, of Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus,* which ushers in the beginning of modern biblical criticism (and hence of modern Jewish scholarly investigation) and John Locke's *First Letter Concerning Toleration,* which, for the first time ever, talks of a secular state that would include Jews as citizens. Although Jewish emancipation had to wait one hundred years before it was transformed from a glimmer of thought into a political program, and although *Wissenschaft des Judentums* did not emerge until the second decade of the 19th century, certainly what had been initiated by the two 17th-century philosophers can be seen as an anticipation of future developments.

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The inclusion of Jews as citizens of their respective lands could only be contemplated, as Locke suggested, in accordance with the notion of a secular state. So long as the state was conceived as subordinate to the Christian church, or to a Christian system of values, there could be no thought of granting Jews citizenship. Prior to the secularization of the European polity, Jews were accepted as residents, tolerated (with varying degrees of benignity), and even, in some instances (Holland for example), treated with generosity. Their fundamental status, however, remained that of aliens; according to the definition of a mid-18th-century German scholar of law, Jews were to be considered as being *in civitate,* resident in the state, but not *de civitate,* of it. Similar formulations persisted until well into the 19th century, when they were taken up by opponents of Jewish emancipation in the British Parliament. In some instances—the majority of the Swiss cantons, England up to the time of Cromwell, certain districts in otherwise beneficent Holland—Jews were excluded altogether. But even in places where Jews were permitted to reside, they lived under the constant threat of expulsion. Thus, for example, Jews were driven from Vienna in 1670, and from Prague in 1745.

It can be said that homelessness—and of a unique kind—was the basic condition of Jewish existence prior to emancipation. For unlike the Gypsies, say, whose vagrant life was accepted by the host societies as a sociological fact, Jewish homelessness was considered by Christians and Jews alike as having a theological dimension. The Jews, as their prayers testified, ascribed their plight to divine punishment for past sins; their exile would last until God willed otherwise. Christians, on the other hand, regarded the exile of the Jews as the result of the latter's rejection of Jesus; only through conversion to Christianity could that guilt be expiated and Jewish homelessness brought to an end. Emancipation changed all this and brought an unexpected turn in the fate of the Jews: they had not converted to Christianity, nor, from their own point of view, had they become worthy of deliverance, and yet they were redeemed from homelessness. Henceforth, following the promulgation of the various edicts of state designated by the term "emancipation,"

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Jewish residency was recognized as lawful, no longer subject to expulsion at the whim of the sovereign power.

The first association which the term "emancipation" usually evokes is that of equal rights. In actuality, however, the granting of political and social equality belongs to a later phase of the process. In its initial stage, emancipation concerned itself merely with recognizing the right of Jewish residency. Such recognition was first accorded the Jews of the Austrian Empire, in 1781-82, by Emperor Joseph II, within the framework of reforms known as the *Toleranzpatent*. The Emperor's decrees fell short of granting Jews equal rights with the rest of the population, and indeed grave professional and personal restrictions remained in force; for example, Jews were not free to change residence or to marry without permission. Nevertheless, the imperial edict was hailed by Jewish notables of the day, by Moses Mendelssohn in Berlin as well as by the renowned Chief Rabbi of Prague, Yehezkel Landau, who in a sermon declared, "The Emperor has removed the stigma of serfdom from us." The fact that the Emperor had remembered the Jews in his general legislation was interpreted as an implicit recognition of their legal incorporation into the Austrian state; the Jews were on the way to becoming *de civitate,* so to speak. This alone was sufficient cause for Jewish celebration.

THE Hapsburg edict, as seen in retrospect, marks an important turning-point in the history of European Jewry. Similar legislation soon followed in other countries, not so much in consequence of the Austrian example but rather as an effect of the same political and social developments that prompted the Emperor's action. These can be subsumed under the rubric of enlightened absolutism, and as represented by Joseph II and the rulers of the petty German states, the particular system, while it did not bring about the complete detachment of state from church, was still greatly instrumental in advancing the progress of secularization. Political decisions, under the enlightened monarchs, were largely motivated by utilitarian principles—which worked to the advantage of Jewish emancipation, for the Jews were regarded as a useful element in society. Altogether the state, in such instances, considered itself as a kind of educational institution whose task it was, through wise legislation, to bring benefits to the various national groups under its jurisdiction and make possible their contribution to the common weal. Thus it was that Jews living in the enlightened German states at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, although they had not become citizens enjoying full rights, had at least acquired the right to a home and a secure residence.

The changes were of a more radical nature in those countries where Jews were accorded their new status not as a result of special reforms but in the course of civil revolutions. When the French Revolution proclaimed liberty, equality, and fraternity for all Frenchmen, the Jews, who did not count as such, were not included in the bounty. On the other hand, they could not be left in their old condition as non-citizens. The question therefore arose as to whether to expel the Jews from the country or to grant them citizenship. The latter solution was ultimately adopted by a decision of the National Assembly (1790-91) and this legislation set an example for all the regions that subsequently came under French sway during the Revolution and the later Napoleonic conquests—the Rhineland, Holland, Westphalia, northern Italy, etc.—where the Jews achieved not merely citizenship, but also equal civil rights. Prussia, which had wrestled with the Jewish problem ever since the death of Frederick II in 1786, remained an exception: only in the course of the Hardenberg Reform (1812), which aimed at a complete reorganization of the internal structure of the state, did Jews become full citizens, and then with the reservation that they could not occupy government positions.

These gains, it should be noted, were not achieved without opposition. The issue of granting citizenship to the Jewish population was a matter of vigorous dispute, in legislative bodies as well as in organs of public opinion; but at this stage of the developments, the contrary voices, if not entirely muted, were at least neutralized by the impetus of events. However, with the defeat of Napoleon the particular momentum was brought to a halt and attempts were made to undo the advances, an effort that was partly successful, especially in Germany, where Jewish citizenship was hardly ever revoked but the attendant privileges were often severely restricted. This is the situation that prevailed between the years 1815 and 1830, a period of stagnation and regression. Not until the emergence of liberalism did the struggle for Jewish rights resume, and only then, under the impulse of the new movement, did the term "emancipation" come to be applied to the Jewish cause. This happened in England, where the struggle of the Catholics for political equality, fought under the name of Catholic emancipation, had just come to an end. The term was now transferred to the equivalent Jewish struggle, then only beginning in England. The term "emancipation," if one is to retain strict historical accuracy, is thus to be limited to the struggle for equal *political* rights for Jews. In popular usage, of course, "emancipation" has come to include the whole process of Jewish assimilation into the larger society. This expansion of the concept is the product of a later generation.

At any rate, "emancipation" became the slogan of the liberal fighters for the Jewish cause, who argued that Jewish emancipation meant righting

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the political disabilities that had been imposed on a religious minority made to suffer because of its nonconformism. Their efforts witnessed steady results. Thus, in 1858, Lionel de Rothschild became the first Jew to hold a seat in the British Parliament. In Switzerland, emancipation was practically effected in 1866. The constitutions of the new national states in Italy and Germany contained paragraphs concerning the equality of all citizens. The same principle was accepted in Austro-Hungary in the course of the political reorganizations after the war against Prussia in 1866. By 1870, all the Jews in Western and Central Europe had become full-fledged citizens of their respective countries.

In order to comprehend the historical significance of this process, we must first try to understand what the conferring of citizenship meant to the Jews themselves as well as to the conferers. What happened can be summed up briefly as follows: the European states, in making citizens of the Jews, now incorporated into their societies a group of people who were strangers to them in religion, history, and culture, and who had been allowed to exist up to then only on the fringes of the polity. This was itself made possible by a prior "declaration" of the states to the effect that they were to be considered secular establishments, independent of religious institutions and value-systems. At the same time, the theological obstacles that had formerly substantiated the exclusion of the Jews were set aside.

Yet revolutionary as all this certainly was, formal acknowledgment of the changed Jewish status did not signify commensurate changes in actual attitudes toward the Jewish minority. Jews now had citizenship, but this fact (as also the theological revisions on which it was based) did not immediately serve to accomplish the incorporation of the Jews into the general society. When the states in question proclaimed their secularity, they did not thereby sever their connection with the church and the Christian faith. For a brief period, to be sure, during the heady first days of the French Revolution, church and state were declared separate, but by the time of Napoleon the breach had been healed and a *modus vivendi* worked out in the form of the concordat with Rome. This agreement defined the respective spheres of influence of both church and state and spelled out the roles each was to play, separately and together, in securing the loyalty of the citizenry to the state. Indeed, the modern states continued to employ religious symbols and terminology in their patriotic appeals. As the religious tradition upon which the states drew was invariably Christian, the Jews continued to remain outside the pale of the dominant civic ideology. Formal emancipation did not prove sufficient to alter the outsider status of the Jews or effect their social integration. A few organizations that had been closed to Jews before emancipation (such as some Masonic lodges) now opened their doors to them, but this was not generally the case and the Jewish situation for the most part remained as problematic as ever.

One does not have to search far for the reasons. The much-acclaimed secularization of the state, a development that was to have paved the way for Jewish entry into the general society, proved to be a highly ambiguous process. As already noted, secularization did not mark the elimination of Christian elements from European culture; on the contrary, Christian concepts and symbols often retained their original force and character even after having been appropriated for the secular purposes of art, literature, and political or social ideology. Thus the state, even though now nominally secular, continued to evince a Christian character, rendering the Jewish situation as precarious as before. Those who had hoped that, following the naturalization of the Jews, the gap between Jews and non-Jews would be completely bridged, had reason for anxiety. There seemed every danger of a permanent estrangement from the state and the society that the Jews had formally joined.

For many Christians this danger could be averted only by viewing the emancipation of the Jews not as the final phase of the process but rather as a first step toward their baptism, an act which would signal their full assimilation into the broader society. This was the case even at the time of Emperor Joseph II's *Toleranzpatent,* when Moses Mendelssohn was publicly admonished to draw the logical conclusion of his own teaching and convert to Christianity. It was also true in France, where Henri Grégoire, an Alsatian priest who was one of the most enthusiastic spokesmen for the Jewish cause in the National Assembly, derived his partiality toward Jewish emancipation from a chiliastic belief in the necessity of Jewish conversion as a prelude to the millennium. The most significant example in this regard was afforded by Wilhelm von Humboldt who, during the negotiations that led to the Prussian *Judenedikt* of 1812, headed the department for religious affairs of the Prussian administration and played an important role in the formulation of the new legislation.

Humboldt, who was rather well-versed in Jewish matters, did not share the general view of his contemporaries regarding the function of the state. According to him, the task of the state was not to provide for the good of the citizenry by the passage of suitable laws and edicts, but rather to create a framework within which the free play of forces would make possible the spontaneous evolution of humane attributes. With respect to the Jews, this meant that they be taken into the society without reservation and given full citizenship. Any failings on their part—such as their stubborn clinging to archaic customs, which Humboldt re-

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garded as the chief Jewish shortcoming—would disappear in an atmosphere of political and social freedom. Humboldt believed that the Jews themselves would gradually come to recognize the superficiality of their ceremonial laws and would ultimately, and of their own accord, turn to the higher faith of Christianity. Humboldt did not have actual conversion in mind; but as a humanist whose philosophy was rooted in the Christian ethos, he believed that the Jews, too, could be led to humanism via the Christian path.

To be sure, not all Christians who took part in the cause of Jewish emancipation hoped for such a radical adaptation to the Christian environment, but even the moderate spokesmen had some expectations in this direction. They looked to emancipation to bring about a broadening of Jewish occupational patterns, as well as changes in what they regarded as questionable Jewish business ethics. Many were of the opinion that the anomalous status of the Jews could be reversed only by their total assimilation into the general life of the country. It was taken for granted that future Jewish generations would adopt the prevailing manners and culture, including language, of the countries they inhabited. The governments themselves had insured this by obliging Jews either to attend public schools or to establish their own modern educational institutions. Finally, there were hints, and in some cases even official measures, pressing Jews to reform their religion. At the same time, hand in hand with the endeavors designed to effect the Jews' cultural and social integration, there were indications that the Jews would be expected to loosen their ties with fellow-Jews abroad. The philosopher Johann Fichte, no great friend of the Jews, spoke of "a mighty [Jewish] state spread over all European countries," a kind of international union linked by a series of business associations, family ties, and mutual demonstrations of solidarity. The states embarking on emancipation were prepared to absorb those Jews living within their own borders; they were not prepared to acknowledge the existence of a trans-national Jewry with a commonality of interests other than religion. It was expected of the Jews that henceforth their highest loyalty would be to the states that had granted them citizenship.

And what of the Jews? Were they willing to pay the price demanded of them by emancipation? Franz Rosenzweig once noted that the tacit expectation of emancipators like Humboldt, who regarded a Jewish movement to Christian humanism as inevitable, was opposed by the equally tacit steadfastness of men like Moses Mendelssohn, Abraham Geiger, Gabriel Riesser, and Leopold Zunz, who, in spite of their eagerness for emancipation never for one moment considered surrendering their Judaism. On the other hand, Jews readily accepted the other conditions posed by emancipation. They did so without fully realizing the consequences of their side of the bargain and without knowing whether they would be able to carry out the obligations they had taken upon themselves. Mendelssohn, the most prominent of the Jewish advocates of emancipation, strongly opposed the popular rationalist notion that Judaism and Christianity would eventually become one. However, beyond this Mendelssohn had no compunctions in urging enthusiastic Jewish entry into the life of society. He nurtured utopian ideals of a separation between church and state, even between society and religion. He expected that Jews and Christians would meet on the neutral ground of a secularist society where the differences in their religions need not constitute an obstacle. In this Mendelssohn was typical of his generation of Jews, recent escapees from the ghetto who believed, with an optimism made possible only by lack of experience, that they could comply with all the demands imposed on them and yet keep their Judaism intact.

If the final results of emancipation fell short of expectations, and Jews, many generations later, still continued to retain a strong sense of group consciousness and coherence transcending the national borders of their respective European states, this cannot be attributed to any lack of eagerness on their part for emancipation. Nor was it due to the strong opposition, in government and without, that emancipation continued to encounter at every turn. Nor did the cement of religion, as asserted by the official leadership, form the chief ingredient of Jewish cohesion and solidarity. More compelling than all these elements, was the fact—the existential fact, as it were—of Jewish community, which, out of its own inner necessities and traditions, resisted the higher blandishments of emancipation. Quite simply, the fact of Jewishness derived from one's being born a Jew. This elementary circumstance sufficed to make one part of the Jewish group and to share in its fate. And so long as Jews wished to remain Jews—a tendency reinforced by the endurance of endogamous marriage—the future of the group was assured and the existence of the Jewish community, in social isolation from its neighbors, remained a fact.

Therein lay the problem. Jewish existence was a fact, a stubborn fact defying regnant ideology and philosophy. In an age of rationalist ascendancy, the old world of faith was collapsing and it was expected that Judaism, too, would share in the general disintegration. Indeed, the theme of the bankruptcy of Judaism found repeated echo among liberals of the Humboldt stripe, the advocates of complete Jewish assimilation. Humboldt's thesis calling for the conversion of the Jews to Christianity, not as an act of faith but as an earnest of their allegiance to the shared culture, was taken up by Theodor Mommsen in his polemics

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against Heinrich von Treitschke. Mommsen, while roundly condemning Treitschke's anti-Semitism, at the same time felt called upon to admonish culturally assimilated Jews for their failure to convert to Christianity. He reminded them that, in the process of merging with German culture, they had absorbed many essential Christian elements and that their formal conversion therefore would only confirm what they had already accepted in fact. But Mommsen was mistaken on this point. For while it was certainly true that emancipated Jews very often accepted Christian assumptions, even the most assimilated among them felt some vestigial attachment to Judaism. Hence their conversion, if not altogether an intellectual violation, would have constituted an emotional betrayal.

Indeed, on the question of Christianity there was a profound disparity between what assimilated Jews thought and what they actually felt. Assimilated Jews, as they moved more and more into the cultural mainstream, acquired a familiarity with the Christian tradition and may even have acknowledged its primacy, but they could never internalize Christian attitudes and values to the extent of those who were born into that tradition. On the other hand, their ties to Judaism lacked cognitive content, since the secular culture had not absorbed the Jewish tradition as it had the Christian. As a consequence, the Jewish minority neglected its own culture in favor of that of the Christian majority. Abetting the process was the fact of the historical rivalry between Christianity and Judaism. Christian doctrine had traditionally looked upon Judaism as an outmoded, inferior creed, and this theologically inspired prejudice, like so many others, lost no force in the age of growing secularization. Caught up in the rush of assimilation, the Jews themselves ran the risk of accepting the Christian evaluation of their own tradition.

That Judaism did not succumb entirely to the danger is due to the fact that not all Jews were affected in this fashion. For a great many, the disparagement of Jewish validity evoked an upsurge of Jewish self-assertion. Thus the emancipation of the Jews led not only to entry into general social and political life but also to spiritual reflection. The various new movements that sprang from this development, from Reform Judaism to neo-Orthodoxy, considered themselves to be movements of Jewish regeneration. In formulating their ideologies and programs, they harked back to past phases in the evolution of Judaism; their hope was to shape the future in accordance with the image of an idealized past. Thus it was that the study of the Jewish past, *Wissenschaft des Judentums,* became not only a scientific end in itself but a religious pursuit. The theologians enlisted scholarship for the purpose of reviving the Jewish spirit.

But this was to come later. In its original impulse, *Wissenschaft des Judentums* professed no connection with any national-religious purpose. The science of Judaism was formally defined as the historical-philological exploration of the Jewish heritage, from the Bible and the Talmud to medieval poetry, philosophy, Kabbalah, and including Jewish history. The methods of study were to be the same as those employed in all historical scholarship; appropriate aspects of Judaism would be made subject to the same rigorous investigation. However, the exploration of the past is never conducted in a vacuum; for all peoples, Jews and non-Jews alike, it is an exercise inevitably tied to contemporary social and spiritual trends and needs, and can be carried out as such without necessarily impairing its scientific character. Thus Zunz and his associates, the founders of the science of Judaism, could uphold the postulates of scientific methodology and yet assume that their exploration of Jewish traditional sources was no mere scholastic exercise. Scientific preoccupation with the whole of Jewish tradition, they believed, would serve to foster greater spiritual identification with the totality of Jewish culture, thought, and experience.

In aim and method, the science of Judaism resembled its general models. *Wissenschaft des Judentums* held that Jewish institutions and ideas evolved from the same laws as those of other societies and could therefore be approached through the standard disciplines. But while the full apparatus of great universities stood at the disposal of scholars probing the cultures of Europe, nothing similar was available for the exploration of Judaism. Equivalent Jewish studies were conducted either by scholars working in privacy or under the auspices of certain rabbinical seminaries, a fact that placed grave limitations on both the quality and the quantity of the research. Zunz and his associates sought to secure the legitimation of the new Jewish science by having it accepted in the academy, but their efforts met with little or no understanding and their attempt to establish a chair of Judaica at one of the German universities came to nought. Zunz could not fail to recognize the significance of the dismissal: as long as the study of Judaism was not yet on a par with general studies, Jewish emancipation would remain incomplete.

Zunz's conclusion has to a large extent been borne out by subsequent historical experience. The Jewish bid for political equality was to find its most daring expression in Zionism, pointedly defined as *auto*-emancipation by Yehuda Leib Pinsker, one of the founding fathers of the Jewish nationalist movement. Characteristically enough, the return to Zion was accompanied by a Jewish cultural renaissance, which found expression not only in the revival of the Hebrew language and in an upsurge of creative activity, but

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also in the intensive cultivation of Jewish studies. The establishment of the Hebrew University, already contemplated in the initial stages of the national movement, was strongly motivated by the desire for a free academic institution that might engage in the exploration of the Jewish past without let or hindrance. The founders of the university no doubt also hoped that scholarly inquiry into the nature of Judaism, in addition to being a desirable end in itself, would yield a further benefit. As the heirs of Zunz, they too were of the notion that the proper presentation of Jewish history and culture might serve as a basis for greater national identification.

This is not the place to detail the accomplishments of the Hebrew University with respect to Jewish studies, but it would hardly be far-fetched to say that in this instance national emancipation proceeded hand in hand with academic emancipation. A similar flourishing, moreover, has recently been taking place in the Diaspora. Departments of Jewish studies are now an established part of many universities around the world, especially in the United States, where there are several hundred chairs in Jewish history and philosophy alone. Most of the scholars working in the field of Judaica, Jews and non-Jews alike, belong to the World Union of Jewish Studies, which last August held its Sixth Congress in Jerusalem.

This quantitative expansion raises the question of the quality of the achievement. In other words, is the work being done by Jewish historians, for example, on a level with that of general historians? It is a question that has a social as well as a scholastic dimension, for the emancipation implied in the acceptance by the academy of Jewish studies is genuine and meaningful only insofar as it is grounded in authentic scholarship. In cases where departments and courses in Jewish studies have come into being for non-academic reasons—for instance, to accommodate the sensibilities of local Jewish communities—that acceptance, and the larger, social acceptance it implies, may well be fictitious, and this in the long run can be worse than not being accepted at all.

Although there are many Jewish scholars of international reputation who can hold their own in any company, the average practitioner of Jewish studies still has special hurdles to overcome, especially as one approaches higher historical analysis and presentation. Here the inhibitions of traditionalism, on the one hand, and a tendency toward apologetics, on the other, can function as deterrents to scholarly objectivity. The minority status that for so long was the lot of Jews has left its mark. It shows itself most notably in the defensiveness that continues to haunt so much of contemporary Jewish activity, including scholarship. The emancipation of the Jews in modern times, even Jewish auto-emancipation in the independent state of Israel, has not liberated them from their minority complex. No matter what its causes and the multiform external factors that have contributed to it, this complex can be fully overcome only by self-analysis, by scholarship of the most exacting kind. It is one of the blessings of emancipation that such self-analysis can now proceed, although the paradoxical and ambiguous fact, essentially unchanged over two centuries of secularization and enlightenment, remains as it was in the beginning: emancipation does not grant automatic freedom, only the opportunity to become free.

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Stalin Under Western Eyes

Lev Navrozov

A Western scholar studying Russia after 1917 (or China after 1949) is in many ways in a worse position than a historian studying ancient Babylonia or Egypt under the Pharaohs. For each, the task of historical reconstruction involves the use of stray desultory records from a civilization which the historian has not experienced as a reality. But there is an additional difficulty in studying Russia after 1917, for it is a society which has not only prevented the spread of knowledge about itself to the outside world but has also actively undertaken to mislead the outside world about itself, much as transmitters in modern electronic warfare "blind" enemy receivers. Among some Western scholars there has been a (natural) tendency to underestimate the effects of this practice, which is intended to mystify them. Thus, David Caute in *The Fellow Travellers* demonstrates with the precision of a clinician how ignorant and/or gullible with respect to post-1917 Russia hundreds of outstanding Westerners were in the past—and then for his own part goes on to say that certain disadvantages of life in Russia have "to be set against the remarkable development of the welfare state." It is hard to know on what—if not the countless booklets of Soviet propaganda—such an inference can be based.

These thoughts occurred to me (an inhabitant, as it were, of ancient Babylonia, thrown by a time-space machine into this world) as I began to read Adam B. Ulam's newly published book on Stalin.* Mr. Ulam is director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, and rightly enjoys a reputation for expertise in East European and Soviet affairs; he is, moreover, a man free of any doctrinal political bias or non-scholarly involvement in the Soviet Union. When Mr. Ulam describes the way in which Stalin, before and during World War II, duped nearly all Western diplomats, statesmen, and official experts, he is, one feels, on firm ground—with at least half of his scholarly being in the familiar West. His analysis is cogent and convincing and is delivered in a tone of incisive yet unobtrusive sarcasm appropriate to the subject and characteristic of Mr. Ulam at his best. Yet as soon as Mr. Ulam leaves this ground, he is back in a vacuum—in Babylonia.

Thus, on the first page of his study, Mr. Ulam asks, "What was the secret . . . of the unprecedented triumphs achieved by the Soviet Union under [Stalin's] leadership?" This is an exciting opening, but we must immediately ask what exactly Mr. Ulam means by unprecedented triumphs. For the fact is that post-1917 Russia has scored, and continues to score, triumphs of one kind and one kind only: military triumphs, including the production of weapons.† But then we must ask, what is unprecedented about these triumphs? Suppose they were to culminate in the triumph of triumphs, in what in my childhood was still being called the "World Soviet Union." Without disturbing the shade of a single Babylonian monarch we can recall thousands of historical instances of more impressive triumphs, relatively speaking, than the acquisition of the globe by Russia or China today.

Given the stupendous task—reconstructing a closed civilization—it is a matter of moment that Mr. Ulam's book contains so many remarkable insights, quite apart from the wealth of information crammed between its covers. Yet it must be said in all candor that *Stalin: The Man and His Era* offers a view of 20th-century Russian history that bears in its general contour an uncomfortable resemblance to the official view which the Soviet Union has had of itself since 1956. In this view modern Russian history divides into three main periods, and Mr. Ulam roughly follows suit.

1) In the first four chapters of his book, about a fifth of the whole, Mr. Ulam describes pre-1917 Russia along the same lines official Soviet history has described the Czarist regime in order to demon-

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* *Stalin: The Man and His Era*, Viking, 760 pp., $12.95.

† There has, to be sure, been one major *social* achievement in post-1917 Russia. From 1918 to the mid-50's any inhabitant could be destroyed in any way for no reason at all. Since the mid-50's, at least in the large cities, a police official has to prove that a crime—say, the distribution of a typewritten text differing from current propaganda—has actually been committed. But this is hardly an unprecedented triumph in the 20th century.

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strate how beneficial the Bolshevik regime established in 1917 was for Russia. He calls the social framework of pre-1917 Russia a "mixture of laxity and brutality."

2) About eight months after the collapse of the Czarist regime there occurred what Mr. Ulam vaguely calls the Revolution.* It was followed by an essentially benign if somewhat rough period under Lenin.

3) Here enters the villain of the piece, Stalin, a "man of vile and brooding temper" who drove the Revolution off the rails while nevertheless leading the Soviet Union to its "unprecedented triumphs."

MR. ULAM'S description of pre-1917 Russia is of a country characterized by unchanging and hopelessly benighted tyranny, in all spheres and at every level of society. It produces on me an impression similar, perhaps, to what the following passage would produce on an American student of U.S. history:

> The U.S. imperialists representing the fascist-military-industrial complex are preparing a third world war in their palaces with seven hundred rooms, while working people scavenge in garbage bins and die of rat poison sprinkled over the food refuse. Concentration camps have been built for about a half of the U.S. population. Persecution of everything progressive, torture, Negro lynchings, ubiquitous crime, war psychosis, degeneracy, insanity: such is today's America. . . .

This is the stuff I was brought up on. Ever since 1919 it has been switched on and off, depending on the situation. Why is it not *quite* true, though all the data are culled from U.S. sources? Because it (a) lacks a sense of proportion, and in particular a statistical sense of proportion; (b) it is not localized, or dated (some events that were observed in 1892 in one place may have been rarer in 1912 in another, and practically nonexistent in 1972 anywhere); but worst of all (c) it ignores the socio-civic context of the society described.

Mr. Ulam ignores the socio-civic context of Russian society before 1917, a habit of negligence which is quite common in the West and, oddly enough, especially so in the U.S. And yet the socio-civic fabric of Russia both before and after 1917 is quite simple in essence. Pre-1917 Russia was a European monarchy which, following the example of other European countries, was developing into a constitutional monarchy and was caught midway at a semi-constitutional stage in 1917. Post-1917 Russia (like post-1949 China) is a super-autocracy on the model of China in the third century B.C.E. (from the point of view of social structure, not in terms of its "unprecedented triumphs" in techniques of military production, which it imported from the West). These facts can be elaborated upon, criticized, diversified, and so forth, but to neglect them is like overlooking the fact that pike is a fish (and not a vegetable) or that the U.S. as of 1974 is a democracy. Neglect of the latter circumstance is precisely what has resulted, in the Soviet Union, in a collection of ravings like the passage about the U.S. cited above.

The difference between semi-constitutional monarchy and super-autocracy is illustrated by the "Jewish Question" in Russia. Certain forces that have existed in every Christian society at one time or another and which we may call medieval bigotry, were responsible for the imprisonment and trial of Mendel Beilis in Russia (in 1911) and Captain Dreyfus in France (in 1894). However, the jury in Russia returned a verdict of not guilty, and no force in the country could do anything about it. Semi-constitutional monarchy thus represents an evolving conflict between reaction and progress. The point is not to underestimate the reactionary forces in pre-1917 Russia, but to see the process in its evolutionary aspect. In the super-autocracy that has been Russia after 1917, Stalin suddenly decided in the mid-40's to support the Zionist cause and then as suddenly decided to torture some Russian Jews to death, hang others in Red Square, and destroy the rest in labor camps. All these actions represented neither the progressive nor the reactionary forces in Russian society: they were simply signs of the super-autocrat's benevolence or wrath—they might happen unexpectedly again tomorrow, as a result of some reshuffle in the Politburo, and could have happened in 1934 or 1922 just as unexpectedly.

There seems to be a common inability in the U.S. to regard semi-constitutional monarchy as progress toward democracy.† Just as many Russians believe that book-printing began with the invention of the press in Russia, so many Americans believe that democracy is not a gradual and universal process of social evolution of which the U.S. is only a single example—the highest, the most vigorous, the largest, but still only an example—but something that either exists full-fledged as in the U.S. today (or sometimes only in an ideal utopia because the U.S. is just another "fascist" state) or does not exist at all. It is like believing that Americans began to speak a modern, well-developed language as soon as, say, the Harvard *Crimson* was founded, while prior to that event mankind had just mumbled.

Senator Fulbright declares today: "The Russian people have lived under dictatorship through-

* In Mr. Ulam's semantics, even more confusing than conventional Western labels, a certain "revolution in the proper sense of the word" or "real revolution" started after what is usually called the Revolution (the collapse of the monarchy), and when in the autumn of 1917 a certain (real?) Revolution took place, "the patched-up Bolshevik party was there to gather its fruits."

† A notable exception is Robert Massie's *Nicholas and Alexandra*, a remarkably well-balanced and penetrating study.

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out their history," their "police state apparatus going back half a century under the Communists and a thousand years before that under the Czar."* Robert C. Tucker, in his recent *Stalin as Revolutionary,*† similarly has a vision of pre-1917 Russia as a land of unrelieved autocratic darkness; he cites on the very first page of his book the official document of 1892 declaring Russia an autocracy. The existence of the jury trial; the fact that freedom of the press was practically unlimited as of 1912, and extended even to the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda;* the existence of thousands of independent organizations, including political parties, trade unions, and national-minority groups, not to mention the Duma (parliament) in which, despite a severely restricted franchise, all political opinions were expressed and officially published—about all this the document of 1892 which Mr. Tucker cites says nothing, and so all this he ignores.

Mr. Ulam for his part does not dwell especially on the darkest aspects of pre-1917 Russia, but like Mr. Tucker he does not notice anything else. Even Soviet propaganda freely admits the fact that *Pravda* began to appear legally in 1912: the date, indeed, is celebrated in the Soviet Union as the Day of the Press! It is simply overlooked in Soviet propaganda that this was a newspaper published by a group openly calling for the overthrow of the regime; in a similar fashion Mr. Ulam both sees such facts very well, and does not see them at all.

So much for Russia before 1917. The overall pattern after 1917 also lies in plain sight. Lenin and his subordinates destroyed the nascent Russian democracy and established a super-autocracy more absolute than recorded European history had ever known; by 1922 it had assumed final shape, and nothing happened in the period between 1929 and 1953 that had not been either planned for or anticipated in the years 1918-22 (the six years between 1922 and 1929 were a retreat to which I shall return below).

The Western image of the period 1918-22 in Russia often rests, as I have noted, on a conception of Lenin as an essentially "good" ruler, a man, in Mr. Ulam's words, of "humane instincts," not at all like Stalin with his reliance on terror and his rage "to appease every suspicion and whim with blood." Yet the system by which an arrested man signed a confession as proof of guilt, for example, was established not by Stalin in the 30's, but by Lenin and his friend Dzerzhinsky in 1918 (see the latter's interview in the newspaper *Novaya Zhyzn,* June 8, 1918). The "most sophisticated torture" was *officially* called for in the "Weekly of the Extraordinary Commission" of October 6, 1918, and it is conceivable that torture during the period 1918-22 exceeded even that of the 30's in scale and sophistication. Torture with rats, described and sensationalized in George Orwell's *1984,* was reportedly used in that period—still called by quite a few Western scholars today a time of "heroic revolutionary idealism"; Orwell evidently took the idea from contemporary memoirs.

Many studies have appeared in the West on the "trials" of the 30's, in which Russian Communists led by Stalin arranged for the extermination of other Russian Communists, like Bukharin. Thus Stephen F. Cohen, in a recent biography,** gives us a picture of Bukharin as a brilliant intellectual, a kind of scholar-in-residence in Lenin's Russia (which seems to bear a resemblance to Princeton University in macrocosm), subsequently martyred by wicked Stalin. Actually, the trial of the Social Revolutionaries in 1922 was in a way more farcical than the trials of the 30's, and in it Bukharin played with gusto the macabre role of one of the "counsels for the defense." These persons were to deliver, and did deliver, thunderous exposés of the endless heinous crimes of the Social Revolutionaries (that was Bukharin's idea of "legal defense"), and in conclusion they asked the "court" for leniency in view of the defendants' confession and repentance. During the Shakhty trial of 1928 Bukharin was for imposing the death penalty on the defendants, as against Stalin's milder opinion.

What happened to Bukharin in the 30's, in other words, was that he landed in the "court" he himself had earlier helped to create for others. In the years 1918-22, however, it was not the Bukharins, Zinovievs, or Yagodas that were exterminated but Russian democracy itself, in the persons of the members of the various democratic parties and millions of other entirely irrelevant civilians (the membership of the Social-Revolutionary party alone came close to one million).

Mr. Ulam does not regard this period as being free of blemish. "It must be an indelible stain on Lenin's record," he writes "that for all his humane instincts he allowed this cult, a veritable mystique of terror, to develop."†† Allowed! It was in order to destroy democracy that Lenin per-

* Speech at *Pacem in Terris III,* October 9, 1973.

† Norton, 519 pp., $12.95.

** *Bukharin and the Russian Revolution,* Knopf, 495 pp., $15.00.

†† He adds in an interesting footnote: "Blindness to this fact mars an otherwise powerful and moving indictment of Stalinism by Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge.*" Roy Medvedev is a true Leninist, a Communist sectarian who was expelled from the Communist party because he believes that true Leninism (under which the Soviet Union was to be a paradise-on-earth) has been supplanted by pseudo-Leninism, i.e., Stalinism. Roy Medvedev is an Old Bolshevik's son, and when, under the leadership of Lenin, one's father or one's comrades were engaged in arresting, extracting "confessions" from, or just killing millions of irrelevant civilians, that is, the parents of others, one might be inclined to believe that one's family and Lenin had deeply humane instincts, while when one's own parents were being destroyed one might be inclined to believe that the paradise-on-earth had gone awry and the destroyers were the most heinous criminals on earth.

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sonally *created* that "veritable mystique of terror." How else could a populace be forced to accept super-autocracy? Even after the Bolsheviks had seized absolute power they were unable to garner more than a quarter of the votes that had been cast for them at the crest of their fantastic war-time promise to bring peace to Russia without actually concluding a separate peace with Germany, and to bring an end to the bread shortages in the cities. What was their actual support after failing to keep that promise? Five per cent? One per cent? The Kronstadt uprising of sailors, soldiers, and workers in 1921 scarcely indicates more. How can a group supported by a tiny minority impose its will on a free population except by waging ruthless war on the entire nation?

Even if super-autocracy had not been Lenin's clearly formulated aim since 1906, only by establishing super-autocracy, by applying terror and destroying every trace of civic freedom, could he hope to remain in power. Lenin's nationwide network of torture-and-death stations originated not as a result of his (or anyone's) sadism or any other such wickedness, but as the main instrument in his stupendous effort to place under his absolute power a huge population that had had a taste of democracy and gotten completely out of hand. As for his humane instincts—well, Adolf Hitler is said to have wept over a dead bird: the instinctively humane tyrant is as old as recorded history.

IN 1921, after a year of mulish stubbornness costing millions of human lives, Lenin was forced to call a retreat in his economic and political drive, and to accept "partial admission of capitalism." The reason for this was famine, not Lenin's much-vaunted "flexibility" and "realism." Western scholars tend to believe that Lenin (like Stalin) opposed capitalism because he was a Marxist, on the theory that educated people are motivated by their convictions, in contrast to the uneducated who are motivated by vulgar self-interest. Let us forget this happy belief: like innumerable other super-autocrats in history, Lenin and Stalin fought against free enterprise, or even "partial capitalism," because the latter diverted power (money and property) from their super-autocracy; Lenin in fact opposed such a diversion even more vigorously than did Stalin, fiercely demanding "state" (that is, his) monopoly of foreign trade, while Stalin was ready to accept non-monopolized foreign trade.

After the forced retreat, Stalin in 1928 reinstated the *status quo ante*. The move was rigidly determined. Briefly, Stalin's super-autocracy, with its "partial admission of capitalism," was found unable to compete in strategic goods with the West. In 1913 Russia had produced, for example, 10 per cent more electric power than France; by 1928 it was producing 66 per cent less.* Why? Because the manpower in "state" electricity production had drifted into the "capitalist" sector: the electricity-producing vulgarians, unmotivated by "Marxist convictions," were out for higher pay. Stalin of course wanted to crush the "capitalist" sector (though not as much perhaps as Lenin or Trotsky); but he also *had* to crush it if he was to remain a super-autocrat and go to his "unprecedented triumphs."

In addition to taking all property from "partial capitalists," Stalin also took all land away from the farmers, and thus the populace became a vast reservoir of manpower for strategic or para-strategic production at the terms he offered. Stalin called this expropriation "collectivization," and the term stuck in the West (just like his expression "fight for peace," later transformed into "détente"). In his interpretation of this episode Mr. Ulam remarks: "The Marxist goal for Russia was eminently sensible and practical"; this eminent good sense may still need to be demonstrated to Russian farmers. His corroborative quotation from Stalin to the effect that agricultural plots in Russia were "small and tiny," and hence that individual farming was impractical, sounds even less convincing today than it did forty odd years ago. In 1921 *Pravda* (April 23) gave the Russian land allotment for a family of ten as 80 acres (a typical corn-belt farm in the United States today is still only 200 acres). In Japan, where 80 per cent of the working population was engaged in agriculture early in the century, the average farm holding today is about 2½ acres, and more than half of the farmers cultivate units that are smaller. Russian farmers were hardly forbidden, either before 1917 or after, to own or rent machinery or land or anything in any kind of mutual arrangement they found to their advantage. But just as in the U.S. or anywhere else, most of them preferred individual farms, and the records of 1926 indicate that quite a few Russian farmers did no worse than the best farmers of Iowa.

Mr. Ulam regrets the victims of collectivization: if only Stalin had carried it out "eschewing forcible methods," his role as the "benefactor of the Russian peasant would remain undisputed." But how could he "eschew forcible methods"? Let a government try to impose on American farmers a plan like the one that seemed so sensible and practical to Stalin—or to Marx; the result would likely be an even greater percentage of farmers shot than in Russia, unless the farmers had the sense to shoot first.

Mr. Ulam calls Stalin irrational for imposing collectivization by force, but in fact Stalin was perfectly rational, as most ordinary people are when their interests are involved. And from the point of view of the interests of the super-autocrat, collectivization was a rational procedure. So

* *Narodmoye Khozyaistvo SSSR in 1970*, Moscow, 1971, p. 102.

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too, for that matter, was the extermination of Russian military leaders in the 30's—an episode that several Western scholars have adduced as evidence of Stalin's insanity, because it was so clearly against his own interests. But in a super-autocracy it is only his rank that makes a nobody a genius of military art, and demotion in rank turns the genius back into a nobody. Similarly, if an extra couple of million lives were exterminated in a given year, surely the perfect security of the super-autocrat was all the warrant that was needed. What's a couple of million human lives, anyway? Only the country's annual population growth. All right: let's assume that this year there was no population growth. A population depletion is anyway compensated for fairly quickly by a higher birth rate. Besides, few people were just shot; most of the undesirables were exterminated by labor—that is, the maximum output of labor per unit of input was taken out of them before they died.

MR. ULAM, like many Westerners, is fascinated by the question of why in World War II "Russian soldiers, led in some cases by the very men who had been beaten and tortured as traitors, went into battle for the Fatherland, for Stalin." This seems to Mr. Ulam so crucial that he even titles the chapter about the war, "For Our Country, For Stalin." Mr. Ulam's answer is a maze of mysteries called upon to explain a miracle. "Millions of Soviet men under arms" considered Stalin a "heartless and tyrannical father whom . . . they sought to obey and please despite the blight he had brought on their lives." Is the mystery really so difficult to unravel? In the U.S. a secretary says "good morning" to her boss every day even though she may not like him at all and even secretly wish him a pretty rotten morning. The difference between this and the miracle of "For Our Country, For Stalin" is simply the presence in the latter instance of an incomparably stronger external compulsion.

This leads us to a more general problem, one that can be called the problem of Western motive-hunting. Except in the case of social conventions like "good morning," in a democracy a correlation exists between verbal and behavioral attitudes: if we observe, for instance, that the majority of people express liking for a politician, the chances are they really want him to hold office and will vote for him. Western observers tend to believe a similar correlation exists in societies in which there is an exact 50-50 chance that any given verbal expression will denote the opposite attitude. Thus with the question inevitably raised in any consideration of the last stage of the Stalin era: did Stalin aspire to "world domination"? According to Mr. Ulam, the answer is on the whole negative: Stalin "was undoubtedly sincere in emphasizing his wish and hope for peace and for amicable relations with the United States."

Now, while Stalin's behavior differed from that of his successors domestically (because the question as to whether one thousand, two million, or ten million subjects should be liquidated depends entirely on a super-autocrat's own perception of his safety), his foreign policy did not differ essentially either from that of his predecessors or from that of his successors.

When those who came to power in the autumn of 1917 crushed democracy with all its evolutionary background, they promised a society in which the wishes of everyone would be fulfilled and there would be no need for freedom. Ilya Ehrenburg wrote at the time with his magnificent sarcasm (which he soon lost) that if one had a sudden wish to stroke a young kangaroo, he would have only to apply to the department where young kangaroos were stroked. Whether or not anyone believed in this magic, it is important to note that it had to be promised as a substitute for freedom. But what happened of course, was that unfreedom remained in force, while the magic did not work.

Just when it was found impossible to insure for every Soviet citizen the fulfillment of his wish to stroke a young kangaroo or even the much more vulgar wish of riding about in a Model-T Ford, it was found possible to match and outstrip the democracies in the production of weapons and the size of armed forces. World domination? In real-life behavior, aims are rarely formulated: they are pursued without formulation.

"The legend grew," writes Mr. Ulam of the period after World War II, "of the Red Army's being able and ready to pounce on Western Europe, to march to the English Channel, and its being restrained only through fear of the atomic bomb." Legend, indeed! It was supported by Winston Churchill, whom Mr. Ulam quotes: the Soviets, he said, "will try every door in the house, enter all rooms that are not locked. . . ."

Mr. Ulam proceeds to disprove the "legend":

> Churchill's view overlooked a considerable residue of Marxism-Leninism in the dictator's mind. To be sure what was good for Stalin was good for Communism: he could not conceive of any conflict between the two. *Eventually*, Communism would inherit the world, not in his time.

A considerable residue of Marxism-Leninism? Fortunately Mr. Ulam defines Communism according to Marxism-Leninism: "what was good for Stalin." So Communism (that is, what was good for Stalin) would not inherit the world in Stalin's time. *All* the world? Sir Winston did not say, all the world. He said: they "will try every door in the house." This they have done, in Stalin's time and our own.

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Reviewing Plays

Jack Richardson

WHEN G. B. Shaw retired as drama critic for the *Saturday Review,* he told his readers that he had come to feel, because of the narrow life led by a theater reviewer, like a goose with one foot nailed to the ground. His successor, Max Beerbohm, found it was time to leave when he noticed he had acquired something suspiciously like a theater library. Both had performed nobly as critics, but both had also been forced to admit, to be sure with clever indirectness, that there was something stultifyingly insular about a reviewer's life, something that, if unchecked, could constrain the mind's faculties and make the soul bitter.

Neither Shaw nor Beerbohm was a daily reviewer; but the long weekly pieces that they wrote demanded many evenings spent facing a proscenium stage on which nothing more inspiring than convoluted melodramas and farces generally took place. What they wrote in response to all the mediocrity they witnessed is testimony that a certain brand of good criticism has very little to do with the quality of the art it deals with. Nevertheless, the obligation to be coherent, thoughtful, and entertaining every week about plays that a civilized intelligence, unburdened by professional duties, would dismiss with a single epithet, took its toll. Beerbohm and Shaw, it is fair to say, ended up abhorring the theater that had usurped so much of their time. Shaw felt compelled to demonstrate that theater's inadequacies with plays of his own; Beerbohm retreated into quiet literary retirement where, if we are to believe his biographers, he reminisced about everything except his years as a drama critic.

I HAVE begun by talking about Shaw and Beerbohm for two reasons. First, they were drama critics whom no one, except perhaps the descendants of those who suffered their disapproval, could accuse of being ungifted. Second, for all their talent, they bear witness to the fact that play reviewing is an occupation that demands a serene indifference to the way in which one spends a good deal of time. As soon as a critic realizes that life is slipping by while he is occupied in deciding the merits of a musical version of the Battle of Hastings or a farce about adulterous twins, a sour uneasiness begins to creep into his tone and attitude, an uneasiness that often turns him into someone desperately trying to assure himself, and his readers, that he is really a more serious man than the limits of his occupation allow him to display. Writers as sensitive as Shaw and Beerbohm generally leave the profession before such peevishness invades their reviews. Some stay on, and turn criticism into acts of self-immolation.

Others, however, seem impervious to the attrition daily theatergoing effects upon the spirit. Year after year they see and report on almost every play they can take themselves to, setting down their judgments in pithy journalese and showing no remorse for so much time spent among the second rate. They bring to their task various degrees of intelligence and knowledge, but they all seem equally unconcerned that there might be something deadening in so much exposure to the theater. They make hits and failures out of what they see with professional dedication, but they never seem able to put the theater in perspective because they are too close to it, too much a part of its rituals and delusions. In the end, instead of being critics of the theater, they become in an odd way its spokesmen, daily personifications of its pieties and prejudices who act churlish and threatened whenever they are forced to encounter anything that seriously questions the fundamentals of the medium they watch over.

Years ago, there were many such reviewers. When I became involved in the theater, in the late 50's, there was Brooks Atkinson on the New York *Times,* Walter Kerr on the *Herald Tribune,* Richard Watts on the *Post;* and the *Journal-American, News, World-Telegram,* and *Mirror* all had reviewers whose names I've now forgotten. At that time, a simple bit of arithmetic could tell a producer whether the play he'd coaxed friends to invest in would survive. If Atkinson and Kerr were enthusiastic, all was well no matter what the other papers' reviewers thought. If Atkinson and Kerr were divided, the situation was grim, but salvation was still possible if Watts plus two of the other four critics could be counted affirmative. If, however, both Kerr and Atkinson were nays, the producer might as well immediately put his cast on unemployment and send a pamphlet to his backers that explained the rules for tax deductions.

THINGS have changed since then, of course. There are fewer papers, but in their place the weekly magazines and television networks more or less provide the same number of variables for the opening-night equations and there is still a terri-

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ble dependency on the good opinion of a handful of men for a play's survival.

At first, this might seem an unfair burden for an art to bear. And, indeed, laments are often heard, generally by those connected with a recently ill-starred effort, that success in the theater is based on too narrow and too final a judgment. The films, the novel, painting, and music are not hostage to the opinions of a handful of men. Their efforts, so the argument runs, while certainly sensitive to critical reaction, at least have an existence independent of it. They can be seen, read, or listened to regardless of bad notices attending their debuts. True, a play can be revived, but not the production that gave it birth, not the original collaborative effort that formed it. If only the public were not such sheep, if only a way could be found to create an audience for the theater that did not need printed approval of a play before it would come in numbers sufficient to insure the success of every worthwhile theatrical enterprise.

In reality, of course, the reviewers for the most part form a perfect complement to the theater. They may abruptly close a play, but it is a mercifully quick operation compared with the slow torture that would be inflicted by an emancipated public that grumbled, walked out, and diminished gradually in number. It is naive or hypocritical to maintain that there is an audience for the theater superior in taste and intelligence to the opening-night reviewers. If such existed, it would be of little use to those who try to make the theater their living, for it would be hopelessly small and demanding, allowing the one or two plays it chose to see each season the luxury of an eight-week run. Both sides may complain about each other, but those who create most of our theater, and those whose job it is to weigh the results, are really quite happy with the way things are arranged. They share a level of understanding and expectation about their professions which is comfortable to both and which permits a small amount of economic reality to surround each new production. This by no means implies a conspiracy; the level is not artificially created but culturally forged. Pressures deep within our society produce our drama reviewers in the same way that they produce our politicians. The media are aware of this, and the newspapers, television networks, and magazines that send forth their resident experts would no more consider hiring a critic from that discriminating audience mentioned above than they would think of endorsing an avowed monarchist for Congress. They, too, are part of the cultural balance and they see no need, or future, in upsetting it.

THE daily reviewer, then, is both a complaisant and complacent critic. He wants to help the present theater to survive and would never think of questioning whether it has a right to this support. Unlike Shaw and Beerbohm, he does not find his life constricted by an excessive amount of theatergoing because he believes that this activity provides wide margins for existence. He does not ask himself unsettling questions about the worth of the theater relative to the other arts, because he is not permitted such disinterested speculation. Even if he were, it is doubtful whether he would be equipped for such comparative studies. Art that demands careful study and slow savoring comes after a time to seem presumptuous to one who is used to wrapping up an aesthetic experience in the space of four hours.

However, even for a parochial profession, it is remarkable how similar are the ways in which these reviewers practice criticism. Not only do they all use the same format to display their opinions—the opening paragraph in which judgment is pithily given, then the description of the play's plot and characters followed by a more direct reiteration of their opening opinion, after which comes a brief salute to the actors, and then a peroration that once more makes an attempt at epigrammatizing

Down Mailer's Way
ROBERT SOLOTAROFF



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their feelings—they also seem to share a common critical code. That a play is to be judged by what it attempts to do is the code's first principle, a handy loophole through which inanity can pass unmolested by anything harsher than good-natured condescension. The natural corollary to this is that the more aspiring the work the more demanding the judgment, and thus it follows logically that few ambitious efforts should survive their opening nights.

HARDLY less important in the daily reviewers' canon is the belief that a dramatist who is not satisfied with naturalism is in some way a theatrical eccentric and is to be dealt with cautiously. When they occasionally praise such a writer there is always a hesitant note in their judgment that informs their readers that they must charitably renounce, for an evening at least, what everyone knows to be theatrical reality so that they can experience something exotic and at the same time worthwhile. That they will not understand everything they see and hear, the reviewer makes manifest by admitting that even he was baffled at times. However, the critique usually implies that comprehension is not all that important when dealing with such theatrical curios and that bafflement for the sake of art helps keep everyone open and culturally healthy.

A third axiom of our frontline critics is that no play—revivals excepted of course—is ever ruined by actors. This attitude has always puzzled me since one would suppose that reviewers, being writers themselves, would be disposed to take the playwright's side when things were turning sour in front of them and to keep an eye out for signs of a fair notion fatally injured. However, whether they simply don't know when an actor is mutilating a part, or whether they feel that a performer, being one of the true "theater people," needs to be protected, they are careful to absolve him of any responsibility for a play's failure. He is dismissed with the "valiant effort" award and wished better luck with the next play that he is destined to ruin.

Finally, the reviewers' code seems to demand that there be no extra-theatrical commitment or prejudice in the practice of their craft. Each offering is to be treated *in vacuo* and judged as though it had no relation to any of the matters of life that occasion the vital arguments of a culture. Although our reviewers don't create fashions, they nevertheless feel obligated to follow them, and they accord each new trend, once it has been well-publicized of course, a respectful hearing, because they have neither the historical assurance nor the critical passion necessary to separate the truly innovative from the merely antic. Their condemnations and celebrations become, therefore, effusions of the moment, random jottings that, when viewed collectively, seem to be the work of a diarist whose life has been packed with quaint, unrelated incidents.

Now whom, it is fair to ask, have I been talking about? Who specifically is guilty of all these sins and errors? My answer is that it is not so much a group of individuals as a generalized attitude that I have in mind when I describe the critical manner of the daily reviewer. The narrowness of mind, the impersonal professionalism, the tired rituals of judgment—these are as much a part of our theater as the 7:30 curtain and the three-act comedy. Certainly, one could single out their present embodiments, but that would be as fugitive an enterprise as the criticism these men produce. It is best, therefore, to hope that they will someday imitate their betters and, like Shaw and Beerbohm, realize that their lives might be better spent elsewhere. Perhaps those that replace them will be less ready to accept the rules and limitations of their profession or will be able somehow to transcend them. Should this happen, it might be a terrible blow to our theater, indeed for a time it might mean that there would be hardly any theater at all. However, we are not far from that condition now, or else why would I be forced to discuss the theater's reviewers instead of the theater itself?

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

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Public Discourse

FOUR REFORMS. By WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. *Putnam. 128 pp. $4.95.*

Reviewed by ELLIOTT ABRAMS

"GIVE it up" was John Kenneth Galbraith's advice, William Buckley reported in *Cruising Speed*. "The whole thing. *National Review*, journalism, television, radio, lecturing. Come to the Academy and write books. It is only books that count." Buckley did not, of course, "give it up" (nor, for that matter, did Galbraith), but *Four Reforms* at first glance appears to be a response to Galbraith's dictum: it is Buckley's first "book" (as opposed to a collection of columns or a personal memoir) in several years.

Yet *Four Reforms* is so short that one wonders whether in writing it Buckley was not responding more to a conviction that he *ought* to write a book than to any real desire to sit down and do so. Buckley devotes only twenty-odd pages to each of his proposals, which concern welfare, aid to education, taxes, and criminal justice; this hardly provides sufficient opportunity to convert the unbelievers, and if that were Buckley's intention the book would simply be a failure. Recognizing the limitations of space, however, he has chosen a different tack. In each of four complex and highly controversial areas, he has attempted to cut through to the core of the problem with a simple, often startling, usually very conservative, proposal. The accompanying text is by and large a devastating critique of present policies, rather than a reasoned argument for Buckley's own proposals.

Buckley's four reforms may be set forth very simply: he proposes two constitutional amendments, one to repeal the Fifth Amendment and one to forbid school busing and permit aid to parochial schools; and he proposes two statutory revisions, one to replace the progressive income tax with a flat-rate tax, and one to forbid federal welfare appropriations to the richer states. The overall program is not likely to win a very high rating from Americans for Democratic Action, but in fact, little of what Buckley has to say contains much ideological bias.

His criminal-law proposal, repeal of the Fifth Amendment, is typical. The suggestion is on its face a terrible one. Upon reading the text, however, we learn that Buckley favors neither torture nor police brutality, but is instead exercised about a number of very real problems. The first is the Supreme Court's insistence on the "exclusionary rule," the doctrine that illegally seized evidence may not be received in court. The effect of this doctrine is to frustrate, on account of police or prosecutorial misbehavior, the conviction of defendants against whom there is competent and persuasive evidence. As Buckley notes, the official misbehavior itself is not punished, but the guilty are freed and society pays the penalty. It is, from the standpoint of logic, an altogether strange state of affairs, and Buckley is not alone in wondering why a less costly method could not be devised to curb abuses by law-enforcement officials. Buckley is also disturbed by the endless delays which now characterize so many criminal-court calendars, and in this area too his concern is widely shared.

Buckley's objections to the present taxation and welfare systems are not fundamentally ideological either. The Internal Revenue Code is nearly incomprehensible, Buckley holds, a circumstance which encourages people to believe it is nothing but a maze of loopholes. This is on the whole an accurate charge. Buckley's reform would entail the elimination of virtually all deductions and exemptions—a system which he claims would appear more just to taxpayers than the present, irregularly progressive, one. As to welfare, dissatisfaction with the present scheme is now so widespread that there may well be no one, even among social workers, who wishes to see it continue without reform.

Buckley, then, has little difficulty demonstrating the need for change. He is less successful in proving that his proposals, if put into effect, would solve the problems to which they are addressed. To take criminal law first, the Fifth Amendment is not in fact what is primarily responsible for the exclusionary rule or for criminal-court calendar delays. The right to counsel, for example, appears in the Sixth Amendment, and therefore any delays occasioned by the ubiquitousness of lawyers would not disappear if "taking the Fifth" were no longer permitted. In any case, as recent and successful reforms in New York City have shown, what may be responsible for delays is poor administration of the courts, not an overly solicitous attitude toward defendants. Buckley offers no evidence that giving "Miranda warnings" has in fact reduced the number of confessions police receive, or that police effectiveness is diminished by the need to inform suspects of their rights. The FBI has followed this practice for decades, and its performance has not been noticeably impaired.

His tax proposal is likewise off the point. Buckley notes that the man in the street distrusts the endless complexity of the Internal Revenue Code, but surely one reason for dissatisfaction is the intuition that the rich are not paying their fair share. Buckley's plan would insure that the rich pay a sum certain, but would that be more or less than they pay now? Buckley never answers this, an obvious question about any tax-reform scheme; a chart he provides, however, indicates that anyone earning much over $25,000 would,

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

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under the proposed 15 per-cent flat rate, pay less than he does now. Since Buckley's proposal includes various forms of tax relief for the poor, one concludes that the middle class would be left with a still-heavier tax burden than today. Perhaps not—but even a 24-page discussion ought to reveal who will pay more and who will pay less.

Buckley's welfare proposal is almost bizarre. In his tax-reform chapter he suggests certain ways of lightening the burden now placed on the poor, but to the present welfare system he proposes no real alternative whatsoever, other than that Congress "appropriate funds for social welfare only for the benefit of states whose per-capita income is below the national average." Buckley's point is that federal funds are themselves derived from all states, rich and poor, and that therefore federal grants to rich states like New York constitute at least a partial subsidy of them by poor states like Mississippi. True enough, but is it not a form of tunnel vision to regard welfare funds as coming from and going to states rather than individuals? Similarly, per-capita income figures are only marginally relevant when the central issue is the distribution of income.

Buckley apparently envisions a plan whereby the federal government would make welfare payments to the poor of Mississippi while the poor of New York depended for help exclusively on the state treasury. If the New York state legislature decided to spend its money on highways, or even education, New York's poor could presumably like it or lump it—or move to Mississippi. It is not, all in all, a terribly helpful idea. If the goal is to reorganize present welfare programs and to increase aid to the poor, Buckley's proposal is, on both counts, at best a *non sequitur* and at worst a step in the wrong direction.

The chapter on education contains a superb review of the recent trials and tribulations of liberals as their dogmas have come under challenge by scholars like James Coleman, Christopher Jencks, and Richard J. Herrnstein. "Of all the dreams of American liberalism," he writes, "the dream that featured education—as the solvent of universal equality, harmony, and prosperity—was the most rudely shattered in the postwar decades." Of course, Buckley suggests no cure for this situation, since he considers it inevitable and indeed welcome. Instead, he turns to two other areas: forced busing, which he wishes to prohibit, and aid to parochial schools, which he wishes to permit. His arguments on both counts are cogent, although he is stronger on educational policy than on constitutional law, and the proposed constitutional amendment he submits is much too loosely written.

THE reforms Buckley proposes are not novel, most having been favorites of conservatives in general and of Buckley in particular for some time now. His tax proposal, for example, may be found in identical form in Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*, published in 1962. Now, lack of novelty is no cause for criticism,

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

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but it does lead one to wonder what the purpose of this book might be. Why should Buckley wish to write it all up now, again, in 1974? An answer may be suggested in the statement with which Buckley ends his chapter on welfare:

> It will take time to instruct people in economic truths, but the effort is worth it. For one thing, the benefits are palpable. For another, we have not very much time left in which to vindicate the democratic idea. The young generation is already dangerously close to concluding that the whole thing is eyewash, and that no one cares to tell them the truth. They are very nearly correct.

If the last decade has been unkind to liberals, it can only have been demoralizing to conservatives, as the troubled tone of this passage suggests. Conservatism, of course, is an ill-defined term, and can be used to describe apologists for big business and inherited wealth as well as fiercely independent thinkers like Milton Friedman. In *Capitalism and Freedom,* Friedman wrote that "conservatism has come to cover so wide a range of views, and views so incompatible with one another, that we shall no doubt see the growth of hyphenated designations, such as libertarian-conservative and aristocrat-conservative." Alas, his prediction has not come true, and the resulting confusion necessitates great care. "Conservative" intellectuals have long been wary of "conservative" politicians, fearing that their commitment was to victory and to the wealthy supporters who would arrange it or make it possible, rather than to "conservative" principles. Friedman favors the term "libertarian" to describe his own views, and Buckley "anti-statist" to describe his, and the clarification is useful: the businessmen who poured millions into President Nixon's campaign may have been "conservatives," but neither their candidates nor they themselves can seriously be called "libertarians" or "anti-statists."

In 1964, the massive defeat of Barry Goldwater, a man whom most conservative intellectuals considered a principled conservative in the Friedman-Buckley sense, brought to an end the dream that one of their own could be elected President. The alternative was, of course, to support a "moderate," a man who apparently shared many of their views, and could win. Nixon was the man, and fears that he was the other sort of conservative, lacking a principled commitment to anti-statism or libertarianism (or anything else, for that matter) were submerged. If one could not elect a "true" conservative, one could at least hope to come close.

This dream, too, has been shattered, for the Nixon administration has compiled a record which must repel the "true" conservatives almost as much as it does liberals. The administration has not reduced the power of the state or encouraged the private ordering of our social and economic life; rather, it has simply used the power of the state to benefit a different, usually wealthier, clientele, and ultimately to preserve itself in power. Thinking of wage-and-price controls, and "plumbers' units," and warm, approving smiles at totalitarian China and Russia, libertarians and anti-statists can only cringe.

Thus the dilemma is posed: if the nation is not ready to support "true" conservative principles, and if a Republican administration closely tied to big business has proved itself unpalatable, where are conservatives to turn? Buckley's answer appears to be that they must turn back to the people once again, with the same arguments and the same proposals as of old, in the hope and with the conviction that logic and good sense will in the end win out.

This is certainly the message of the very last lines of *Four Reforms,* where Buckley states that "So much time is spent on vapid exhortation in a democracy, one's ear tends to discount it. But every day laws *are* passed, and every now and then the people experience the delights of reasoned self-rule, and then true reforms are made." The tone is upbeat, yet not Pollyannaish. Buckley describes his reforms as "entirely procedural," and hopes they will be found to lack "ideological bias"; both comments reflect the defensiveness of a man

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who feels his substantive proposals and his ideological position to be a minority one.

Four Reforms seems to represent, finally, the realization that conservatives must place political education on at least as high a plane as electoral politics. The book is too brief to be meant as a theoretical contribution, or even a serious intellectual workout; it is instead meant to stir and to influence public debate. It is one of Buckley's 19th-century liberal principles that in such debate, truth must ultimately defeat error (though Buckley has lost too many battles not to understand how distant that victory may be); so, in part, he writes out of commitment to the principles of democratic politics. And to the demands of principle are added those of political expediency, for the very different sorts of defeats Goldwater and Nixon represent for "true" conservatives must show them that their views can triumph only after a great campaign of political education. Buckley writes because he loves to, but there is in this book a sense of obligation, too.

THOUGH this is not a major work, then, and one might almost accuse Buckley of merely going through the motions, that would be to miss the point. *Four Reforms* is an affirmation that, when the electoral process produces frustration and disappointment, the proper reaction is to turn again to public discourse, rather than to protest demonstrations or to semi-legal circumventions of the system. It is an antiquated theory, but, at this particular point in our political history, one in which it is especially valuable to have a demonstration of confidence.

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Fashions of the Jews

A HISTORY OF JEWISH COSTUME. By ALFRED RUBENS. Illustrated. *Crown. 221 pp. $15.00.*

Reviewed by ANNE HOLLANDER

THE very idea of Jewish costume seems a little ridiculous at first glance (a caftan and *shtreimel*? custom-tailored suits? rags? mink?), but Alfred Rubens has made a most satisfying attempt to organize and describe the extraordinary variety of Jewish dress in history. Mr. Rubens is a learned British antiquarian with formidable credentials, but he writes with the civilized straightforwardness and clarity also characteristic of modern British journalism at its very best. The combination of intense, authoritative learning and briskness of tone makes *A History of Jewish Costume* a pleasure to read and learn from; and that is extremely fortunate, since apart from a few weighty turn-of-the-century tomes in German, it is the only comprehensive one available on this enormous and elusive subject.

Whereas Jews have often been prohibited from participating in the great tradition of Western fashion, they have also sometimes shone in the midst of it. They have followed the habits of folk-dress in the countries where they have lived, and also resisted them. They have been prevented from wearing certain things, and made to wear certain things, and they have also resisted both kinds of pressure at different times and places. They have both followed Scripture and flouted it; and there are very few generalizations to be made about any universal characteristics of Jewish dress, except that Jews have managed to display the sartorial desire to be both utterly distinctive and undistinguishable at the same time, to be at once Eastern and Western, and both fashionable and traditional. One obvious secret of Jewish historical durability has been this perpetual capacity for stylistic compromise—the ability to bob down under the surface of culture and then reemerge dif-

ANNE HOLLANDER *is currently working on a book about art and dress.*

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ferently but with continuity somehow unbroken.

Thus, a good deal of what has come to be considered essentially Jewish costume isn't originally Jewish at all, while many biblical and talmudic requirements for dress have long since vanished. The *tallith* (prayershawl) is in itself not Jewish but generally classical, identical with the Greek *himation* and the Roman *pallium,* which later became the Christian liturgical stole. What makes it Jewish are its tassels, which were, however, prescribed for other kinds of garments as well. The stripes are also classical, identical with Roman *clavi,* which were originally worn to denote rank and later used for decoration of various garments. *Peoth* (sidelocks) are mentioned in Leviticus, but there is no evidence that Jews were wearing them in antiquity. On the other hand, Libyans, Syrians, and Cretans definitely did wear them as a distinguishing characteristic of the headdress.

Masculine covering for the head has the flavor of an extremely ancient and universal Jewish custom, but in fact in biblical times it was a privilege or requirement only for priests while engaging in priestly activity, and in talmudic times, like the wearing of *tallith* and *tefillin* (phylacteries), it was restricted to scribes, rabbis, and Pharisees. The covering of the head for ordinary Jewish men had no religious significance until the last fifty years, when it came to be a necessary symbol of Orthodoxy. Yet head-covering had great authority as a general secular custom among both Eastern and Western European Jews beginning with the Middle Ages, when Jews were required not by their own laws, but by the Christians, to wear a distinctive hat.

Jewish dress everywhere has often (but not always) included the wearing of some distinguishing sign, perhaps originally worn with humiliation and shame but later coming to be worn with a sense of pride and personal embellishment. Hester Prynne's disconcerting embroidered "A" leaps to mind when one looks at the elegant and decorative silk badges which European Renaissance Jews were made to wear, since the rest of their costume could not be told apart from Christian dress, or at the wonderful high Jewish hats of early medieval times. Rabbinic authority, meanwhile, perpetually tried to counteract the recurrent tendency among Jews to dress fashionably like everybody else.

This had curious results in different times and places. After Jews had successfully disguised themselves for a few generations as prosperous Polish landowners in the 12th century, wearing caftans and fur hats, or as respectable German merchants and scholars in the 16th, wearing flat berets and ruffs, their originally unnoticeable dress suddenly became frozen in time, just like any kind of folk-dress, while the course of fashion moved on. This left Jews wearing the modes of one and two hundred years back, and the following generations believing that these originally stylish ways of dressing were essentially Jewish.

For example, the three-cornered hat and knee-breeches common to all Western fashion in the 18th century had become "Jewish" costume in parts of late 19th-century Germany and were even worn as rabbinic dress. Meanwhile in France, Italy, and Holland, any kind of distinctive Jewish clothing had virtually already disappeared by the 18th century. Prominent and prosperous Jews of those centuries appear in portraits dressed in the height of fashion, with powdered wigs and swords. The covering of married women's hair, elsewhere and previously quite generally observed, also vanished among French, Italian, and Dutch Jewish ladies, who wore coiffures as seductive as those of any Boucher duchess. It was possible for Western Jewish costume to alternate between the modish and the folk style, or indeed between a European kind of subjection to the changes of fashion and a Middle Eastern kind of emphasis on unchanging forms supporting symbolic ornament and detail.

Mr. Rubens's admirable book has


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a chapter devoted specifically to the rabbinic dress of all countries, and also a lucid guide to Eastern Jewish costume. This last seems an unutterably confusing matter, since it looked like all the other hundreds of varieties of Eastern folk-dress—except that it requires sorting out according to which Jews went where at what time. And there is also the effect of Islam upon Jewish customs in general. A whole chapter is devoted to Poland and Russia, in which American Jews can find pictures and descriptions that are a bit more recognizable than the extraordinary, often magnificent garb of the Moroccan, Turkish, and Indian Jewish communities. There are other things a bit difficult to grasp in the Oriental section, like the fact that 3rd-century Jews escaping Russian persecution fled to settle in China wearing Persian costume. Mr. Rubens makes it all amazingly easy to follow, however, with the aid of a great many illustrations and his persistently clear prose.

The many pictures are indeed a wonderful study in themselves. A number of them reproduce watercolors done by talented and conscientious European travelers during the 18th and 19th centuries. Some of these show the apparently inescapable need for such an artist to impose his own conventional vision of the clothed human figure upon even the most bizarre or exotic costume drawing. One can often date these illustrations from the style in which the bodies have been posed and rendered: they may show, for example, a vague suggestion of corsets and hoopskirt, indispensable to the 1846 mental image of a dressed female shape, distorting the loosely-caftaned body of an otherwise authentic-looking Algerian lady. The same kind of thing shows up in the 16th-century engravings of American Indians done by the earliest European visitors to these shores.

Mr. Rubens has done students of costume history a great service by mapping this vast, complex terrain. Students of Jewish life will find his book an illuminating ornament to any historical investigation; and anyone who likes any sort of treasury of fascinating lore, accompanied by plenty of pictures, cannot help but enjoy it thoroughly.

History and Reform

MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875. By GERALD GROB. *The Free Press. 458 pp. $10.95.*

Reviewed by
STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN

HISTORY may not travel in cycles, but interpretations of history generally do. The last decade especially has been a fertile period for historical revisionism, not least in the area of social institutions and public policy. Authors like Christopher Lasch, Michael Katz, and David Rothman have debunked the idea of a humanitarian impulse behind the founding of American prisons, public schools, mental hospitals, settlement houses, and the like, and on the basis of their analyses have demanded a radical revamping of social-welfare institutions in this country. As a perusal of university reading lists makes abundantly clear, the social-reform history of the 60's has also succeeded in capturing the academy. But already we are beginning to see the signs of yet another cycle of revisionism. Gerald Grob's *Mental Institutions in America,* the first of two volumes encompassing all public and private efforts to rehabilitate the insane, is a herald of things to come along this new line of historical interpretation.

Beginning his analysis with the colonial period, Grob traces the abandonment of familial for institutional care of the mentally ill, and the emergence of a fledgling psychiatric profession in the middle of the 19th century. Unlike earlier historians, he refuses to condemn colonial America for its indifference to formal therapeutic facilities, finding the explanation not in the callousness of early American society but in the simple demographic fact of its overwhelmingly rural character. In a population so widely dispersed, mental illness was just not conceived as a pressing *social* problem. By the early 19th century, demographic changes demanded institutional re-

STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, *a new contributor, teaches educational history at the University of Chicago.*

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adjustments. But even then, Grob maintains, the growth of mental hospitals was not merely the inevitable response to population increases and urbanization. New developments in medical theory and practice gave impetus to, and suggested clinical procedures for, the burgeoning institutions.

Grob's most striking theme concerns the impact of the large-scale Irish immigration of the mid-1800's on therapeutic possibilities. Early 19th-century psychiatric theory had assumed a close, harmonious doctor-patient relation in an anxiety-free milieu; and so long as patients and doctors shared similar values and cultural traditions, Grob argues, this ideal was not wholly illusory. But once Irish immigrants began to fill public facilities in the 1850's, the latent prejudices of psychiatrists became manifest and the limitations of prevailing theory readily apparent. As Grob observes, even the best-intentioned of psychiatrists were generally oblivious to, or unable to overcome, their cultural parochialism, and thus unwittingly hastened the transformation of mental hospitals into custodial facilities.

GROB is very much aware that "mental illness" admits of no simple definition, that governments have frequently misused their powers to confine people for psychological aberration, that 19th-century therapeutic techniques were often little more than applied Protestant pieties, and that tolerance for deviant behavior always seems to decrease in times of stress and rapid social change. Still, he insists that many types of insanity are, and always have been, open to medical cure. His assertion that in several ante-bellum asylums three-quarters and more of the patients were actually cured will unquestionably trigger much doubt, but the larger point that lies behind this assertion carries much weight: in lieu of contradictory evidence there is no good reason, *a priori*, to deny the possibility. Nineteenth-century psychiatrists may not have been very sophisticated medically, Grob suggests, but in fact they did provide many a troubled individual with the emotional resources he needed to cope with the world.

For views like these Grob will no doubt be charged with doing little more than supplying an apology for the institutional status quo. And his refusal to incorporate in his analysis, or even take very seriously, the protestations of a modern critic like Thomas Szasz will infuriate those who assert that all therapy is merely a euphemism for social control and political repression. Grob himself simplifies the task of his critics by prefacing his book with a few candid, but very misleading, remarks on the nature of historical inquiry and the proper relations between that inquiry and public policy. He castigates "didactic history" in the name of humility, on the one hand, and of methodological purity on the other. "I am not at all certain that I am necessarily wiser and more knowledgeable than earlier generations of individuals whose achievements fell far short of their hopes and aspirations. . . . What I have attempted instead is to study and understand the past on its own terms and avoid the imposition of a presentist framework upon the subject."

Fortunately for the reader, Grob has done no such thing. He does provide a finely balanced account of reformers' hopes and aspirations, tracing them to the mutually reinforcing tendencies of Enlightenment theories of progress and rationality, and Protestant evangelical conceptions of moral uplift and human perfectibility. But he also borrows freely from modern theories of social change, legislative behavior, and social planning, and employs with discrimination a number of sociological concepts which have recently been used with abandon—social elite, ideology, professionalization, bureaucracy, to name a few. As a result, *Mental Institutions in America* is much more interesting than the theory of history on which it purports to rest.

On a superficial level, what most clearly distinguishes Grob from the revisionist historians of the 60's are his views on the issue of social control. Here Grob's principal antagonist is David Rothman, whose Beveridge prize-winning *The Discovery of the Asylum* stresses the fear of social disorder as the key reason behind the birth of mental

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hospitals and other "total institutions" in Jacksonian America. Grob deals with the issue temperately, incorporating Rothman's viewpoint and then going beyond it. "A few saw reform as a conservative phenomenon in that it would diminish class rivalries and antagonisms and thereby preserve a fundamentally sound and moral social order. But many more were primarily concerned with uplifting the mass of suffering humanity and were not particularly aware of political or economic considerations."

More fundamentally, though, Grob's argument is with Christopher Lasch, and hinges on the historical treatment of benevolent enterprises that have gone sour. To Lasch, who relies heavily on the sociologists Erving Goffman and Gresham Sykes, prisons, insane asylums, orphanages, and a host of other "total institutions" were destined to fail from the start, because "they obey an internal dynamic of their own," and because confinement and therapy are by their very nature incompatible. The bad end to which we have come, in Lasch's view, ought to have been apparent from the beginning. To Grob, on the other hand, nothing in history is easily predictable. Against Lasch's historical determinism, Grob insists that the historian must deal more with process than with origins and intentions. Although he too believes that mental care in America has been a failure, he offers no simple explanation:

> Indeed, the most impressive fact is the relative absence of malevolence or for that matter consistency of behavior. What emerges more closely resembles a tragedy, in which participants, to a greater or lesser degree, were well intentioned but their actual behavior gave rise to less than desirable results.

CAN a progressive public policy be informed by social-reform history which is not overtly didactic? Grob's work provides no clear-cut guidelines for reform, but it is safe to assume that the future of social policy will be better served by works like his than by the wholesale damnation of all social institutions, whatever their purpose and whatever their record of success or failure.

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

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

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The End?

CLOSING TIME. By NORMAN O. BROWN. *Random House. 109 pp. $5.95.*

Reviewed by ALAN GOLDFEIN

IN 1959 Norman O. Brown published *Life Against Death,* an attempt to take Freud's principles beyond Freud, to explain how man had been enchained by his repressions, and how he might be freed from them, to be resurrected into a kind of pan-corporeal sexuality. The book scanned the entire history of modern Western thought, but its special emphasis was upon those concepts which lent themselves best to the use of literary-psychoanalytic technique. Thus, the concept of anality, for example, explained man's use of money, his need to accumulate savings, his sense of sin and guilt, and the meeting of all these in religion and capitalism. Essentially, Brown's analysis laid Freud upon Max Weber, with some help from the economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi. Its conclusions, though, were strictly the author's own.

Life Against Death was not immediately popular—for this it had to await the furious middle 60's. But it contained the ingredients which were to make of it the first super-successful post-modern apocalyptic work: political and sexual radicalism coupled with academic respectability. In its appeal to the mood of the 60's, *Life Against Death* shared the spotlight with Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization,* which also, though in somewhat differing proportions, combined Marxism and Freudianism with pan-genitalism. Freud's phrase, "polymorphous perversity," popularized by Brown, became a catchword of sorts, just as Marcuse's "non-repressive sublimation" had, and in the minds of many the two may very well have been inseparable, the one serving as a kind of cryptic explanation for the other.

Love's Body (1966) was a product of the culture anticipated by *Life Against Death.* For this reason, and perhaps also because Brown was by now a sort of culture hero himself, the second book did not seem to require the kind of arguments and explanations which are standard in works whose intention is to persuade. The author's entire effort, after all, had been directed toward liberation from the tyranny of Western reason, so he could now practice what he had preached, uniting form with content, and letting "the body" take over from the brain. This second volume was couched entirely in free-verse epigrams, on the assumption, apparently, that the kind of liberation it preached could only be expressed through poetry. The attempt to get form and content together once and for all superseded any attempt at conventional communication—and also, incidentally, prevented it.

Now, in *Closing Time,* his most recent book, Brown has grown more cryptic than ever, though this time the "poetry" is not his own but a collage which he has put together out of fragments from the work of James Joyce and the early 18th-century philosopher, Giambattista Vico. The book's title, *Closing Time,* signifies that Western civilization is over, but the combining of *Finnegans Wake* and Vico's *New Science*—two books which concern the cyclical nature of history—is intended to convey the information as well that a *new* age is dawning, one which will be marked by a return to primitive simplicity, where life will be totally free, and human expression will be a "sounddance." In this new era, language itself will have returned to an earlier, more perfect form, the form of the hieroglyphic, which combines sound, structure, and meaning in one elemental symbol. The perfect utterance will be a kind of stutter: "Half a sylb, helf a solb, holf a salb onward," as Brown, quoting Joyce, puts it. Throughout his exposition, Brown tries to emulate Joyce by shooting puns at us ("Etyms are atoms," etc.), forgetting that *Finnegans Wake,* inspired though it may have been by Vico's philosophic theories, was not itself a philosophic tract, but a work of literature.

SO FAR as Vico himself goes, his greatness lay not in his speculations about cyclical return, nor in his theories about the recurrent

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ALAN GOLDFEIN *is the author of* Heads *(Morrow). He is currently at work on a new novel.*

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stages of world history, but rather in his method. The general assumption of the Enlightenment had been that the physical universe was accessible to understanding because it was external to the observer, uncomplicated by the factor of his presence. Human behavior, too, as expressed in the various social, political, and economic arrangements that made up human society, could best be studied—as John Locke and Adam Smith did—in the light of the supposed clockwork regularity and predictability of the physical world.

Vico's combination of reason and empiricism changed all this. To Vico, knowing was not only perceiving, but also doing or making, and man could learn best to understand what he himself had fabricated. Vico went from objects back to subjects—therein lay his greatness. American instrumentalism is in his debt, as was Marx, as are the modern disciplines of anthropology and psychology, and even the sociology of knowledge. Brown, however, ignores this large contribution and prefers to locate Vico in his own "hermetic tradition." He takes Vico's one eccentricity—the belief in cycles—and makes it seem central to his thought, thereby turning Vico into a kind of ideologue.

In fact, Brown practices precisely the kind of ideological dogmatism against which Vico rebelled when it was practiced by the 18th-century philosophers in their attempt to fit human social behavior into predetermined patterns. In Brown's earlier books, he practiced the same approach to Freud. Freud had seen Eros, the pleasure principle, as only one of two instincts perpetually at war with each other. The other impulse—Thanatos (from the Greek word for death)—worked in the opposite direction to Eros, restraining the impulse toward abandonment of all restraints, and making possible—indeed unavoidable—that complex series of efforts which we call civilization. Freud had despaired over the duality and the pessimism contained in his own vision. Brown, going "beyond" Freud, simply threw out the problematic part of Freud's vision and proved to his own satisfaction that Freudian theory led straight to Eros.

All teleological system builders —whether Hegel, Marx, Vico, or, for that matter, Norman O. Brown —are haunted by a common problem. They create a universe, set it in motion, observe it in godlike detachment, and then step outside of it, forgetting in the process that they themselves are a part of the very thing they have created. They become Cartesians without the Cartesian cognizance that they *are* Cartesians. Why should Marx's dialectic stop with the dictatorship of the proletariat and the withering away of the state? Why should Vico's cycles end where Brown wants them to?

BROWN's progress as an apocalyptician has now gone through three stages, of which the third is a mere re-enactment of the second. *Life Against Death* used the elements of Western reason to analyze the course of human history and paradoxically point up the need for transcending rationality. *Love's Body* was an attempt to show by example how the need could be fulfilled, and thus an announcement that the desired state was already halfway here. *Closing Time,* spuriously leaning on the authority of an 18th-century philosopher and a 20th-century novelist, is intended as further demonstration of this proposition. In Marx's view history's repetition of tragedy is farce; Marx neglected, or perhaps he found it superfluous, to say what we should call it the third time around.

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

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

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Social Philosophy

THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE. By DANIEL J. BOORSTIN. *Random House. 717 pp. $10.00.*

Reviewed by
DAVID HERBERT DONALD

AFTER fifteen years and three-quarters of a million words, Daniel J. Boorstin has completed his trilogy, *The Americans.* In 1959 the first volume, subtitled *The Colonial Experience,* deservedly won a Bancroft prize. Seven years later, the second installment, *The National Experience,* received the Francis Parkman prize, recognizing history of outstanding literary excellence. Now the final, longest, and best volume, *The Democratic Experience,* has appeared and it ought to be a strong candidate for major honors and awards.

A best-seller and a selection of the Book of the Month Club, *The Democratic Experience* is tautly, and at times brilliantly, written, with scarcely a superfluous phrase or sentence. It is enormously learned; Boorstin has apparently read everything. It is unbelievably comprehensive, giving extended treatment to matters as diverse as rural free delivery and air conditioning, divorce and life insurance, market research and space exploration. This vast history finds room for the seemingly trivial as well as for the obviously important. Boorstin's index includes references to full-frequency-range reproduction and gangsters, to "Rudolph the red-nosed reindeer" and scientific management.

Unlike much social history, *The Democratic Experience* is not an aimless collection of miscellaneous data but a cogent argument of a novel thesis. In the last century, Boorstin believes, Americans have experienced "countless, little-noticed revolutions, which occurred not in the halls of legislatures or on battlefields or on the barricades but in the homes and farms and factories and schools and stores." The most remarkable of the changes was the shift from the face-to-face fellowship of the 19th-century ethnic, religious, or political community to a new world of impersonal relationships among consumers. Consumption became an end in itself; shopping was the major American pastime. For city people the daily newspapers with their pages of advertisements served as "streetcars of the mind" that led directly to "the great consumers' palaces," the department stores. In the country, rural free delivery made it possible for farm folk, using that "Bible of the new rural consumption communities," the Sears-Roebuck catalogue, also to join the "everywhere communities of consumers and national-brand buyers who would never meet." In these consumption communities each man was attached "only by the thinnest of threads and by the most volatile, switchable loyalties, to thousands of other Americans in nearly everything he ate or drank or drove or read or used." The total result, Boorstin argues, was an alteration of "human experience itself, the very meaning of community, of time and space, of present and future."

THOUGH this remarkable book has already found a large popular audience, it is safe to predict that it, like its predecessors, will have very little impact upon the historical profession in the United States. There is no "Boorstin school" of historiography, no coterie of loyal disciples and imitators. Even when Boorstin was a professor at the University of Chicago he had few graduate students completing dissertations under his direction; as director of the National Museum of History and Technology—a post he recently left—he has had none. The pages of the *Journal of American History* and the *American Historical Review* are not filled with essays testing and evaluating the theses Boorstin has advanced in *The Americans;** indeed, the leading

DAVID HERBERT DONALD *is Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard.*

* John P. Diggin's "Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The Burden of Daniel J. Boorstin," in *American Historical Review,* Vol. 76 (February 1971), pp. 99-118, is only apparently an exception. It gives passing reference to the two volumes of *The Americans* then published but deals primarily with Boorstin's *The Genius of American Politics.*

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Did you know that the Bar Mitzvah ceremony is unknown in the Bible and Talmud? (see page 57) That Judaism frowns on celibacy? (see page 81) That the mystical Kabbalah has doctrines in common with Hinduism? (see page 389)



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

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historical journals have not always bothered even to review the books.

For this curious situation it would be easy to place all the blame upon the history professors. By and large a serious-minded lot, they are put off by authors, like Boorstin, who have a sense of humor. Perhaps, too, they suspect that anybody who writes as well as Boorstin cannot be entirely sound. Concerned more with forces and movements than with individuals, they dislike Boorstin's technique of telling his tale through biographical vignettes, like his brilliant brief portraits of George Washington Seldon, the man who patented the internal combustion motor, and G. Stanley Hall, the originator of child psychology in America. Finally, history professors are busy people; when they read the work of other historians, they tend to choose short, analytical books with clear-cut controversial theses, rather than a long, subtle, and elaborate argument like that of *The Americans*. It is not accidental that among historians Boorstin's most influential publication is also one of his briefest: *The Genius of American Politics* (1953).

But Boorstin himself has been in part responsible for the indifference with which the historical profession has received his vast trilogy. Announcing that his purpose in writing it was "to see what our civilization promises, and what unsuspected possibilities it may reveal," he nowhere explains what methods he used to attain his goal, what standards he employed in selecting his data. Boorstin's version of the American experience may well be correct; but it is a unique and highly personal interpretation, not subject to testing by other scholars.

It is, moreover, an interpretation that does not rest heavily upon historical data. For all Boorstin's formidable learning, he is not much concerned with the chronological development of ideas and institutions. For example, his account of life insurance in America begins with a happy vignette of Elizur Wright, the pre-Civil War insurance reformer, skips hastily to a portrait of Henry B. Hyde of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, and then rushes to conclusions about the democratizing effect insurance has had upon society as a whole. Boorstin thus uses the past only to illuminate the present; he reaches back into history less for proof of his assertions than for the anecdote or biographical detail that will, in W. S. Gilbert's words, give verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.

It is, moreover, harder for professional historians to accept Boorstin's vision of America because it has so markedly changed during the writing of this trilogy. *The Americans* began as a celebration of our nation, as a tribute to a people so vibrant and promising that not even their warts could disfigure their true beauty. Even in *The Democratic Experience* Boorstin often reverts to this boosterish tone. He clearly admires his go-getters, his hucksters, his captains of industry, even when—or perhaps especially when—they were slightly shady. He rejoices at the perfection of American technology. But increasingly a note of pessimism and discouragement has become evident in Boorstin's writing. Advances in technology have puzzlingly not been accompanied by advances in civilization. "Democratizing everything enlarged the daily experience of millions," he continues to argue, but he also admits: "spreading meant thinning." "Was it inevitable that a democratized experience, however rich and technologically sophisticated, should be impoverished?" he now asks sadly. "Was there an inherent contradiction between the aim of democracy—to enrich the citizen's everyday life—and its modern means?"

With such questions Boorstin's central purpose becomes clear. All along he has been writing not history but social philosophy. Perhaps the professional historians have been right in unconsciously sensing that *The Americans* is the work of a first-class mind, but not necessarily of a first-class historical mind. It is not to be compared with the great monuments of American historical scholarship, like Edward Channing's *History of the United States* or Allan Nevins's *Ordeal of the Union*. Instead, it is an astute and learned commentary upon American society and deserves a place on the shelves alongside Crèvecoeur and Tocqueville, Bryce and Laski.

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
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tastes good like a cigarette should.
Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.

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American conductors are a rare breed -especially in America.

In the culture-conscious United States, there is a surprisingly small number of American symphony conductors.

Exxon is trying to help. We're sponsoring the Exxon-Affiliate Artists Conductor program. This program is designed to accelerate the careers of young American conductors, and, at the same time, expose more Americans to fine symphonic music.

The program has already placed six young conductors in residence with the Atlanta Symphony, the San Diego Symphony, the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra, the Pittsburgh Symphony, the National Symphony in Washington, D.C., and the Milwaukee Symphony. They're getting invaluable experience working closely with ranking conductors for a full season.

These young conductors are handling rehearsals. And they're conducting "outreach" concerts for special audiences—in parks and schools for youngsters, in homes for the aged, and in other institutions where the audiences are often unfamiliar with classical music.

They're also working with smaller musical groups in areas around their orchestra's home city. Because one of the aims of the program is to build public support for classical music and symphony orchestras.

And most important to them, these young maestros are conducting the full orchestras in regularly scheduled concerts several times during the season.

We hope Exxon with Affiliate Artists, Inc. will bring many hours of musical pleasure to American audiences. By American conductors.

EXXON

We'd like you to know

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